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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses two broad questions :
1. What environmental, organisational and individual attributes affect the way 
managers scan their business environment?
2. How might a firm organise their environmental scanning function?
The primary data base for this thesis consist of (1). a questionnaire survey covering 
one hundred and eleven managers from sixteen of the largest Malaysian business 
institutions, (2). interviews with thirty-six managers in three of those institutions, and 
(3). on-site observation of the scanning department in two of them.
Even though the data is limited to Malaysian firms, comparison of the results with 
those of previous research on scanning in U. S. corporations suggests that the 
scanning behaviour of the sampled managers and, indeed, the overall nature of their 
managerial functions, closely resembled those of managers in American corporations. 
(During the course of the study, the writer looked for a European or British study on 
scanning, without too much success however, the model adopted for the analysis is of
( ii )
an European origin, namely the Joreskog and Sorbom model). Accordingly, it is 
proposed that the findings of the thesis are not limited to Malaysia but may be 
generalisable across a wider population of managers in business organisations.
The results show that individual level scanning is influenced by the managers' 
perceptions about the characteristics of the environment and about the strategic 
orientation of the firm as well as by personal attributes such as their entrepreneurial 
orientation and experience with diversity. These factors affect the importance assigned 
by them to the scanning function, the amount of time they devote to the task and also 
the foci of their scanning attention.
At the organisational level, it is observed that a firm's scanning system consists of two 
separate and distinct (but interacting) components : a strategic scanning system that 
focuses on long term effectiveness and adaptation and an operational scanning system 
that is closely related to the current task environment and to the objectives of achieving 
short and medium term efficiency. These two systems need different forms of 
organising and, in particular, require different kinds of involvements on the part of 
regular line managers and "expert" scanning staff.
( iii )
Based on this findings, a conceptual model of the organisational learning and 
adaptation process is proposed. Scanning is related to this model through the concept 
of information value-added. Organisations are seen as systems for adding value to 
organisation through the process of recognition, circulation, synthesis, and hypothesis 
formation. The roles of different components of the organisation with regard to each 
of these processes are reviewed and some prescriptive suggestions are made about 
how managers can enhance the scanning capability and effectiveness of a firm.
Copyright by Manuel Melvyn Yunggar, 1990 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and overvmw
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This thesis is concerned to investigate two processes:
(1). How individual managers scan the environment and accordingly investigate the 
effects of different environmental, organisational and personal attributes on the various 
aspects of managerial scanning behaviour, such as the kinds of information acquired, 
the sources used, and the preferred mode and focus of scanning.
(2). How a firm might organise its scanning system, to identify the advantages and 
disadvantages of formalising the scanning mechanism, and to explore how and to what 
extent the acquired information is actually used in organisational decision making.
Environmental scanning has been defined by one authority as "the managerial activity 
of learning about events and trends in the organization's environment" (Collings 
1968), and at the same time extracting, shifting out, and pinpointing crucially useful 
information therefrom in its process of adapting to its surrounding. Pang (1989), 
translates scanning in operational term for the State of Sabah (an East Malaysian state) 
as " . . .  a stock-taking exercise . . .  this amounts basically to identifying the strengths 
and weaknesses (endogenous to the State) as well as opportunities and threats 
(exogenous to the State) to the system in question". Environmental scanning as 
viewed in this thesis, is the organisational activity of getting external information - the 
collective and individual executive's action, a definition which raises the basic 
questions of what is the appropriate unit and level of analysis for a study on scanning.
In the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, and in Malaysia 
specifically, the move towards modernisation and competitiveness is accelerating fast,
1
bringing in its wake rapid technological, economical, social, political and other 
changes. Young et al (1988) observe that indeed changes " . . .  in (the) international 
business patterns are closely aligned to changes in world economic and political 
conditions and the national and international fiscal, monetary, trade and legal 
encironments". Obviously if an organisation does not take the initiative to be cognisant 
of and be adaptive to the changes, or in the words of Young "this complex 
intermeshing", the organisation will, at worst, move ultimately to its demise, or at best 
be just barely able to breakeven, very much at the mercy of a turbulent environment 
(Snyder 1981). On the other hand, it may attempt to modify the environment to 
accommodate its wishes, but such an option is a highly unlikely and difficult strategic 
move in a very competitive environment.
Figure 1:1, illustrate the proposition that the higher the degree of 'cognisance and 
adaptiveness1 the better chances of the firm's survival and growth, over a long period 
of time.
When the degree is at median i.e. X = 5 or SG = 0, ceteris paribus, the chances are 
that the firm may only be able to break even, proceeding in time, either towards X < 5, 
in which event the firm has negative growth (declining), i.e.if the degree of cognisance 
and adaptiveness (Y) moves below 5, or X > 5, in which event the firm has a positive 
growth, i.e.ii Y > 5. ([X = 5] = [SG = 0]).
2
Figure 1:1 - Firm's awareness of the environment
Survival and growth (SG) line
-Firm's survival 
and growth 
point
Probability of 
survival and 
growth in 5 
turbulent 
environment
5 10
Degree of cognisance to and adaptiveness 
with the environment
N o te :
The shape of discrete steps (they could be in any forms or shapes) 
do not represent any particular connotation/meaning except that 
they are intended to convey stages or periods wherein the condition 
of the firm plateaus at a certain point of time (e. g., its industrial 
position or ranking in a particular business locality or area). The 
dynamic environment then cau ses the position or ranking of the 
firm to go up or down the SG line depending on the firm's 
degree of cognisance and adaptiveness to the environment, good 
strategic formulation and implementation, et cetera.
Scanning has been defined as a commencing step or the "mechanism that initiates" the 
organisation in its dynamic on going process of adapting to its surrounding by 
generating an up-to-date database of information, alerting management to what is 
happening by disseminating important information and analyses to key strategic 
decision-makers and influencers (Brownlie, 1989 p21). Young (1987) commenting on 
the speed of internationalisation of Japanese firms, the speed is ". . .related to 
experience domestically . . . that joint ventures with foreign partners in Japan itself
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permitted the Japanese enterprises to learn how to manage multinational enterprises". 
Its importance is well recognised, . .the successful entrepreneur minimises risk by 
increasing his store of information. He indulges in intensive process of information 
gathering from consultants, business friends, sources of finance, market gurus, people 
in the know or people who know people in the know. The quality of his information 
sources and channels is critical to success." (Sweeny, 1989, p2), (see also, for 
example, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Abdul Rahman, 1988, and a number of others 
who have devoted their attention, at least temporarily on this scanning issue).
Environmental scanning, however, is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. There 
is almost an unlimited amount of information out there that an executive wants to 
acquire. Often, however, he or she may not be very certain which information is 
crucially needed for a given tactical and/or strategic purposes. Moreover, not all of 
potentially relevant information is easily obtainable or available at all time. Aguilar 
(1981) provides an interesting framework for visualising the problem of an individual 
manager with regard to information needs (Figure 1:2). A manager receives a vast 
amount of information, on a continuous basis. Box 1 represents the information a 
manager receives. Box 2 represents information that the manager wants.
Obviously, he does not receive all information that he wants and also receives 
information that he does not want. Box 3 represents the information that he needs, but 
all of which he does not necessarily receive. He does not even want all the information 
he needs, because he does not perceive the need. There can also be information he 
receives, needs but does not want. Figure 1:2 depicts this phenomenon.
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Figure 1:2 - Information wants, needs and availability
1
2
3
Box 1 : Information a manager receives 
Box 2 : Information a manager wants 
Box 3 : Information a manager needs
Adapted from Aguilar (1981)
This diagram provides an interesting insight. It shows the deficiencies of an 
information system designed only on the basis of what a manager wants without a 
rational analysis of what information he really needs. The empirical part of this thesis 
will be concerned largely with the methods and systems for collection of information. 
Such a system will normally be biased by what information the managers want and may 
not represent the actual information needs.
Again, there is a semantic question about the term "information". What may be 
"information" to some people may not be so to others, for there is a variety of 
apparently appropriate statements, but none is a universally valid description or
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definition. The reason, according to Otten (1974) is that those various definitions 
reflect subjective and context-dependent concepts of information and are very 
vulnerable to criticism as being incomplete because they do not include the critic's 
subjective point of view. Therefore, it is not easy to determine whether a certain 
phenomenon is "information" enough to be worth looking into - because what prompts 
the individual executive to react is intrinsic to his personality, an accumulation of past 
experiences, values, knowledge, et cetera, which in any particular situation culminates 
in an action,or actions. However, Livingstone (1975) points out (in the context of 
behavioural modification of an executive) that even " . . .  two or three years immersion 
(in an alien/foreign) culture would at most sensitise him to the differences between his 
culture and the company's. It would not transform him . . .  at worst, it might make 
him . . .  depayse, and as a result an alien in two cultures". An organisation scanning 
profile is made up of collective individual executives' scanning actions.
An organisation's executives will, according to Hambrick (1981), only act on "those 
phenomena to which their attention is drawn and since information is so abundant can 
be directed any number of ways but not every way". Aguilar (1967), Kefalas and 
Schoderbek (1973), and others also describe the manner by which scanning is done by 
middle and top level managers: as "an activity carried out consciously or 
unconsciously" and/or on an ad hoc basis in the routine course of their day-to-day 
work, on the one hand, and on the other, it is also an activity that firms organise and 
coordinate, trying to achieve efficiency through division of labour, e.g., by allocation 
of scanning responsibility among operating managers, and also, in some firms, the 
creation of a specialised unit with scanning as its principal function (e.g., a planning 
department, research division, et cetera.)
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The studies on scanning done by scholars like Aguilar (1967), Keegan (1967), 
Collings (1968) and Kefalas and Schoderbek (1973) concentrated on either the 
formalised or informalised aspect of scanning. They are among those who viewed 
scanning as the activity of individual managers attempting to meet their own needs for 
external information. Thomas (1980), Fahey, King and Narayan (1982), and Stubbart
(1982), operationalise scanning as the organisational activity of acquiring external 
information. Diffenbach (1983), Linnenman and Klein (1979) and Kudla (1978) focus 
their works on the formal aspect of organisational scanning and, in particular, on the 
role and functions of special scanning units that are often created by large firms for 
monitoring critical components of the environment. This is one dimension of 
differences that exist in the study of scanning, viz., differences in the unit of analysis. 
Another dimension of such different approaches is based on the purpose of scanning. 
Some studies have considered scanning as the means for acquiring tactical and 
operational intelligence (Fortune, May 14, 1984). Others have viewed scanning as the 
process of acquiring information for effective strategic formulation and have 
concentrated on the role of scanning in evolving long term plans (Klein and Newman,
1983). Some have limited their inquiry only to scanning for competitive intelligence 
(Porter, 1980; Sammon, Kurland and Spitalnic, 1984) while some others have studied 
the methods of scanning as an instrument for forecasting technological changes or for 
managing political risk (Kobrin, 1982).
This thesis is not, intended as a criticism of the individual pieces of research, which 
have often been most insightful and appropriate given the state of the field at the time, 
but is rather the identification of a research opportunity and need - that of trying to 
synthesise these insights in a way that the whole becomes greater than the sum of the 
parts. Hambrick (1981 and 1982) has already initiated this process of concept-building.
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This thesis represents a continuation of the effort, in the context of Malaysia, an Eastern 
country. However, it has to be emphasised that in as much as there is no universal 
applicability of all the management prescriptions/theories but open themselves to 
situationality - norms, tradition, culture et cetera - of the locus of operation, the same is 
true of this study. The problems and techniques of scanning, the findings and 
conclusions derived herefrom are only generalisable to Malaysia and do not necessarily 
(in an absolute term) represent the East in comparison with the West as otherwise can 
be fallaciously generalised/construed or inferred in the comparative findings (on the 
practice of scanning) between those in the U. S. (West) and Malaysia (East).
A literature review follows in the next chapter. At this stage however, it is interesting to 
note that almost every author in this subject expresses regret that too little research 
attention has been paid to this important topic. Aguilar (1967) and Wilensky (1967), 
pioneers of formal research on scanning made this observation in the late 1960's. 
Kefalas and Schoderbek (1973), Thomas (1974), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
repeated the same allegation in early and late 1979's. Hambrick (1981), and Daft and 
Weick (1984) have come to the same conclusions in the 1980's. In other words the 
perception of limited research attention persisted despite the continued research that the 
topic has attracted.
Why is it that scanning research has not grown? Poor quality or the academic tradition 
for ignoring past research can, at best, provide only partial answers to this question. As 
will be argued in the course of the literature review that follows in the next chapter, the 
principal reason for non-cumulation has been that while a rich stock of insights about 
the scanning function has been developed through a series of partial analyses, a broad 
conceptual framework has not emerged from these studies. In the absence of such a
8
framework, the individual research efforts have not lead to the development of a theoiy. 
What the authors above really lament, it can be argued, is not the paucity of research 
but the absence of a theoiy.
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
The physical act of collecting information from the environment is carried out by 
individual members of the organisation. An organisation can only scan through 
individuals. Understanding how individuals carry out the scanning task is therefore an 
important piece of understanding how the organisation scans. However, the 
organisation coordinates the scanning efforts of individuals through the formal 
organisation structure, the allocation of tasks and responsibilities, the formal and 
informal definition of roles, the internal information system and through shared context 
that includes the strategic orientation of the firm, its history and culture, et cetera. The 
organisation affects not only to what aspect of the environment attention is paid, but 
also how the attended sectors are perceived (Weick, 1969). Thus, clearly, there is also 
a need to investigate scanning as an organisational process, and to understand the 
organisational environmental influences that impact upon it. Given that more 
organisations are creating special organisational units for formal environmental analysis 
(Diffenbach, 1983), the analysis of scanning at the firm level must include not only the 
effects that organisation might have on scanning behaviour of managers in general, but 
also the impact such differentiated and specialised scanning units may have on the 
overall process through which environmental information flows into the organisation.
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Finally, scanning is a means, not an end by itself. The organisation can scan the 
environment to reduce uncertainties (Cyert and March, 1963), to learn (Daft and Weick,
1984), and to improve the effectiveness of decisions and choices (Aguilar, 1967); 
Wilensky, 1967). Therefore, any prescriptive suggestions about how firms may 
organise the scanning functions must be based on an understanding of how information 
acquired through the scanning process is actually used within organisations. The 
objective to be stressed here then is the development of a better positive understanding 
at a theoretical level. Given the state of the field, and in view of the objective of this 
thesis (stated in the beginning of this chapter) there exist many interesting and important 
questions that need to be addressed. Some of these are discussed in the context of the 
literature review that follows in the next chapter. However, the choice of the two 
objectives from the rich menu of research questions, to the writer’s thinking, are the 
most suitable as a starting point for developing the integrative conceptual framework 
that makes up the principal objective of this thesis.
As far as the writer is aware, virtually all previous investigations on scanning have been 
carried out in the United States. Based on such studies, usually within one industry in 
the U.S., broad generalisations have been made about scanning behaviour of managers 
and about scanning practices of firms. The field research of this thesis was conducted 
entirely in Peninsular Malaysia and the State of Sabah and Sarawak, henceforth referred 
to only as Malaysia. The choice of Malaysia as the research venue offers a number of 
benefits and adds to the contribution to study. Malaysian firms, as argued in a later 
chapter, face particularly severe scanning requirements and their coming into the 
limelight of the international business arena could severely be handicapped by the 
absence of effective and efficient scanning systems. This makes a study of those 
systems useful, particularly for deriving prescriptive suggestions. As well as 
comparing the findings in Malaysia with those previous studies in the Unites States,
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there is an additional advantage in making or creating a larger and more diverse 
database and this facilitates generalisation and theory building. There is also the 
personal reason for the choice of Malaysia, as the writer's country of origin. On one 
hand, this enhances a richer understanding of the (scanning) situation there, for 
example the cultural aspect and other issues inherent or unique to the place, that arises 
in connection with the subject of the research; on the other hand, the over 
familiarisation of the location, can also be construed as bias and hence an impediment 
to the study. But what and/or however this is seen, it is hoped that good overall parts 
exceed those small parts that may impede the reliability and enhancement of the study.
This study is structured along three sequential but inter-related stages. First, a broad 
conceptual framework is proposed, based on a review of the relevant literature. The 
framework identifies different attributes of individual and organisational level scanning 
and suggests different factors that may influence or be influenced by those attributes. In 
this sense, this starting framework is a little more than a laundiy list of variables and 
issues of interest.
In the second component, data on these variables is collected from a sample of 111 
managers in 26 Malaysian institutions. Analysis of this data lends to a reduction of the 
initial framework to a more parsimonious and formalised model of individual level of 
scanning behaviour.
Finally, case descriptions of the scanning activities of two big business institutions are 
used in conjunction with the individual level model to make some tentative prescriptive 
suggestions about how the scanning function can be organised, institutionalised and 
implemented in large organisations and also to propose theoretical construct that relates
11
scanning to the strategic and structural contexts of the firm.
THESIS OUTLINE
In this introductory chapter, the outline of the research objectives is presented to 
provide the overview of the research strategy. In the next chapter, the relevant literature 
review and the conceptual framework is developed for the starting point of the inquiiy.
The third chapter is devoted to research design. Two separate methodologies are 
adopted for the two level of analyses. To develop an analytical understanding of 
individual level scanning behaviour, a self administered questionnaire is used, for 
understanding the scanning function at the organisational level, a situational studies 
using interviews and observation is employed. In this chapter, the research instrument 
is being explained and also the description of the respondents to the questionnaire 
survey. The sample raises interesting issues about what might be the appropriate unit 
and level of analysis and it will be seen that the individual manager rather than the 
institution is the most suitable unit for analysing the survey data.
The demographic description of the respondents outlined in chapter three is perhaps not 
by itself adequate to develop a frame of reference about the sampled managers against 
which the research findings can be interpreted. An understanding of the nature of the 
work they do, the writer suggests, is useful both for understanding who the manager is 
and also for identifying their similarities and differences with other managerial 
population of interest, for example those in the United States, where the study of 
scanning originated.
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Chapter four, is a description of the responding managers in terms of their work, and a 
comparison of the findings with those of Mintzberg’s study on the "nature of 
managerial work" conducted in the United States, is made. The similarities in the 
findings suggest that the present study's observation about scanning at the individual 
and organisational levels may have some relevance for managers and institutions 
outside Malaysia even though at the present time this claim cannot be fully substantiated 
theoretically, given the technical limitations of the sample.
The principal objective of this study is to develop an analytical understanding of 
scanning behaviour and its dependence on different environmental, organisational and 
individual attributes. Chapter five introduces these explanatory variables and also the 
explanation of their various measurements in the research design. In most cases, the 
variables are complex theoretical constructs, arising out of the combination of a number 
of responses and the chapter also deals with issues of scaling and reliability of the final 
measures.
The following four chapters are devoted to the individual level of analysis. Chapter six 
describes the overall attitude of the managers toward the task of scanning: how 
important it is perceived to be, and how much time is devoted to it. In chapter seven, 
the writer describes the context of scanning for the sample of Malaysian managers - the 
kind of information they collect, the sources they use and how both are affected by 
individual differences in personal attributes as well as in perception about the 
environment and the organisation. Then the writer juxtaposes the factors and sources to 
develop a profile of how external information flows into an organisation. The results of 
all these analyses are also, where possible and appropriate, compared with results 
studies on scanning behaviour of American managers.
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In chapter eight, scanning is related to the interpretation process described by Daft and 
Weick (1984) and an attempt is made to test the contingencies suggested in their model. 
While some aspects of the model are confirmed, others are not, at least in respect of 
Malaysian managers. However, the findings about how scanning modes are affected 
by managerial perceptions of the organisation and the environment, the writer suggests, 
may have significant implication for practice. Causation, in organisational behaviour, is 
rarely, if ever, unidirectional. Thus, if a certain kind of strategic orientation of the firm 
given certain environmental characteristics (actual or perceived), results in certain ways 
of scanning, it is entirely plausible that inducing certain ways of scanning, given certain 
environmental conditions, may lead to a change in the institution's strategic orientation. 
In other words, inducing specific scanning modes can be an effective instrument for 
creating strategic change.
Chapter nine, the last of the four at the individual level of analysis, pulls together the 
findings of the previous three to build up a structural model of scanning behaviour in an 
attempt to explain the variations in the way managers scan in terms of the explanatoiy 
variables develop in chapter five. The data is not longitudinal and neither is the design 
of this thesis experimental or quasi-experimental. Thus the ability of the data generated 
to infer causation is limited. Moreover, structural equation models cannot confirm 
causation but can only disprove it  Thus the most that can be claimed about the model is 
that it suggests interesting hypotheses, most of which are consistent with theory- 
derived expectations. However, not all are consistent, for the relationship between task 
structure and scanning behaviour that emerges from the data is counter-intuitive, 
suggesting an interesting future research direction.
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In chapter ten, the level analysis is organisational. It attempts to demonstrate that even 
within the same organisation, there exists a wide range of scanning behaviour among 
managers and this suggests the need to organise the scanning function so as to provide 
a degree of coordination. Further, most of the information collected by one manager is 
perceived as important and useful for others, thus generating a communication need that 
also demands an organisational arrangement. The writer reviews how the function is 
organised in a large Malaysian institution and, based on observational interview data, 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the system. This analysis lays the foundation 
for certain prescriptive recommendations that the writer makes about how the scanning 
process can be organised in a large institutions.
The eleventh and final chapter summarises the finding and draws out the major 
theoretical and practical implications of the study. Scanning is an instrument for 
organisational learning and adaptation. In this chapter, the writer proposes a conceptual 
model of the organisational learning process and relate the findings on scanning in 
terms of this model. The model serves as the basis for suggesting the role that the top 
management of a firm might play in enhancing the scanning effectiveness. Finally, the 
chapter of the thesis concludes with a review of the need for follow-up research that 
emerges from this study.
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Chapter Two 
Literature review and conceptual 
framework
CHAPTER TWO
ENVIRONMENTAL SCANNING:
A VIEW FROM ORGANISATIONAL THEORY
The middle of this century saw a major turning point in the history of management and 
organisation theory. Till then, management research was mostly descriptive and the few 
efforts for developing theories were largely limited to searches for universal principles 
of management, in the belief that ultimately there was "one best way" of managing 
organisations. Weber (1947), while conceding that bureaucratic structures and controls 
could have certain dysfunctional properties, implied that these structures were 
appropriate for all organisational settings. Taylor (1911), similarly, viewed his 
principles of scientific management as universally applicable. Most management 
theorists, at least up to the 1930's either ignored the external environment, or held it 
constant thus viewing organisations essentially as closed systems (see Miles, Snow 
and Pfeffer, 1974, p. 245 for detailed discussion).
One of the most important post World War 2 breaks from classical management 
concepts was the emergence of the open system view of organisations which was in 
sharp contrast to the previous quest for the "one best way" of management. 
Conceptually, the open system approach attempted to relate the various parts of the 
organisation to the whole and the whole to the rest of the environment, visualising the 
organisation as a "socio-technical system" existing in a state of dynamic equilibrium 
within a changing environment. Over the last four decades, this view of organisations 
has emerged as the principal paradigm in the field of management theory through the 
pioneering work of scholars such as March and Simon (1958), Cyert and March 
(1963), Emery and Trist (1965), Thompson (1967), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), and 
Bertalanffy (1968).
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One of the more persuasive accompaniment of the open systems theory is the need for 
organisations to monitor developments in their external environments so as to create and 
maintain what Selznick (1957) calls "dynamic adaptation" and Thompson (1967) labels 
"co-alignment". Irrespective of whether the managerial role is considered to be pro­
active or reactive, acquisition, analysis and use of external information remain as key 
tasks in the overall management process. The only exception is if we accept the more 
extreme versions of the natural selection view {e.g., Aldrich, 1979 or Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977). From their writings it can be argued that ". . . both the source of 
variation in organisational strategy and structure and the process through which 
information about the environment is obtained are of little important" (Kobrin, 1982,: 
p i6). The theoretical arguments in this debate between the deterministic and 
voluntaristic approaches to organisation theory are well known and need not be repeated 
here (see Astley and Van de Ven 1983 for a review). The debate, so far, has been based 
chiefly on ideologies and beliefs of individual scholars with anecdotes as supporting 
evidence. An understanding of the role and utility of scanning may be useful as a 
starting point for a more analytical evaluation of these alternatives perspectives. For 
instance, empirical evidence that persistently successful firms devote substantial 
resources on a continuing basis for scanning their environments would be inconsistent 
with the deterministic model, at least in its extreme form. Further, evidence that 
information so collected can be, and is, used by firms to take pro-active steps that on 
ex-post analysis, proves to be beneficial, would provide support to the voluntaristic 
school. Viewed from this perspective, a study of the scanning behaviour of firms and 
of the effect of scanning on decision making can make a significant contribution to the 
field of organisation theory.
The open system view is more of a paradigm than a theory. A number of specific 
theories about organisations and organisation designs have been proposed, based on 
this paradigm. Two of these, the information processing theory of Selznick (1957) and 
the model of organisations as an interpretation system Galbraith (1977), are of particular
17
relevance to a study on the scanning behaviour of a firm.
Organisations as Information Processing Systems
The view of an organisation as an information processing system is receiving increasing 
theoretical and empirical attention in the literature on organisation theory (Daft and 
Macintosh, 1981). Derived from the open system concept, this suggests that 
organisations develop information processing mechanisms as a means of dealing with 
internal and external sources of uncertainty (Tushman and Nadler 1978). Information 
processing, in this context, entails the gathering, interpreting and synthesis of 
information for decision making process. Galbraith (1977) has theorised that 
information processing reflects uncertainty created by diverse activities and goal 
difficulty. Variables in the design of organisations such as structural self-containment 
and vertical information system, according to him, should provide sufficient capacity to 
meet information needs. Tushman and Nadler have proposed that organisational 
effectiveness is a function of the fit between the uncertainty of organisational structure 
to provide participants with required information.
Empirical studies have indicated that the external environment represents one source of 
variation in information processing requirements. In general, complex environments 
require more information processing than simple environments (Tushman, 1978, 1979; 
Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). This relationship is the basis for theories that relate task 
uncertainty to structure (Galbraith). In an era of increasing environmental complexity, 
the key to organisational effectiveness, according to this view, lies in the ability to 
acquire, interpret and use information so as to manage and minimise the process of 
increasing external uncertainties.
Organisations as Interpretation Systems
Daft and Weick (1984) have argued that most prevalent views about organisations tend
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to be over simplistic. They have proposed a view of organisations as interpretation 
systems which must "differentiate into highly specialised information receptors that 
interact with the environment". Organisations, according to the authors, are highly 
complex systems wherein "information about the external world must be obtained, 
filtered, and processed into a central nervous system of sorts, in which choices are 
made. The organisation must find ways to know the environment. Interpretation is a 
critical element that distinguishes human organisations from lower system".
Daft and Weick also have suggested that the organisational interpretation process can be 
organised into three stages that constitute the overall learning system [Figure 2:1]. The 
first stage is scanning, which is defined as the process of monitoring the environment 
and providing environmental data to managers. In the next step, data is given meaning 
through the process of interpretation - of sharing perceptions and construction of 
cognitive maps. Learning, the third stage, is distinguished from interpretation by the 
concept of action: "Learning involves a new response or action based on the 
interpretation".
Figure 2:1 - Organisations and Interpretation Systems
SCANNING
[Data collection]
LEARNING 
[Action taken]
INTERPRETATION 
[Data given meaning]
Daft and Weick (1984) propose a model of organisational interpretation using two key 
dimensions: (1). The managers’ belief about the analysability of the external
environment (assumption about the environment), and (2). the extent to which the 
organisation intrudes into the environment to understand it (organisational 
intrusiveness). The authors argue that organisations reflect different scanning
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characteristics, interpretation processes and, hence, strategy and decision making 
behaviour which can be analytically related to these dimensions. In other words, they 
suggest that scanning behaviour is influenced by perceptions about the environment and 
strategic orientation of the firm - a proposition that is yet to be tested but, if verified, 
could develop a far more analytical understanding of the phenomenon than currently 
exists through the limited number of mostly descriptive studies that have been 
conducted on these topics.
Environmental Scanning and the Information Cycle
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) review literature on organisation-environment relationship 
and conclude that scanning is a key topic for explaining organisational behaviour. As 
yet however scant attention has been paid to it by management researchers on 
environmental scanning process.
The preceding brief review of a few major themes in organisation theory is aimed at 
demonstrating the importance of scanning in some of the modern views about 
organisation and management. While arguments and citations can be marshalled almost 
endlessly to support the contention which is about to be made here, it may be more 
efficient merely to state it as a widely accepted starting premise for this thesis: over the 
last four decades, importance of external information has increased enormously for all 
organisations. This has been due, on one hand, to the accelerating rate of change 
(Toffler, 1970) and, on the other, to the increasing awareness of the importance of 
organisation-environment interdependencies.
A parallel process that has occurred over approximately the same period is an explosion 
in the generation and availability of information. Sociologist Daniel Bell writes that 
ours ”is a rare moment in cultural history when we can self-consciously witness a large 
scale social transformation". The change Bell refers to is the "informatisation of
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society", propelled by the convergence of spectacular progress in both computer and 
telecommunication technologies. The resultant "information deluge" has been 
documented by Weinberg (1963), Drucker (1964), Toffler (1970), Cleveland (1982) 
and many others and has since become a widely known and accepted phenomenon. 
One of its consequences is that managers today face a twin problem - on one hand, they 
need more and more external information to carry out their tasks effectively and, on the 
other, they face a serious information overload that far surpasses their cognitive 
capacity.
Given this problem, it can be argued that every organisation today, requires a system, 
either formal or informal, for effective information management. The system as 
suggested by Montgomery and Weinberg (1979), can be viewed in terms of the 
information cycle (Figure 2:2). The first step in the process is to identify information 
needs, lay down priorities, and to decide on the indicators to be monitored. The 
identification of needs leads to the next step : that of collecting and gathering the 
information.
The collected information then needs to be processed and analysed before it is ready for 
dissemination and use. The use, in turn, determines further information needs and 
feeds back into the cycle.
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Figure 2:2 - The Information Cycle
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The term "scanning" is usually used to denote the activity of information acquisition. 
The definition encompasses only the first two steps of the cycle. But, each stage of the 
cycle is inter-related with all others and it is impossible to meaningfully analyse or 
research on, to the total exclusion of others.
Thus, in this thesis, while the focus is clearly on the process of acquisition of external 
information, a relatively broader view is taken to relate the acquisition process to the 
other stages of the information cycle. To that extent, the information cycle or the 
"interpretation process" is the broad arena of this dissertation.
PREVIOUS STUDY ON SCANNING
In the late 1960’s the Harvard Business School pioneered research on the topic of
/
scanning which had led to useful insights on how individual managers acquired external 
strategic information (Aguilar, 1967; Keegan, 1967; Collings, 1968). It was found that
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market information dominates the scanning function in domestic firms but regularity 
factors and broad social and political issues assume greater importance for 
multinationals. Managers were found to make far more use of outside sources than 
inside sources and to rely largely on their personal network of contacts for meeting their 
information needs (these conclusions are also supported by the findings of Kotter, 
1982; and Mintzberg, 1973). Most information was found to be obtained unsolicited 
and through relatively passive and undirected surveillance rather than through 
structured and active search.
After several years of relative neglect, research attention on scanning has been growing 
from the mid-1979's but the level of analysis has changed to the organisation. All these 
studies have, however, focussed only on the formal scanning systems of firms as 
represented through a scanning or environmental analysis unit. Out of these studies has 
emerged an improved awareness of the factors that help and hinder effectiveness of 
such formal scanning organisations (Diffenbach, 1983; Stubbart, 1982).
A combined top-down and bottom-up approach has been found to be essential for 
success of the scanning function. The chances of success of a scanning unit have been 
found to increase substantially if a senior, experienced and respected executive is made 
responsible for the unit. On the other hand, changes in top-management, 
decentralisation, tight financial controls and entrusting scanning to new or junior 
personnel have been found to diminish effectiveness of the formal environmental 
analysis unit. Organisational resistance to the unit has also been found to reduce to the 
extent that specialised scanning functionaries provide information early before prestige 
and careers get committed on particular decisions. The most important problem areas in 
scanning have been identified as difficulties in establishing information needs, 
difficulties in interpreting information in terms of relevance to the organisations and 
difficulties in integrating scanning with planning or decision making process.
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Recent research has also built up a large body of evidence that suggests such formal 
environmental scanning is receiving increasing attention in business organisations, 
particularly in large business organisations. Over seventy three percent of Fortune 500 
firms in the United States have been found to use formal environmental analysis 
(Diffenbach, 1983). There has been a rapid growth in the use of special techniques 
such as Multiple Scenario Analysis (Linnenman and Klein, 1979) and in the integration 
of scanning with corporate planning (Kudla, 1978). Special organisations have sprung 
up to provide needed scanning services (Fortune, May 14, 1984). Formal scanning 
with twenty to one hundred staff members have also existed for over a decade in many 
MICs (Thomas, 1980) and an increasing number of firms are found to be establishing 
such units.
Normatively, most authors agree that routine surveillance of the environment by 
operational managers in the regular course of their work is a major source of 
environmental information for most firms (Collings, 1968; Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 
1982). Unfortunately, however, most empirical investigations into the organisational 
scanning function have been concerned only with the formal scanning process and there 
is no documentation of how this informal organisation-wide surveillance mechanism 
functions. Further, as argued in the first chapter, scanning is the means to an end, not 
and end by itself. The effectiveness of an organisational scanning system depends on 
the use that the acquired information is put to. Between scanning and use lie the process 
of communication, interpretation and analysis (Montgomery and Weinberg, 1979). 
There is little evidence in the literature that any systematic empirical attention has been 
paid to the systems through which these functions are carried out in an organisational 
setting.
If detailed descriptions of scanning practices are rare, normative and prescriptive models 
of scanning systems abound in the academic literature (e.g., Muarry, 1972, Thomas 
1974; Cleland and King, 1975; Hills and Cravens, 1975; Neubauer and Solomon, 
1977; Montgomery and Weinberg, 1979; Kalff, 1980; Klein and Newman, 1983;
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provides a detailed review of all the models that predate this thesis). Most of these 
proposals seem to fall into two broad categories. First, there are a number of 
suggestions about monitoring the immediate task domain of the organisation - the "Area 
of Influence," as Montgomery and Weinberg (1979) call it. An extreme version of 
these provide a laundry list of "How to Snoop on Your Competitors" (see Fortune, May 
14, 1984). The methods are often barely legal (for example, conducting phoney job 
interviews with competitor’s employees or getting customers to put out phoney bid 
requests) or highly esoteric (such as measuring rust on the rails of railroad siding 
leading to competitors plans for determining shipment volumes). The more modem and 
analytical schemes within this category seem to be largely modeled on Professor 
Michael Porter's influential work on formulating competitive strategies (Porter, 1980). 
He himself dwells at length in the book about scanning requirements and methods for 
effective industry and competitive analysis. Practitioners and consultants have since 
developed his concepts of a business intelligence system in more practical terms and a 
book by Sammon, Kurland and Spitalnic (1984) provides a comprehensive review of 
various "hands on" approaches for monitoring the immediate task environment.
The other type of prescriptive models focus on long term objectives of the firm and 
suggest scanning requirements for supporting a long term planning system. A recent 
and representative example of such a scheme is SPIRE - Systematic Procedure for 
Identifying Relevant Environments - suggested by Harold Klein and William Newman
(1983). The methods suggested by these authors depend on the concerned manager 
being able to generate a list of key strategic planning components, another list of 
environmental factors felt to have an impact on those components, and finally a set of 
linkage statements about the nature of those impacts. These statements are then 
computer analysed to arrive at a broad groups of environmental factors that have similar 
impacts on different strategic planning components as well as different components that 
are similarly affected by key environmental factors. This analysis leads to the
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construction of a flow chart diagram representing the important environmental dynamics 
for each set of clustered strategic planning components. These environmental factors, in 
turn, define the firm's scanning domain.
Only recently some researchers have started looking at scanning as a process rather than 
as a function and exploring the links between scanning and other organisational 
processes. The most significant empirical effort has been Hambrick's (1981 and 1982) 
who has investigated the effect of organizational strategy on scanning behaviour and of 
scanning on internal distribution of power. Overall, he failed to confirm the hypothesis 
of a strategy-scanning link but, as pointed out by Hambrick himself, this could have 
been due to the nature of his sample or because of measurement difficulties.
Figure 2:3 represents the conceptual framework that, to borrow a phrase from 
Roethlisberger et al (1939), served as a walking stick in doing this thesis inquiring into 
the phenomenon of scanning. This is not a model that in this thesis the writer propose 
to test in any formal sense here. It is merely a shorthand summary of the literature that 
being constructed as a guide to identify issues and variables of interest. Implicit in the 
framework, are a series of preoccupation about the scanning behaviour of individuals 
and organisations. These preoccupations, however, fall short of being testable 
hypotheses since the variables themselves span different units and level of analyses. 
The principal functions that the framework served were to direct the process of data 
collection and to provide a starting point for data analysis.
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Figure 2:3 - Conceptual Framework
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In this section, the framework is explained briefly. Each of the variables in the 
framework and all the associations suggested in it are explained somewhere in this 
thesis, i.e., in the section where data related to those variables are analysed. In the 
course of the research, the writer follows the approach of inductive sense-making by 
iterating through the data and the concepts, and the data clarified the concepts just as 
much as it tested them. It is this interactive exploration that is presented in chapter four 
and nine. This exposition is facilitated by presenting the concepts along with the data. 
Besides, such a form of presentation is also a more accurate representation of the actual 
research process.
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The Dependent Variable: Scanning Attributes
Organisational scanning is a multifaceted activity. That, as discussed in the introductory 
chapter, is a starting premise of this thesis. To understand the scanning function in a 
large firm, one must study the scanning behaviour of the general body of operative 
managers, at the micro level, and also the scanning organisation of the firm, both formal 
and informal, at the macro level. In other word, the organisational scanning system 
must be represented through a set of individual level parameters and also through a set 
of organisational level parameters.
At the individual level, the traditional parameters have been the kinds of information 
acquired (the factors), the sources used, the extent of surveillance versus search 
(scanning mode), and the manager’s involvement with the scanning task (perceived 
importance of scanning and the time devoted to this activity). These parameters, first 
proposed by Aguilar (1967) and adopted by almost all researchers investigating 
individual level scanning, have been very useful in developing a descriptive 
understanding of the scanning behaviour of managers.
One difficulty encountered in dealing with these parameters, however, has been that 
they have not led to generalisations in an analytically meaningful way. These 
parameters do not have any underlying theoretical construct, nor has it been possible to 
build up a ground-theory based on them. The writer of this thesis would add one more 
to this list of individual level parameters: the extent of domain-focus. The construct is 
built on two of the existing parameters, viz., the kinds of information acquired and the 
sources used. Domain-focus refers to the extent to which the manager's scanning 
activities are limited to the current task-domain. It is contrasted with scanning 
behaviours that look beyond the task domain to the broader environment within which 
the firm operates.
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The origin of this parameter lies in an apparent contradiction in the firm behaviour. 
Most organisations of any size have fairly extensive systems for long term planning and 
most of these systems are designed to achieve the "rationality" implied in the normative 
planning models (e.g., Ansoff, 1977). Yet, empirical evidence shows that the outputs 
of such systems are not fully "autonomous" (Burgleman, 1983) and that existing 
structure and strategy affect future strategy leading to what Mintzberg (1978) calls 
"emergent" strategies of organisations. The contradiction to be explained is how 
"emergent" strategies emerge out of the "rational" process of formal planning that most 
big business institutions adopt.
The extent of domain-focus in managerial scanning behaviour, it is suggested here, can 
provide an explanation of this apparent contradiction. If scanning is entirely limited to 
the current domain of the firm, the information base on which future strategy is 
determined is limited to the current activities of the firm. This constraint, as will be 
argued in later chapter, can lead, at best, to incremental strategies (Quinn, 1980) or, at 
worst, to "muddling through" (Braybrooke and Lindbloom, 1963).
At the organisational level, as is argued in this and the earlier chapter, one must look at 
the way the scanning of individual managers is organised, formally or informally, and 
also at the role and functions of the specialised scanning units that have come to exist in 
most large business institutions. These are the two principal components of the 
organisational scanning system and must be analysed independently. But the two 
components are also mutually interactive and such interactions form the third and, in 
retrospect, perhaps the most important parameter of the organisational scanning 
mechanisms.
The Influencing Variables: Individual, Organisations and Environmental Attributes.
A commencing premise in this thesis is that scanning behaviour of individual 
organisations may be affected by a host of individual, organisational and environmental
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attributes. Previous studies on scanning have already suggested some of these 
influencing variables. Research in the fields of cognitive psychology, business policy 
and organisational behaviour suggest a number of others that have so far not been 
considered in scanning studies.
The individual characteristics included in the framework of this thesis are organisational 
roles (i.e.,level in the management hierarchy and departmental affiliation), past history 
and background, and the individual's strategic orientation. (There is no assumption of 
the attributes being independent).
Aguilar (1967), Collings (1968), Keegan (1967), Kefalas and Schoderbek (1975) and 
Hambrick (1982), among others, have demonstrated the influence of management level 
and departmental affiliation on individual scanning behaviour. The possibility that the 
background of managers, and, particularly, their exposure to diversity and their 
perception of success may affect scanning behaviour is derived from the suggestions 
and findings of Schroeder, Driver and Streufert (1968); Keen 1973; Hogarth (1980). 
Wide experience with diversity can enhance an individual's cognitive complexity, thus 
improving his/her ability to comprehend and integrate diverse pieces of information and 
to tolerate and deal with ambiguity. Perception of success can, similarly, permit 
innovation and boldness in decision making and a wider level of search beyond the 
immediate problem area (i.e.,beyond problematic search as defined by Cyert and 
March, 1963). Finally, the possibility of the individual's strategic orientation 
(entrepreneur versus trustee) affecting the way scanning is carried out arises out of the 
arguments of Stevenson (1984) and other researchers on entrepreneurial behaviour. 
While individual behaviour is affected by individual attributes, it is also shaped by the 
characteristics of the environment and the nature of the organisation to which the 
individual belong. Organisations and managers dealing with non-complex 
environments may have fewer critically important information categories required for 
decision making. They may not require complex scanning system. On the other hand,
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organisations facing complex environments may need extensive scanning of individual 
or cluster of sectors in the environment. Further, in a stable enwrrmrnpnt e rm in e
environment, surveillance of the task environment may constitute a larger component of 
the scanning activity. Theoretically, these arguments follow from proposals of 
Thompson (1967) and Galbraith (1977). Empirically, earlier on, the findings of Fahey 
and King (1975) and Kefalas and Schoderbek (1973) provide at least limited supporting 
evidence.
The effect of a firm's strategy on its scanning system and on the scanning behaviour of 
its managers have been proposed and tested by Hambrick (1981). Put simply, the more 
analytically a firm is oriented, the more extensive is its scanning system may be 
expected, since scanning provides an input for carrying out such analysis. A 
prospecting firm (Miles and Snow, 1978), in contrast, may depend more on 
experimentation and trial and error and may show lesser scanning intensity. These are 
the influencing variables which are included in the framework. This is not an 
exhaustive list and there may be a number of other factors that can affect how managers 
and organisations scan their environments. In the final analysis, choice of these and not 
the other variables for inclusion in the framework is a subjective decision based on best 
judgement, keeping in view the conflicting demands for parsimony and completeness.
Finally, in organisation behaviour, causation is rarely if ever, unidirectional. Thus, 
while the scanning parameters may be influenced by the individual, organisational and 
environmental attributes, the relationships may well be a confounded simultaneity 
problems. For example, if organisational strategy affects scanning by determining what 
kind of information is perceived as needed, the aspects of the environment that are paid 
attention to, is also affected by scanning, for strategy is both autonomous and emergent
may be less domain constrained and may depend more on search, while in a dynamic
Feedback
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and the "formation of strategy depends on information acquired through scanning" 
(Mintzberg, 1978; Burgleman, 1983). This interdependence is shown in the framework 
through the feedback loop.
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Chapter Three 
Research design and implementation
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The field research for this study was conducted entirely in Malaysia, between July, 
1988 and December, 1988. The principal reason for the choice of Malaysia as the 
research venue was of convenience and familiarisation - being the researcher's home 
country : the ability to speak the language, being familiar with the locality, are among 
the added advantages beside having contacts and almost ready access with many of the 
leading organisational establishments in Malaysia. But, as will be argued in detail later 
in this chapter, selection of the research venue/site offers a number of special benefits. 
Institutions in Malaysia have been uniquely successful in their field, among others in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), if not in the international 
business arena also.
As was mentioned earlier in the introductory chapter, Malaysian institutions experience 
a particularly severe need for environmental scanning and, given their constraints 
compared to their British gurus and other giant competitors like the United States 
(U.S.), and closer home Japan and Korea, et cetera, they seem to be developing good 
scanning mechanisms. As noted earlier on, all past researchers on scanning have 
conducted and used firms in the U.S., and the choice of Malaysian firms allows the 
researcher to add breadth to this body of research as well as to provide a comparative 
dimension to this research study by comparing the findings with those of earlier 
studies.
THE CHOICE OF MALAYSIA
Malaysia, according to Kurian (1987), has one of the most impressive economies in 
Asia after Japan and Singapore. It is one of the upper middle-income countries of the 
world with a free-market economy in which the private sector is dominant.
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Malaysia is of course known as the world's leading producer and exporter of rubber, 
palm oil and tin. It is also a principal exporter of tropical hardwoods beside having a 
large reserves of petroleum and natural gas. Indeed, Malaysia is also one of the most 
resource-abundant countries in Southeast Asia. And just to have a glimpse of its 
economic well-being, the average annual increase of the Gross National Product 
(GNP), measured in constant price, was 7% during the 1961-76 period rising to 8.5% 
in the 1976-80 (Malaysia's Third Plan or Third Malaysia Plan). In 1984, the growth 
rate of its GNP was 7.3%, the highest since the economy retreat in 1981 because of the 
international recession.
The upturn was the result of a two-year programme of structural adjustment undertaken 
by the government with the aim of reducing its budget deficit and the deficit of the 
current account of its balance of payment (BOP). In 1985, however, GNP declined, in 
real terms, by 1.5%. The economy was projected to expand by 5% per annum during 
the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1985-1990), a lower rate of annual growth than the 5% that 
was achieved in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985).
In 1987 a sharp recovery in commodity prices, together with a strong upturn in non- 
agricultural activity, helped to increase real GNP by 5.5%. Malaysia's GNP per capita, 
at current market prices, declined from M$4,581 in 1985 to M$4,088 in 1986, but rose 
to M$4,416 in 1987. The forecast for GNP growth in 1988 is 5.3% (no official figure 
has been computed for this period during the time of writing).
The country has indeed shown (see Figure 3.1a, 3.1b, and 3.1c) a marked progress in 
the last few years, particularly in the area of international trade exposure wherein the 
Uped for scanning is invaluable.
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Figure 3.1a : Malaysian Export (fob) - by p roduct, 1985
Low (1989) describes the Malaysian trade climate as follows : "In the mid-1980s 
export earnings were equivalent to more than one-half of the country's GNP. In 1987 
total exports were 61% of GNP. As growth in mineral exports continued, the mining 
sector replaced the agricultural sector as the chief source of export earnings. Rubber, 
which had been the country's largest export earner since 1960, has been second to 
crude petroleum since 1980 and fell behind sawlogs in 1987. Its share of total exports 
decreased from 16.6% in 1980 to 8.7% in 1987. Exports of logs (including sawn 
timber) and palm oil (including palm kernel oil) provided 13.4% and 8.2%, 
respectively, of total exports in 1987. Manufacturing accounted for 44.8%, crude 
petroleum 13.9%, LNG 3.8% and tin 1.9%. Gross exports reached M$45,176m. in 
1987, while gross imports were M$31,983m., contributing to a surplus on the current 
account of M$5,887m. (equivalent to 8.1% of GNP.), the largest such surplus on 
record. Malaysia's main export outlets are Japan, the USA, ASEAN countries and the 
EEC, which together accounted for 74.6% of total trade, remained Malaysia's principal 
trading partner, with Singapore accounting for 18.2%. Malaysia maintained a 
favourable balance of trade with all its major trading partners".
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Figure 3.1b : Malaysian Export (fob) - by product, 1986
This phenomenal success in multinational business, by itself, makes Malaysia an 
interesting venue for study. What makes it more interesting is the way the progression 
of successes being achieved and, in particular, the role played by the government in its 
Look East Policy, privatisation, et cetera, and in Sabah, East Malaysia the People's 
Development, a concept developed by a Harvard trained Kadazan economist.
The marked difference of the Malaysian management style from that of its UK, USA 
and other counterparts is its engrossment in achieving the New Economic Policy’s 
(NEP) targets - translated in operational term as "the protection of the indigenous' or 
bumiputra's interest, Maung Kyi (1988) describes it as "welfarism".
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Figure 3.1c : Malaysian Export (fob) - by product, 1987
To maintain and improve their position in the different international markets, Malaysian 
firms (mostly government backed or owned) need highly effective scanning systems. 
Their scanning problems, in many ways, are more complex than those of their U.S., 
Japanese, or European competitors. Their domestic markets are smaller and 
considerably less developed. They do not have the extensive internal infrastructure for 
international (e.g., interstate and/or world wide computer link, et cetera) information 
gathering that their older and more established competitors have. They also do not have 
as much support from the government or private scanning and research institutions, as 
do firms in the UK, USA or Europe. Thus, while their scanning requirements are just 
as intensive as those of their competitors, their resources are far less. Despite this 
handicap, if they have done well, as they have, they must be doing something different 
and something right. To the extent that one of the objectives of this research is to evolve 
prescriptive norms for scanning, there are obvious justifications for studying the more 
successful firms for they, rather than the less successful or even the "average" firms, 
are apt to innovate and adopt novel and efficient methods that others might find useful 
to emulate. According to Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) "organizational actors 
are more likely to mimic those organizations to which they have some interpersonal tie
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via boundary-spanning personnel. . .  an organization may mimic those that it thinks 
are particularly successful but more likely it will mimic those organizations that it trusts. 
Interpersonal networks in highly competitive organizational fields are important 
mechanisms to sort out trustworthy information. While environmental conditions 
create the uncertainty that motivates organizational mimicry, it is the network ties of 
boundary-spanning personnel that tell us who they will imitate and thus how they will 
behave”.
Studying Malaysian institutions offers another important benefit. Firms have 
developed to the present stage they are at, through adopting a followership strategy, not 
only for technology and marketing but also in their organisational systems and 
processes. Example worth citing are the practices of a number of institutions in Sabah, 
East Malaysia (see Table 3.2), viz., Sabah Development Bank Berhad, Institute of 
Developmental Studies, the Sabah Foundation, et cetera, emulating the practices of 
having a five-day week work, not having perhaps known the real concepts behind it, 
are now debating whether to revert to the original five and a half day work week. This 
is an example of followership strategy in action. It is the observation of the writer that it 
is a common practice for Malaysian senior executives to make frequent trips to other 
countries to observe organisational systems and then implement them in their own firms 
- a most pronounced aspect of followership and adaptation and strategy being practiced 
in many Malaysian institutions. This is a process of organisational isomorphism of 
sorts (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), for the organisations concerned had to change 
their ways of working so as to match those of their suppliers and customers.
The interesting aspect, however, is that two very different organisational systems have 
been synthesised in the process, as the Malaysian institutions picked and chose systems 
and structures from the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States. For external 
dealings, they adopted largely the United Kingdom practices; for internal management, 
they internalised many aspects of the Japanese and Korean style, about which the
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government is very keen. This is seen, in practice, enshrined in and the tenet of the 
present Look East Policy concept, Malaysia Incorporated, privatisation, et cetera. 
This synthesis of distinct management systems make Malaysian firms unique and 
specially interesting to study.
Malaysian firms are also arguably under-researched and deserve serious academic 
attention. Selecting Malaysia as the venue, therefore, adds a special and interesting 
dimension to this research study; that of developing a better understanding of a new and 
successful phenomenon. The principal problem arising out of the choice of Malaysia as 
the research venue is that the researcher cannot technically, generalise the findings to 
other population of interests such as the United Kingdom managers, et cetera. In 
survey research, generalisation is always limited anyway, because the practice of 
management differs not only in different countries but also among industries in the 
same country, and also even among individual in the same organisation, Maruyama 
(1985)’s mindscapes typology. Ultimately, as argued by Pettigrew (1974), the study 
of management must be situational since the practice of management is situational. 
Therefore, selecting ,a survey sample on the basis of representativeness is not 
technically feasible because managers, unlike elementary particles or national 
currencies, can never be classified into homogeneous populations, irrespective of how 
deeply we segment or how many variables we control for.
In behavioural research, technical generalisability to define populations is not a major 
criterion of research venue in large part, because one can be technically correct only 
when the populations are uninteresting. An alternative objective, the one adopted in 
this study, is to find new ideas and insights; to suggest rather than to prove since proof, 
in the Popperian tradition of positivist falsificationalism, is permanently beyond reach 
(Cook and Campbell, 1979, p 20). As argued by Kidder (1981, p 440), if this be the 
objective, a convenience sample may be no less suitable than a random sample and can, 
often, be more appropriate. If indeed management is a profession, there must be 
underlying similarities that cuts across companies, industries and countries. And, if
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those similarities exists, one can find them no matter where one looks. In other words, 
if there are interesting generalisation that can be made about any management 
behaviour, including scanning, one can find them (but not prove them) in Malaysia, 
just as much as in Scotland or elsewhere.
This argument is developed more extensively in the chapter that follows, with the 
support of the data acquired in this research. The study will attempt to demonstrate that 
for a number of interesting proxy and background variables, the Malaysian managers 
that acted as respondents in this study are no different from Japanese or Scottish 
managers or others studies done by other researchers. Much later on, in this thesis, the 
comparison of the descriptive statistics about the scanning behaviour of Malaysian 
managers with those found in past scanning research using the United States, samples 
show that the two are similar and that the minor differences that exist can easily be 
traced to simple and perfectly understandable reasons. In other words, the underlying 
similarities do indeed exist as revealed by the empirical analysis. Thus, the analytical 
content of this study; the associations and causal relationships found or suggested may 
be generalisable to a much larger population than can be claimed statistically from the 
sample.
DATA COLLECTION
The questionnaire survey covered twenty six organisations from five 
groupings/classifications by types of product/services (Table 3:1). Interviews with one 
hundred and eleven personnel with the rank of senior officers (SO) to managing 
directors (MD) and government cabinet ministers, and detailed in-plant observations, 
are the principal data gathering method use in this thesis.(These institutions are either 
wholly commercial, not wholly commercial, in their nature of operation, and/or 
government owned/backed, or had been privatised).
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Table 3:1 - Group!classification of firms according to 
types of products!services
Group 1 : 
Group 2 : 
Group 3 : 
Group 4 : 
Group 5 :
Financial, Investment and Insurance 
Manufacturing and Engineering 
Chemical, Petroleum, Food and Beverages 
Agriculture, Forestry, Government institutions 
Services industries, viz., hotels, public transport,
airlines, hospitals, et cetera.
The Questionnaire Survey
During the last few months of 1987 and up to May 1988, letters were sent from the 
University of Glasgow, Scotland, asking permission to conduct research survey in one 
hundred and fifty two selected institutions (from five groups by products/services 
classification as in Table 3:1). (a). Asia’s 7500 Largest Companies in 1987, and (b). 
Major Companies of the Far East 1987, Volume 1: South-East Asia. The current 
addresses of the institutions were checked against a list found in the Trade Section of 
the Embassy of Malaysia in London for accuracy (Malaysia at that time i.e. 1987, has 
just adopted the postal coding system). Of the one hundred and fifty two, 
institutions/firms, 82% responded and of those that responded, 73% granted 
permission for the researcher to conduct the survey, the rest, or 9% politely declined. 
Of the twenty seven organisations that did not respond, one government own newly 
privatised firm, in particular, was not sure (was found much later on to be so) of what 
to do about the researcher's request for research survey access, and in the state of 
being uncertain, wrote a letter of verification to the researcher's supervisor Professor J 
M Livingstone, to confirm if indeed the requestor was an authentic bona fide student 
of the University of Glasgow. The researcher found later during the field survey trip 
that the firm is engaged in producing a highly classified product. Additionally the 
researcher has no personal contact in the firm, which culminated into the major cause 
for the much reluctance and uncertainty in the part of the firm and ultimately the very
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polite but firm refusal of access. As the various firms are very geographically scattered 
throughout the country, (see Table 3:2) and again the severe flood that hit the country 
during the month of July to November 1988 made travelling impossible (all 
establishments were closed for weeks and months in several areas), coupled with the 
various year-end annual festivities, the researcher’s movements were very much 
hampered affecting in part the thoroughness of the research in time to return for 
residency at the University of Glasgow, Scotland.
Table 3:2 - Malaysian States and their capital cities - area in square 
kilometer and distance (flight) from Kuala Lumpur.
Distance from Kuala Lumpur 
State Area (sq. km.") Capital state Nautical miles kilometer
Johore 18,986 Johore Bahru 191 354
Kedah 9,426 Alor Star 199 -  368
Kelantan 14,943 Kota Bahru 190 352
Malacca 1,650 Malacca Town NA NA
Negeri Sembilan 6,643 Seramban NA NA
Pahang 35,965 Kuantan 121 224
Pulau Pinang 1,031 George Town 153 283
Perak 21,005 Ipoh .96 178
Perlis 795 Kangar NA NA
Sabah 73,771 Kota Kinabalu 906 1,678
Sarawak 124,449 Kuching 562 1,041
Terengganu 12,955 Kuala Terengganu 172 318
Federal Territory 243 Kuala Lumpur NAp NAp
Note: NA - Not available 
NAp - Not applicable
Source : Wings of Gold, February, 1989.
In-plant Observation
Detailed interviews and in-plant observations were conducted in two large government 
owned and privately backed institutions where the researcher has personal contacts with 
the top level managements who approved the research in plant observation. It may be 
noted at this point that Malaysian firms, generally, are not known to be open for
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research access, particularly when this involves with a lot of asking questions. The 
contacts consented on the understanding that the firm would not be identified by its real 
name in this thesis or elsewhere or the information obtained therefrom not be ’’used to 
discredit the government or the firm" or any findings of the research undertaking 
contravening with the Malaysian law.
Although information could easily be obtained through the various discussions with the 
managers of the sections and/or departments, it was expected that a much richer 
understanding of their system and processes could be acquired through direct 
observation of their work. Accordingly, the researcher spent thirty two days in the 
organisations, observing the activities of the managers/officers and the staff and also 
engaging in detail discussions about what they did, how they did it and the reasons for 
both.
SAMPLE
A total of one hundred and eleven questionnaires were completed during the months of 
the July 1988 to January 1989. Because of the research design, whereby the individual 
respondent filled the questionnaires in the presence of the researcher so that any 
questions pertaining were clarified on the spot, no evaluation of non-response bias is 
possible. On the other hand, that act of filling the questionnaire in the researcher's 
presence, can in itself, be construed as bias, in addition to others of its kind, e.g., 
because the researcher is a government sponsored equipped with letter of introduction 
(authorisation) from the Chief Minister's office of the State Secretary, (Career and 
Training Division). In addition to, in most cases, the researcher who is also known to 
most of the respondents, and would, in the way-of-doing-things in and of that place, 
"lose face", if the prospective respondent refused to answer questions, after initially 
consenting to accommodate the research survey. This is termed as "guli-siku" in the 
major vernacular of the place, which is tantamount to bad manners and produces bad
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omens, a practice to be avoided at all costs by the local people. This case is, not of 
course, applicable to those who refused from the outset. Whatever the nature of the 
biases construed to have marred the validity of the data obtained in this research survey, 
should be viewed as of the nature that is not within the sphere of the researcher's 
willful control.
Age
Out of the one hundred and eleven respondents, one hundred and ten indicated their age 
which varied from twenty four years to fifty six years.
For the purpose of analysis, respondents' age was classified into four categories : 
twenty to thirty, thirty one to forty, fourty one to fifty, and greater than fifty. The 
distribution of the sample by age categories is shown in Table 3:3.
Table 3:3 - Age distribution of respondents
Age Group Frequency
20 to 30 years 15
31 to 40 years 66
41 to 50 years 26
51 and above 3
Education
Out of the one hundred and eleven respondents , one had a PhD degree, twelve held 
Masters' degree, ninety five held Bachelors' degree and one did not complete 
secondary school. Two respondents did not indicate their highest academic attainment.
Thus, overall, the responding managers/leaders represent a well-educated group with 
diverse academic background and a wide range of post-academic experiences.
44
Work
The original design was so made, to get as far as possible, a fair sample of each 
group/function of organisation/institution with equally fair cross sectional 
representation of, at least six, preclassified functional departments. But the design was 
altered by circumstances (mentioned earlier) beyond the control of the researcher. 
Hence the unbalanced distribution in Table 3:4; which tend to bias towards the 
planning function, with 30 representatives from this function, which is 
disproportionate to the relative strength of the planning staff within the surveyed 
institutions.
Table 3:4 - Respondents by functional area.
Functional department Number of respondents Percentage
Finance/Account 7 6.3
Research/Design 9 8.1
MIS 4 3.6
Marketing 32 28.8
General Management 21 18.9
Planning 30 27.0
Others 8 7.2
On the plus side, however, there are at least a few respondents from all the major 
functional areas except MIS which, for the responding firms, is an underdeveloped, 
small and often insignificant function.
Management level
A special plea had been made to the contact person in each institution to ensure 
representation of all management levels. On this score they complied. For the purpose 
of analysis, managers/leaders were re-classified into three groups out of the original 
seven classifications, as follows:
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Chairman (Cabinet Minister), President, 
Managing Director, or equivalent 
designation.
General Manager, Branch/Area Manager,
Senior Manager, or equivalent designation.
Manager, Assistant Manager, Senior Officer, 
or equivalent designation.
Out of the one hundred and eleven respondents, 19% belong to Group 1, 23% belong 
to Group 2, and the remaining 58% belong to Group 3.
The respondents also represent a wide of range work experience. Three measures of 
work experience were recorded - experience in the assignment, experience in the 
firm/company, and total work experience. The distribution is shown in Table 3:5.
Table 3:5 - Work experience of respondents (Percent)
Experience Experience. Total
in assignment in company employment
Number of years
0 to 3 years 49.5 15.3 7.2
4 to 6 years 37.8 15.3 8.1
7 to 9 years 8.1 28.8 18.9
10 to 12 years 4.5 24.3 23.4
13 to 15 years - 8.1 14.4
16 to 18 years - 5.4 12.6
19 to 21 years - 0.9 10.8
22 to 24 years - 1.8 4.5
Note: Numbers of years are rounded to the nearest decimal point.
Experience with diversity
Experience with diversity was operationalised through two measures : language 
capability and experience of living in different countries. About 50% of the 
respondents can communicate in two (Bahasa Malaysia and English) or more 
languages and the rest know only Bahasa Malaysia plus some dialects. About 17%
Group 1 :
Group 2 : 
Group 3 :
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percent of the respondents have lived in at least one foreign country for at least one
year. (Table 3:6):
Table 3:6 - Experience with diversity
1 2 3 4 >4
Number of language
Spoken 73 27 9 2 -
(66%) (24%) (8%) (2%)
Read 56 39 12 4 -
(50%) (35%) (11%) (4%)
Written 72 30 7 2 -
(65%) (27%) (6%) (2%)
Number of countries
lived in 92 12 4 - i
(83%) (11%) (4%) (2%)
Note : Numbers in the table represent number of respondents in each cell and
figures in brackets show cell percentages.
As could be expected, the three measures of language skills - speaking, reading and 
writing abilities, are highly correlated (Table 3:7), all significant at p < 0.001.
Table 3:7 - Spearman correlation between measures of language skills.
Read Write
Speak o0-73 0.81
Read 0.00 0.74
However, there is no significant correlation (even at p = 0.25) between language 
abilities and countries lived in. Thus, the two measures can be considered as 
orthogonal. u v f d c r 0
Out of the three measures of language skills, reading ability seems to be the most 
appropriate for capturing the underlying dimension relevant for this research - i.e., the
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ability of managers to meaningfully interpret external information and signals. Beside, 
in Malaysia, many managers can converse in the English language haltingly with heavy 
localised slang but adequately for business purposes. However, they hesitate to admit 
to their speaking ability in that language, for among other reasons; their very well 
known sifat ketimuran or eastern modesty. Moreover, they have been conditioned to 
speaking (using) the Bahasa Malaysia in conformity with the Government directive of 
using only the National Language in all official communication (writing and speaking), 
et cetera. Reading ability is relatively less ambiguous and, for these reasons, only 
this variable is considered as representing linguistic diversity of the respondents.
To create a composite measure of the respondents' experience with diversity, the two 
dimensions of language skills and number o f countries lived experience were 
combined as shown in Figure 3:2. Respondents with a score of more than three in 
either dimension were considered to have high experience with diversity (n =11). A 
score of more than one but less than four in either was considered to represent medium 
experience with diversity (n = 50). Others, i.e., those who have lived only in Malaysia 
and could speak only the local language and some dialects were classified as having 
low experience with diversity (n = 46). It has to be pointed out however that Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Brunei share the same national language.
Figure 3:2 - Composite measure of experience with diversity
Number of countries lived in
2 3 > 4
Number of 
languages 
read
Low 
n = 48
2
Medium 
n = 50
3
High 
n = 2
4
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Perception of success
Perception of success was measured across two dimensions - success within the 
company and success in general (see chapter two). Given the significance of academic 
cohorts in Malaysia, success in general was operationalised through success with 
regard to co-students in the last academic institution. Success within the firm was 
measured through age in comparison with those of peers - the justification for the 
measure laying in the hierarchical and seniority driven nature of Malaysian business and 
society.
A majority of respondents felt that their success - both within the firm and in general - 
was about average. However a significant minority felt otherwise as can be seen from 
Table 3:8.
Table 3:8 - Perception of success (Percentage)
Success within Success in
the firm general
Less successful than most 12 3
About average 77 77
More successful than most 11 18
The two measures were correlated (Spearman correlation coefficient 0.27, p = 0.33) 
and their joint distribution is shown in Figure 3:3
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Figure 3:3 - Composite measure of "Perception of success" 
and classificatbn of respondents
Success
in
company
Low
Medium
High
Success in general 
Low Medium High
In this case again, a single composite variable was constructed to represent the 
respondents' perception of success by combining the two measures as shown in Figure 
3:3. The distribution of this composite variable over the study sample is shown in 
Table 3:9.
Table 3:9 - Distribution of "Perception of success"
Frequency Percent
Low 12 11
Medium 73 66
High 24 21
Non-response 2 2
TOTAL 109 99
UNIT AND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
In principle, the survey followed a nested design with individual respondents belonging 
to groups of different companies in two broad sectors (Figure 3:4).
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Figure 3:4  -  Possible level of analysis
Survey
WCF NWCF
10 different firms6 different firms
Individual respondents 
in each firm
Individual respondents 
in each firm
The respondents to the questionnaire were individuals and the unit of analysis for the 
survey was therefore the individual. However, the design raises questions about the 
appropriate level of analysis as suggested in the figure.
The effect of the sector (sector rather than industry appears to be a more appropriate 
way to distinguish between Wholly Commercial Firm [WCF], and Non-wholly 
Commercial Firm [NWCF]) was therefore first tested using one-way variance test on 
all the important research variables. These variables are defined in chapter four and five 
and their mention here gets the writer ahead of his story. For the time being, they may 
be taken as given, for the objective in this section is not to explain or defend the 
definition or measurement of the variables but to explore the effect on them of sectors, 
companies and individuals in a search to establish the appropriate level of analysis. 
Table 3:10 summarises the results of the variance test by sectors. Six out of the 
seventeen key variables are found to have a significant (at .05 level) part of their 
variance explained by the sector.
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Next, the firm effect was investigated by carrying out similar one-way variance tests 
within each industry. The results are summarised in Table 3:11. Only five out of the 
thirty-four tests yield statistically significant results, no more than can be expected by 
pure chance. Further, two of these are the perception of the managers about the 
strategic orientation of the firm/company which only suggests that those perceptions 
may well reflect the realities of those strategies.
The combined information contained in these two tables justify the approach taken in 
this thesis of treating the individual as the appropriate level of analysis for the 
questionnaire data. For all the key variables, neither the sector nor the company 
explains a significant part of the variance. The individual, therefore, appears to be a 
more useful and interesting level of analysis. There are some interesting patterns at the 
sector level (the six variables where the results are significant) and the writer shall 
explore these associations as they come in the ensuing chapters but, on the overall, the 
data allows the treatment of all responses as separate entities, and build up an analytical 
model of individual level scanning behaviour.
About a fourth of the responses are from one institution. Before proceeding further it is 
necessary to test if these respondents are somehow very different from all the rest 
because that, if true, would pose a serious problem for the study. Table 3:12 shows 
the results of one way tests of variance for all the variable to see if respondents from 
that particular WCF are significantly different in their responses compared to 
respondent from the other WCFs. Only one out of the seventeen tests are significant 
showing thereby that the "five legged cow" problem does not exist for the data. 
Further, it also shows that the diversity in scanning behaviour and in the variables that 
the study explores as influencers of such behaviour are as extensive within a firm as 
they are across companies/firms. That further strengthens the argument for considering 
the individual respondents rather than the companies as the proper level of analysis.
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Table 3:10 - One-way variance tests : sectors
SCANNING MEASURES F RATIO F PROB'LTY
1. Total scanning time 1.606 0.22
2. Percent scanning time on competitive factor 5.336 0.02
3. Percent scanning time on market factor 0.003 0.95
4. Percent scanning time on technology factor 21.084 0.00
5. Percent scanning time on regulatory factor 2.533 0.11
6. Percent scanning time on resource factor 0.279 0.60
7. Percent scanning time on broad issues 0.307 0.58
8. Usage of external sources 1.012 0.32
9. Usage of personal sources 5.137 0.03
TASK MEASURE
10. Extent of structure in task 0.555 0.46
ENVIRONMENT MEASURES
11. Environmental predictability 0.662 0.42
12. Environmental homogeneity 17.319 0.00
PERCEIVED STRATEGIC ORIENTATION OF FIRM
13. Analytical orientation 0.395 0.53
14. Attitude toward risk 5.108 0.03
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
15. Entrepreneurial orientation 9.222 0.00
16. Perception of success 0.930 0.34
17. Experience with diversity 0.560 0.46
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Table 3:11 - One way variance tests : companies within sectors
WCF NWCF
Scanning measures F F F F
Ratio Prob. Ratio Prob.
1. Total scanning time 2.541 0.03 0.381 0.55
2. Percent scanning time on 
competitive factor 1.363 0.25 0.015 0.90
3. Percent scanning time on market 
factor 1.302 0.27 0.288 0.60
4. Percent scanning time on technology 
factor 6.060 0.00 0.440 0.52
5. Percent scanning time on regulatory 
factor 1.127 0.36 0.337 0.57
6. Percent scanning time on resource 
factor 0.731 0.63 0.167 0.69
7. Percent scanning time on broad 
issues 0.641 0.70 1.405 0.26
8. Usage of external sources 1.365 0.23 0.318 0.58
Task measure
10. Extent of structure in task 0.288 0.94 0.000 1.00
Environment measures
11. Environmental predictability 0.860 0.53 0.035 0.86
12. Environmental homogeneity 2.277 0.05 0.588 0.46
Perceived strategic orientation of firm
13. Analytical orientation 2.735 0.02 1.623 0.23
14. Attitude toward risk 0.728 0.63 5.000 0.05
Individual characteristics
15. Entrepreneurial orientation 3.088 0.02 4.310 0.06
16. Perception of success 0.200 0.66 0.200 0.66
17. Experience with diversity 1.216 0.30 1.216 0.30
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Table 3:12 - One way variance test -XYZ Berhad versus 
other WCFs
Scanning measures F Ratio F Probability
1. Total scanning time 0.526 0.47
2. Percent scanning time on
competitive factor 0.676 0.41
3. Percent scanning time on market
factor 4.070 0.05
4. Percent scanning time on
technology factor 0.115 0.74
5. Percent scanning time on
regulatory factor 3.961 0.05
6. Percent scanning time on
resource factor 0.931 0.34
7. Percent scanning time on
broad issues 0.090 0.77
8. Usage of external sources /  7.332 0.01
9. Usage of personal sources 0.009 0.93
Task measures
10. Extent of structure in task 0.807 0.37
Environment measures
11. Environmental predictability 0.973 0.33
12. Environmental homogeneity 0.706 0.40
Perceived strategic orientation of company
13. Analytical orientation 0.973 0.33
14. Attitude toward risk 1.080 0.30
Individual characteristics
15. Entrepreneurial orientation 0.002 0.96
16. Perception of success 0.021 0.89
17. Experience with diversity 0.249 0.62
55
Chapter Four 
The nature of managerial work
Malaysia
CHAPTER FOUR
THE NATURE OF MANAGERIAL WORK IN MALAYSIA
The proceeding chapter describes the demographies of the research sample: managers 
by their age, education, experience, seniority, and a host of other personal and 
organisationally related attributes. These are the individual level variables that, as in the 
context of the conceptual framework presented in chapter two, are expected to influence 
the scanning behaviour of managers. The nature and extent of these influences are 
explored later in this thesis.
Following the arguments of Mintzberg (1973), scanning, however, is not something 
that managers do, just as planning and coordinating are not managerial activities. 
Managers read letters and journals/magazines, they write memos, attend meetings, visit 
plants and customers, and so on. In carrying out these activities, they fulfill the bulk of 
their roles, and, through these activities, they achieve their purposes including that of 
acquiring external information. Before proceeding to an analysis of the scanning data, 
therefore, it may be useful to provide a description of the responding managers, in 
terms of their managerial activities, so as to be able to obtain a functional view of their 
work which can be related to the findings about their scanning behaviour.
One of the most important conclusion of Mintzberg's highly acclaimed doctoral thesis 
(1973) is that, "manager's job are remarkably alike. The work of foremen, presidents, 
government administrators, and other managers can be described in terms of ten basic 
roles and six sets of working characteristics." An extension of this argument is 
therefore that the job of managers are similar irrespective of whether the organisation 
they belong to are British, Japanese, American or any other nationality.
The first half of this chapter, explores the nature of managerial work in Malaysia and 
looks for the similarities suggested by Mintzberg. Environmental scanning however, is
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a boundary spanning activity and can be carried out only through interactions with the 
world outside the firm. The overall nature of managerial work in Malaysia is important 
to establish a comparative framework within which they could be related to the research 
sample of other populations of interest. Even more useful would be a comparison that 
focuses on this boundary spanning component of the managerial function. Who, in 
the Malaysian organisations, deal with the outside world? How does their behaviour 
compare with the pattern in other, for example Japanese companies? Answers to these 
questions make the comparison more relevant and are suggested in the second half of 
this chapter.
A C irvm E S OF MALAYSIAN MANAGERS
Following the categorisation of Mintzberg, the distribution of work time for the 
respondents in terms of six activities are identified as follows: desk work, scheduled 
meetings, unscheduled meetings, telephone calls, tours, and others.
Desk work
Table 4:1 shows the distribution of percentage of total worktime devoted by the sample 
Malaysian managers to desk work. On the average, this activity accounts for work 50% 
of total worktime.
Table 4:1 Time spent on deskwork: distribution 
of respondents
Percentage of total 
work time devoted 
to deskwork Frequency
0 to 15 5
16 to 30 10
31 to 45 32
46 to 60 17
61 to 75 30
76 to 100 17
Total 111
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The hierarchical level of manager makes a significant (significant at 0.05) difference to 
the relative share of desk work. The more senior the manager, the lesser is the time 
spent on desk work (Table 4:2)
Table 4:2 - Effect of management groups on time spent on deskwork.
Percentage of total work 
time spent on deskwork.
Group 1 33%
Group 2 46%
Group 3 58%
None of the other attributes such as education, age or departmental affiliation have any 
significant effect on the time spent by managers on desk work.
Scheduled and unscheduled meetings.
On the average, the sampled managers spent about 16% of their work time in attending 
scheduled meetings, the range varying from 0 to 40%. As can be expected, the higher 
the group/level of manager, the greater the proportion of time spent in scheduled 
meetings (Table 4:3).
Here again, management groupAevel is the only variable that differentiated (p < 0.05) 
significantly the sample. GroupAevel 1 and 2 managers spend about 15% of their work 
time attending unscheduled meetings, while groupAevel 3 managers spend relatively 
less time on this activity. The differences, however, are not statistically significant 
and, on the average, this activity occupies about 10% of the work time on the sampled 
group.
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Table 4:3 - Effect o f management level on time spent in scheduled meetings
Percentage of total 
work time spent in 
scheduled meetings
Level 1 managers 26%
Level 2 managers 17%
Level 3 managers 12%
Average 16%
Tours.
Senior group/level Malaysian managers spend significantly (p < 0.05) more time on 
tour than do their relatively junior colleagues (Table 4:4).
Table 4:4 - Time spent on tour
Percent of total work time
spent on tour
Level 1 managers 14%
Level 2 managers 9%
Level 3 managers 6%
Average 8%
This confirms expectations, managers in the Marketing and General management 
functions tour more than those in Finance, Planning and Research and Development.
As can be seen from Table 4:5, the relationship is not due to any correlation in the 
sample between functions and levels.
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Table 4:5 - Joint effect of function and level on
percentage of total work time spent on tours
Managers hierarchial level
Functional area Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Sample
average
Marketing % 22 10 7 9
Finance % 10 6 4 6
Planning % 9 13 5 6
Research % 13 6 2 6
Gen. Mgt. % 16 9 4 11
Others % 30 3 10
Aggregate % 14 9 6 8
Table 4:6 summarises the preceeding analysis and compares the overall pattern of work 
time allocation by managers at different hierarchical levels. This table shows that the 
nature of managerial work is indeed different at various levels. Top managers spend, 
relatively much less time on desk work and much more time in meetings and tours - in 
dealing with and through people.
Table 4:6 - Work time allocation at different management levels
% of total worktime spent by 
Top managers Senior managers Middle/Junior
Activitv
(n = 27) (n = 26) managers (n
Deskwork 33 46 58
Scheduled meetings 26 17 12
Unscheduled (do) 15 15 11
Telephone calls 9 8 8
Tours 14 9 6
Others 3 5 5
60
The data shows a clear pattern and consistency in the transition of managerial work 
from the bottom, through the middle, to the top of the organisation.
COMPARISON WITH MINTZBERG'S STUDY
In Table 4:7, the findings (results) of this study are compared with Mintzberg's 
allocation of work time of top American managers.
Table 4:7 - Comparison with findings of Mintzberg (1973)
% Worktime % Worktime % Worktime
spent by US spent by spent by
top managers Malaysian Malaysia!
(Mintzberg) (average)
Activitv
Deskwork 22 32 50
Scheduled meetings 59 26 16
Unscheduled (do) 10 15 13
Telephone calls 6 9 8
Tours 3 14 8
At first sight, it appears that the time allocation by U.S. top managers is quite different 
from those of Malaysian top managers. However, one must assess whether this 
difference is to be ascribed to the fact of the managers, belonging to different countries, 
culture or "milieu of business" Longton and Stening (1988, p92), or to other aspects of 
the two studies including the choice of samples.
In this study, all the respondents work in the five groups of firms (see the grouping in 
chapter three) with partimonial milieu merging into patron-client relationship type of 
organisational climate, Longton and Stening (1988). The sample in the Mintzberg 
study, on the other hand, involved five managers only - three in commercial 
organisations, and two in non-profit organisations : one a superintendent of schools 
and the other the administrator of urban hospital. If Mintzberg's data is split into two
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categories - top managers in commercial and non-commercial organisation - the first 
category becomes more directly comparable with most of the sample in this study, 
while the remaining will be almost if not totally identical. This comparison is shown in 
Table 4:8. For each category of work, the difference in time allocation between U.S. 
and Malaysian top managers is reduced if the business organisations in Mintzberg’s 
sample is the only one considered.
The table also highlights the considerable differences in time allocation between two 
CEO's of non-commercial organisations and the three business CEO's included in 
Mintzberg's study.
Table 4:8 - Work time allocations by top managers : comparison 
with Mintzberg's findings
% of total worktime spent by U.S. top managers
Commercial Non-profit Malaysian top
organisations organisations managers
Desk work 25 17 32
Scheduled
meetings 52 69 26
Unscheduled
meetings 13 6 15
Telephone calls 6 6 9
Tours 4 1 14
However, even for business firms, some differences remain in the observed work 
characteristics of American and Malaysian top managers. The American managers 
spend more time in meetings while the Malaysians spend more time in deskwork and
tours. The greater time for touring in the Malaysian sample is easily explained: as ,
(
mentioned earlier, the managers do not possess equipment of modem communication I
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as sophisticated and up-to-date as their Western counterparts, additionally the rapport 
between and among staff is seen as more cohesive. Operations are also very wide 
spread all over the 13 states and among the ASEAN countries. Thus, the Malaysian 
managers need more time for travel, both because of the geographical diversity in their 
business and also because of the larger distances involved (East and West Malaysia is 
separated by the South China Sea, refer to the map enclosed), additionally the land 
infrastructure is not as modem. The differences in time allocation for desk work and 
meetings arguably represents a greater preference in Malaysia for internal 
communication in the written rather than the verbal form, compared with the U.S. 
study.
This discussion on the differences should not divert attention from the fact that the 
similarities are more significant. Both groups of top managers spend most of their time 
in meetings. Desk work, for both, take the next largest share of time. And, except for 
time in meetings, the differences between Malaysian and American business managers 
is no more than those between American managers of commercial and non-commercial 
firms.
DEALING WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
There is a widely shared stereotype in the world of business which portrays Western 
top managers as the key persons interfacing between the organisations and the outside 
world, and the Eastern top managers, in contrast, as secluded semi-recluse who keep 
their distances from the actual operations of their firms and devote most of their time to 
building and supporting internal structures, values, and maintaining organisational 
harmony. This is implicit in books like The Art of Japanese Management (Pascale and 
Athos, 1981) where, it is argued,: the Japanese top manager devotes his attention to 
maintaining "wa", i.e., group harmony while the Western image of a manager is more 
energetic and kinetic, (pl79). The Western organisation is seen as a pyramid with the
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top manager at the apex, which is also the point with maximum exposure to the outside 
world. The Eastern organisation, on the other hand, is seen as a sphere, with the top 
manager at the centre, creating and strengthening integrative centripetal forces.
This view, if true, would make the scanning task very different between the East and 
the West. In the West, the top and middle managers would be the chief scanners for 
they have the greatest exposure to the environment. In the East, the lower level 
managers would pay a far more important role in scanning since they, rather than the 
top management, are expected to deal with the outside world and act as the 
organisational sensors. It is, therefore, interesting to explore whether indeed there are 
such differences in the way Eastern (say Malaysian) and Western (say, Scottish) 
organisations interact with the environment. In particular, it would be desirable to 
compare the Malaysian managers in this study sample with comparable U.S. (in 
Mintzberg's) managers to see if there are fundamental differences with respect to who, 
in the organisation, deals with the outside world. Fortunately, Mintzberg has analysed 
the activity pattern of managers in his sample in terms of dealing with insiders and 
outsiders and it is therefore possible to make such a comparison.
The managers in this study sample spend, on the average, 23% of their total work time 
in contact with outsiders. This time is spent in their base and while on tours; during 
meetings, (scheduled and unscheduled) and over the telephone - the average 
contribution of the different activities is shown in Table 4:9.
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Table 4:9 - Worktime spent with insiders and outsiders 
(Percentage)
Distribution of total work time
With inside With outsiders Total
Scheduled meetings 9 7 16
Unscheduled meetings 7 6 13
Telephone calls 3 5 8
Tours 3 5 8
Sub total 22 23 45
Deskwork 50
Others 5
Total 100
Table 4:10 breaks down the percentage of total work time spent with outsiders by 
management levels/groups. Level 1 and Level 2 managers are found to spend much 
more time with outsiders than Level 3 managers. In other words, it is the senior 
managers and not their junior colleagues who, in Malaysia, form the chief link between 
the organisation and its environment. They spend about 30% of their time with 
outsiders; about twice as much as do the junior managers.
Table 4:10 - Share of work time spent with outsiders - 
by management levels
% of worktime spent with outsiders
Scheduled meetings
Level 1 
12
Level 2 
10
Level 3 
4
Unscheduled meetings 6 7 5
Telephone calls 5 6 4
Tours 7 6 3
Total with outsiders 29 29 16
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This data is in sharp contrast to the "recluse" model of the Eastern top manager.
In the Mintzberg study, the U.S. top managers were found to spend about 31% of their 
total work time with outsiders. If this is differentiated or compared between 
commercial and non-commercial executives, the comparisons become even clearer 
(Table 4:11).
Table 4:11 - Time spent with outsiders - US. and Malaysian 
top managers compared
Malaysian top U.S. top managers U.S. top managers U.S. top managers
managers (commercial) (non-commercial) (aggregate)
29 36 25 31
The differences in Table 4:11 are not significant, statistically or otherwise. It does 
tend to show that the boundary between the organisation and the environment, in both 
the U.S. and Malaysia, is spanned by managers at a comparable level in the 
organisation. Or, more accurately, the activities of the top managers in Malaysia, at 
least with respect to dealing with the outside world, are not dissimilar in volume to 
what has been observed for similar level managers in the United States.
The main point to be stressed in this chapter is that the nature of managerial activity, 
and particularly, the managerial activity of dealing with the outside world is no different 
in Malaysia than it is in the United States (and, by implication, elsewhere in the West). 
In chapter three, it was argued that this underlying similarity suggests that the analysis 
of individual and organisational level scanning behaviour that follows (in chapters 
ahead) may be more broadly generalisable than can be claimed technically from the 
sample of this research. In chapter six, comparison of specific aspects of scanning 
behaviour will be made, such as the relative importance of factors and the relative usage 
of sources it will attempt to show that there are no significant differences between 
American and Malaysian managers in terms of those behaviours. At a more theoretical
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level, it will also be shown that the effect of environmental characteristics, like 
heterogeneity and predictability, on such scanning characteristics are also similar for 
American and Malaysian managers. Individually, these similarities are interesting; 
collectively they add considerable strength to the claim in this thesis for a wider external 
validity for the results of the survey.
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Chapter Five 
The context of scanning
CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONTEXT OF SCANNING
In the introductory chapter, it was mentioned that most past research on scanning has 
been descriptive rather than analytical. What kinds of information do managers collect? 
What sources do they use? How are they acquired? These had been the principal 
questions addressed by past researchers on scanning practices of managers. The 
framework for such descriptive analysis was formulated by Aguilar (1967). Follow up 
studies by Keegan (1967), Collings (1968) and Kefalas and Schoderbek (1973) have, 
in essence, replicated his study in different industries. At the analytical level, these 
studies have tried to relate scanning activity of managers to their functional areas, 
hierarchical levels, and to the size of their organisations. Kefalas and Schoderbek had 
included, over and above these variables, the dynamism of the organisation's 
environment as an additional explanatory variable. The overall findings of this stream 
of research has been inconclusive, for no clear pattern of associations have been 
observed.
Hambrick (1982), noting the failure of these efforts in explaining variations in 
executive scanning activities, had taken a major conceptual leap by trying to relate 
individual scanning behaviour with strategies of the organisations the managers belong 
to. Hambrick was perhaps the first scholar who tried to build up a more analytical 
understanding of managerial scanning by developing and testing a set of propositions 
that were firmly rooted in organisation and management theories. While the 
propositions, by themselves were not unambiguously supported by his data, he must 
be given the credit for taking scanning research from the largely descriptive to a more 
analytical level. In a way, this thesis may be seen as an effort to carry forward the 
work initiated by him.
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However, Hambrick attempted to explain variations in individual level scanning 
through only one variable - the strategic orientation of the firm. In contrast, it is the 
focus and view in this thesis that individual behaviour in organisations is influenced by 
a whole range of factors and that no meaningful or significant explanation of such 
behaviour is possible unless one's construct matches the complexity of the 
phenomenon one wishes to explain. Besides, the influencing factors, as normatively 
suggested by Daft and Weick (1984), may also be interactive and their joint effects may 
indeed be very different from their main effects. This would mean that limiting 
attention to the main effect of just one out of many explanatory variables may not only 
be inadequate but also incorrect. Thus, the commencing point here is a conceptual 
framework that is more complex and inclusive than Hambrick's. The results, the 
writer submits, justify the added complexity.
The framework, in summary form, has been introduced in chapter two. In chapter 
three, the operationalisation and measurement of the individual influencing variable 
were explained. In this chapter, this writer attempts the same as in chapter three for the 
organisational and environmental attributes which, as proposed in the framework, are 
expected to affect the scanning behaviour of managers.
A persistent problem in the field of organisation theory is the diversity of the constructs 
and measures that exist for almost all variables. Thus, the first task to be addressed 
here is to review the different constructs that have been proposed for each of the 
variables and to select the appropriate operationalisation scheme that best serves the 
objectives of this study. Then the writer dips into the data to test the constructs and 
often the data suggests changes and simplifications, usually by reducing the number of 
indicators for complex variables. Both theory and data to construct and test appropriate 
scales, are used. In other words, for each variable, concepts and data are used 
interactively to arrive at the final measures.
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Finally, these influencing variables are mutually interactive. The ultimate objective is to 
build up a multivariate causal model for explaining scanning behaviour in terms of an 
appropriate parsimonious set of these variables. To do so, it is necessary to understand 
the nature of the interactions that exist among these variables and this is another task 
that is addressed in this chapter.
ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS
As discussed briefly in chapter two, almost all authors studying scanning behaviour of 
managers have suggested that the characteristics of the environment can be an important 
determinant of such behaviour. Aguilar (1967) and Collings (1968) specifically 
controlled the environment by limiting their studies to individual industries - the 
chemical industry, in the case of Aguilar, the financial services industry/in the case of 
Codings. Kefalas and Schoderbek (1973) included two industries in their sample - the 
"stable" meat packing business and the "dynamic" farm equipment business, but failed 
to detect any significant difference in scanning behaviour of managers in the two 
environments. However, there has been no effort so far to take the search for an 
environment-scanning link to a deeper theoretical level, or to connect it to the vast 
amount of research conducted by organisation theorists on organisation-environment 
interdependencies.
Dimensions of the environment
In organisation theory, the environment is conceived as a residual - as everything that 
lies outside the organisation's boundary. This has lead to a two-fold measurement 
problem. First, definition of the boundary has never been easy, for "organisations are 
open social systems, they are constantly changing, and their boundaries fluctuate 
accordingly" (Miles, Snow and Pfeffer 1974, p 248). Second, even assuming that 
such a boundary could be identified, it has not been clear as to how the environment - 
i.e., "everything which is outside the organisation" - could be described in a way that
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is analytically useful.
Early attempts (Merton, 1957; Gross, Mason and McEachem, 1958) have sought to 
specify an organisation's environment by describing all its elements. This, as pointed 
out by Dill (1962), could never be possible for modem, large organisations facing 
highly complex environments. He, therefore, suggested an alternative approach for 
describing the environment not in terms of its absolute characteristics but in terms of its 
effects on the organisation. Many of the currently popular typologies of the 
environment have emerged following this suggestion.
Most of these typologies attempt to describe the environment in terms of two 
dimensions of the current state and the rate of change. Thompson (1967) analysed 
environmental uncertainty as the net effect of the extent of homogeneity and stability. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) adopted a four-cell typology of two states of diversity 
(high, low) and two states of stability (high, low). Duncan (1972) has suggested that 
environmental complexity has the dimensions of simple-complex (number of factors 
considered in decision making and their degree of similarity) and static-dynamic 
(degree to which these factors change).
Perhaps the most comprehensive as well as the most complex typology of 
organisational environmental has been provided by Jurkovitch (1974) in his sixty-four 
cells classification that includes four dimensions of general characteristics and two 
dimensions of change rate.
Objective and subjective measures of environments
In the environmental literature an unresolved debate has focused around the choice of 
objective versus subjective measures of environmental attributes. The paper by Pfeffer
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and Leblebici (1973) is an example of studies that have operationalised the environment 
through "objective" measures like industry concentration and average debt-to-equity 
ratio. On the other hand, Duncan (1972) described the environment in terms of 
"subjective" perceptions of the respondents along a number of dimensions. Some 
authors like Pennings (1975) have used both the methods, measuring on the one hand, 
participant's perceptions of environmental instability, uncertainty, and the like, and, on 
the other, certain objective attributes like investment patterns in the industry and 
customer characteristics.
As pointed out by Downey and Ireland (1979), this objective-subjective categorisation 
has had some dysfunctional effects on organisation research. First, it has created a 
preference for objective measures for no other reason except that the label suggests 
them to be more "scientific" and therefore, more appropriate for academic inquiry. 
Second, it has equated subjective measures with measures of perception without 
distinguishing between subjectivity on the part of the researcher and subjectivity on the 
part of the respondents. This has been unfortunate for "the objectivity that is desired in 
scientific inquiry refers to objectivity on the part of the researcher. Subjectivity 
behaviour on the part of those being studied, however, may well be a legitimate topic 
for scientific inquiry". (Downey and Ireland, 1979, p632).
In the ultimate analysis, appropriateness of a measure depends on the phenomenon 
under investigation. In this study the purpose of including environmental 
characteristics as variables of interest is to investigate the association, if any, between 
those variables and the scanning behaviour of managers. The underlying hypothesis is 
that the nature of the environment influences the kind of information that is perceived as 
necessary for managing the affairs of an organisation and thereby affect managerial 
interest in, and effort for collecting such information. To the extent that an individual's 
behaviour cannot be affected by what is not known by him, the writer of this thesis
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argues that it is the manager’s perceptions of the environment rather than any notion of 
an "objective reality" that influence the way they monitor the environment. Following 
the arguments of Dill (1962), Weick (1969), and Starbuck (1976), it is the perception 
of the environment that drives the attention and interpretation process that are 
collectively labelled as scanning behaviour.
In this study, therefore, operationalisation and measurement of the environment are 
based on managerial perceptions and not on any "objective" measures - quantitative or 
qualitative.
Measurement of Environmental Attributes.
In measuring environmental characteristics, this thesis has adopted both the 
categorisation and the questions used by Miller and Friesen (1983). There are two 
advantages of such a direct adoption. First, the theoretical construct proposed by the 
authors is a synthesis of existing findings in the field of organisation - environment 
research. It is both rich and relatively parsimonious. Second, this study, in some 
ways, is an extension of theirs. While they tried to establish a link between 
environment and strategy, this study explores the same link but in a more complex 
way, positing scanning as an intermediary variable. Using the same construct and the 
same questions, permits a direct comparison of the findings, thereby offering the 
benefits of research replication and cumulativeness.
Following these authors, this study has measured the respondents' perceptions about 
their business environment along three dimensions - dynamism , hostility, and 
heterogeneity. Dynamism refers to the rate of change or innovation in the industry 
and the uncertainty or unpredictability of the actions of competitors and customers. It 
is therefore not unlike the measure of uncertainty used by Thompson (1967) and 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). Hostility, the second dimension, measures the extent of 
environmental munificence, and can be thought of as the reverse of environmental
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benevolence. It reflects the lack of slack available in the organisation's environment and 
is measured in terms of hostility of competitors and the suddenness of the industry's 
upswing and downswing. Finally, heterogeneity is a measure of environmental 
complexity and reflects variations in the output markets that require diversity in the 
throughput process (Khandwalla, 1972). It is measured in terms of diversity in 
production methods and marketing tactics required to effectively cater to the needs of 
different customers.
The Data
Table 5:1 shows the non-parametric correlations (Spearman coefficients) between 
responses to the six questions (see appendix) that attempted to measure the three 
environmental dimensions. It can be seen that one of the hostility measures, 
predictability of industry upswings and downswings, is highly correlated with the 
measures of environmental dynamism. Similarly, hostility of competitors - the other 
measure of the same attribute - is highly correlated with the measure for environmental 
heterogeneity. This suggests that hostility is not seen by the respondents as an 
independent attribute of the environment.
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Table 5:1 - Correlations between different indicators 
of the environment
Diversity in 
production and 
marketing 
methods
Predictability 
of competitors
- 0.01 
(n = 110)
Predictability 
of customers
0.18  
(n =110)
New product 
and process 
innovation
0.32 ** 
(n-111)
Predictability of 
industry upswings 
and downswings
0.07  
(n = 110)
Hostility of 
competitors
0.17  
(n = 110)
Hostility of 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.11
competitors (n =111) (n = 111) (n = 111) (n = 111)
Predictability
of industry upswings 0.40** 0.30** 0.14
and downswings (n=111) (n =111) (n=110)
0.09 0.19
New product and 
p rocess
innovations (n = 110) (n =110)
Predictability 0.45 **
of customers (n = 111)
Note : ** significant at 0.001 (no other correlation 
significant at 0.01).
The picture becomes clearer when the response are factor analysed (Principal 
Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation): only two clear and distinct underlying 
factor emerge (Table 5:2).
Table 5:2 - Measurement of environmental attributes factor loading
Factor 1 Factor 2
Predictability of competitors 0.75
Predictability of customers
needs 0.61
Predictability of industry
upswings and downswings 0.50
Diversity in methods
of production and marketing 0.56
Rate of new products
and process innovation 0.42
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The first factor, clearly includes three components of environmental predictability, 
viz., predictability of competitors, customers, and business cycles. The two 
components of the second factor, similarly refer to aspects of heterogeneity, i.e., 
diversity of products, processes and techniques.
In effect, therefore, even though the writer starts with a different and more complex 
construct of the environment, the writer is led back to the conceptualisation of 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) because the two dimensions of predictability and 
heterogeneity correspond almost exactly to the typology proposed by these authors.
Construction of Scales:
Given that no single variable was split between the two factors, it was felt that 
subsequent analysis would be more meaningful if additive scales built on the measured 
variables is used instead of directly using the factors themselves.
A scale for environmental predictability (PRED) was constructed by adding the scores 
of the three variables included in the first factor. The scale was found to have 
satisfactory reliability (Combatches' alpha of 0.667).
The scale had a minimum value of three and a maximum value of fifteen and had a 
near-normal distribution within that range. Given the nature of the inquiry, a 
continuous scale with twelve different values had its own used but it was felt that a 
simpler two scale categorisation would also be useful, particularly for simple and 
robust statistical analysis. To serve this purpose, one more conversion was carried out 
by splitting the scale so as to segregate the respondents into two groups. The first 
group, with a PRED score less than or equal to eight, consider their environments to be 
relatively predictable; the others, with a PRED score greater than eight, find their 
environments as relatively unpredictable.
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A scale was similarly constructed for environmental heterogeneity (HETROGEN) by 
adding the two variables loaded on the second factor. The scale had a Combatches' 
alpha of 0.526 and was therefore found to have acceptable reliability. For the same 
reasons as in the case of environmental predictability, a simple two state measures of 
environmental heterogeneity also was constructed by bifurcating or forking the scale so 
as to split the sample into two roughly equal parts. Those scoring up to seven on the 
scale were considered to find their environments to be relatively homogeneous, and 
those scoring above seven were considered as facing a relatively heterogeneous 
environment.
Associations between Environmental Characteristics and other Variables.
It is observed that more wholly commercial firms' (WCF) managers find their 
environments to be relatively predictable and homogeneous compared to managers in 
other types [that is, not wholly commercial firms (NWCF)]. (Tables 5:3 and 5:4).
Table 5:3 - Perception of environmental heterogeneity:
WCF and NWCF
Wholly commercial Non-wholly commerical
Environment institution (WCF) institution (NWCF)
Homogeneous 35 23
Heterogeneous 23 29
The perception of greater homogeneity is perhaps more easily understood. After all, 
WCF do not carry out many functions like NWCF while all the NWCF in the sample 
internalise all usual business functions. The greater range of activities clearly increase 
the number of different environmental sectors that the NWCF are exposed to and can 
therefore be expected to enhance the perception of environmental heterogeneity among 
their managers.
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Table 5:4 - Perception o f environmental predictability: 
WCF and NWCF
Environment WCF NWCF
Predictable 34 22
Unpredictable 25 30
Significant at 0.50
The perception of greater environmental predictability among WCF managers appears 
counter intuitive at first sight. The WCF deal with many more products and in many 
more markets and thus presumably face a greater amount of demand uncertainty.
The popular stereotype of WCF managers depict them as "light-footed wheeler- 
dealers", deftly bringing together buyers and suppliers in a highly uncertain and 
unpredictable market place. How then can they perceive the environment to be more 
predictable than managers in stodgy NWCF firms?
One probable explanation of this finding may lie in the nature of risks WCF and 
NWCF firm carry. As suggested in chapter three, WCF pass on most long and 
medium term risks of a business to their suppliers and internalise only very short term 
risks. Thus, for a given business, their need for long term predictions is low.
They move in and out of products and markets with greater ease, for they face much 
lower entry and exit barriers than the NWCF. They can, therefore, be much less 
sensitive to the long term predictability of a business and this lack of attention and 
sensitivity to the long and medium terms may account for the perception of greater 
predictability on the part of WCF managers.
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Management level was the only other variable that was found to have a significant 
influence on managers' perceptions about their environments. It was observed that the 
more senior the manager, the more heterogeneous he perceived the environment to be 
(Table 5:5). There was, however, no significant association between management 
level and perception of environment predictability. This finding is not very surprising. 
The higher up one is on the management ladder the greater the number of factors that 
one must consider in connection with any issue.
Table 5:5 - Effect of management level on perceived 
environmental heterogeneity
Environment
Management level Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Top 6 15
Senior/middle 15 10
Junior 37 27
Significant at 0.05
There is less and ultimately no differentiation, in the sense of Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967), as one moves up the organisational hierarchy. The broader perspective of top 
managers contribute to their perception of greater environmental diversity and 
heterogeneity. Predictability, on the other hand, is relatively a less subjective factor. 
One builds up a notion of predictability based on past experiences which are often 
matters of fact rather than of judgment. This perception is therefore not systematically 
affected by where one is placed in the management hierarchy.
It has been argued earlier in this thesis that the systematic variation in perception of 
environmental heterogeneity across management hierarchy is, from a practical point of 
view, not unexpected. This finding however, carries important implications for theory. 
In organisational research, environment has always been associated with the
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organisation - it has been primarily considered as a variable applicable at the 
organisational level of analysis. Most authors operationalising environment through 
the perceptions of organisational members typically measure such perceptions on the 
part of a few members of the organisation and aggregate the measures to arrive at a 
description of the organisation's environment (e.g., Miller and Friesen, 1983).
The key contribution of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) to organisation theory was the 
insight that different organisational sub-units face different environmental characteristic 
and, therefore, need different structural mechanisms for effective coping. The data in 
this thesis suggests a further possibility that managers at different organisational level 
face what can only be described as different environments. In other words, the 
subjective environment differs not only across functions but also across levels. If that 
is true, basic questions are raised about whether environment, or at least perceptional 
measures of the environment, is an appropriate concept for analysis at the 
organisational level of inquiry.
TASK CHARACTERISTICS
The expectation of a link between task characteristics and scanning behaviour of 
managers arise from the empirical evidence that the nature of the task represents one 
source of variation in managerial information processing requirements (Bavelas, 1950; 
Beeker and Baloff, 1969; Tushman, 1978). When tasks are non-routine or highly 
complex, participants face high uncertainty and therefore need greater amounts of 
information for uncertainty reduction and effective performance. This relationship, to 
quote Daft and Macintosh (1981), "is the basis for theories that relate task uncertainty 
to structure". (Galbraith, 1977; Tushman and Nadler, 1978) and is supported by the 
empirical literature (Tushman, 1978,1979; Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). Scanning is 
one of the mechanisms available to managers for meeting information needs. 
Therefore, when managerial tasks are complex and information needs are high, one can
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expect more extensive scanning. That is the rationale for inducing task characteristics as 
a variable of interest in this study.
Perrow (1967) had originally proposed a description of tasks based on a routine- 
nonroutine dimension. Subsequently, researchers have suggested that the routineness 
or otherwise of a task is an aggregation of two underlying task characteristics : task 
variety and task analysability (Daft and Macintosh). Task variety is the frequency of 
unexpected or novel events : low variety means that participants can predict problems 
and activities in advance, high variety means that they cannot. Task analysability, on 
the other hand, concerns how individuals respond to problems that arise. It refers to 
the ease with which alternative course of actions and their associated costs, benefits and 
outcomes, can be determined.
However, this conceptualisation of task structure is based on only the demand side of 
the task in terms of information and does not consider the supply side. For certain 
tasks information needs may be high but, at the same time, required information may 
be easily available. In some cases, the problem may not be one of information 
availability but one of information ambiguity or equivocality (Weick, 1979). As found 
by Daft and Macintosh, the relationship between task uncertainty and information 
processing may be much more complex than hitherto assumed. Given the complexity 
of the relationship, it may be desirable to include the availability and equivocality of 
information as additional components of a more broadly defined conceptualisation of 
task characteristics. There is no suggestion of the components being unrelated, 
however, and the principal advantage of including the additional components is to 
provide a greater opportunity for being informed by the data about appropriateness of 
constructs instead of starting with a narrower definition that rules out such possibility.
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Measurement and scaling
For measurement task characteristics, the writer used questions developed and reported 
by Daft and Macintosh. However, not all the questions in their instrument was used 
but, for each variable, only two questions that had the highest factor coefficients in 
their analysis was selected, (see questionnaire in the appendix).
Responses on all the task characteristics questions were factor analysed using the 
principal components methods. The analysis extracted only one factor and eigenvalue 
of 1.34 that explained approximately 27% of the variance. Only three items had 
significant factor coefficient (see Table 5:6).
The extracted factor suggests a task description along the structured-unstructured 
dimension. The need of extensive and demanding search for solution (i.e., beyond 
the problemistic search of Cyert and March, 1963), the need for experience and training 
(reflecting difficulty in applying standard operating procedures), and high equivocality 
in available information - the three induced items, are all the classic components of 
unstructured tasks. Accordingly, these three items were combined and the additive 
scale labelled "STRUCTURE" that was subsequently used in the analysis as the only 
measure of the task characteristics of the respondents. Combatche's alpa for the scale 
was 0.62 and, being above 0.5, suggested acceptable scale reliability.
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Table 5:6 -  Task structure: extracted factor
Factor 1
Task require lots of 
experience and training 0.83
Task require extensive and demanding 
search for solutions 0.55
Available information can be interpreted 
in several ways and can lead to different 
but acceptable decisions 0.43
Further, as in the case of the scales measuring environmental characteristics, this scale 
was also collapsed into two state variables. Respondents with a scale score of up to ten 
were considered as carrying out structured tasks; those with scale score above ten were 
considered to be engaged in unstructured tasks.
Associations with other variables
Perceived task structure was found to have no statistically significant association (at 
0.05 level) with industry, firm/company or environmental characteristics. It also had 
no significant association with management level of the respondent.
The managers' experience with diversity is the only variable which has a systematic 
effect on their perception of task characteristics. Managers exposed to more than one 
language or to more than one country generally perceived their tasks to be more 
unstructured compared to managers whose experience with diversity is limited to a 
single country and a single language (Table 5:7). The explanation perhaps lies in the 
possibility that greater experience with diversity increases a manager's cognitive 
complexity and thereby allows him to see the complexities of his job more clearly. He 
has a more complex schema (Hogarth, 1980) and a lesser need for simplifying
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judgmental tasks. In other words, all managerial tasks have structured and 
unstructured components and greater experience with diversity helps a manager to 
recognise the unstructured aspects of the job and thereby makes him perceive the same 
task as relatively less structured compared to another manager with lesser exposure to 
diversity. Alternatively, it is also possible that greater experience with diversity leads 
to the manager's being assigned more unstructured tasks. Given a correlational 
findings, it is not possible to identify the actual direction of causation.
Table 5:7 - Relationship between managers' experience with 
diversity and perception of structure in task
Manager's experience with diversity
Single country More than one country
or single language or language
Task perceived
as structured 24
15
Task perceived
as unstructured 24
46
Significant at 0.02
STRATEGIC ORIENTATION
As argued by Chaffe (1984), "strategy" as a term does not have a consensual 
definition. The differences are more than cosmetic : different authors researching and 
writing on strategy often differ fundamently on the nature of the phenomenon they call 
strategy. In the field of Business Policy, strategy is the process through which the 
general manager determines the desired future direction of the firm (Andrews, 1983).
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In organisational studies, strategy is the process by which an organisation adapts to its 
changing environment (Child, 1972) - whether or not it has the capacity of voluntaristic 
adaptation being a major topic of debate. In the field of economics, strategy is the way 
a firm can conduct itself, given a particular industry structure, to maximise its 
performance. The underlying assumption is that a firm possesses a set of a fixed assets 
or factors, some of them physical, others consisting of human skills, knowledge and 
experience. The performance maximising process of strategy, then, reduces to "one of 
maximising quasi-rents to these fixed factors" (Caves, 1980). The aim and purpose of 
the writer here is not to debate or discuss these different perspectives on strategy. 
Instead, it is the writer's desire/wish to highlight the one commonality among them - all 
these perspectives consider and operationalise strategy at the organisational level of 
analysis.
The literature on strategy abounds with efforts to relate strategy to various aspects of 
individual behaviour in organisations. A typical example of such efforts is Hambrick's 
study, relating organisational strategy (operationalised in the Miles and Snow 
framework of reactor , prospec tor , defender and analyser and assessed 
independently and "objectively" by the researcher) to individual scanning behaviour. 
This raises an interesting issue about unit and level of analysis. As long as we can 
think of an operationalised strategy at the organisational level, we can meaningfully 
relate it with any other variable at the individual level. Doing so essentially assumes 
organisations as simple and linear aggregates of the individual members and there is 
evidence to question that assumption. Besides, the issue goes beyond academic hair­
splitting on level of analysis. It addresses the basic objective and interpretation of such 
research efforts. What does an association, say, between the amount of time a 
particular (or even typical) manager spends reading trade journals and the rate of new 
product introduction by his firm mean? Such individual behaviour is clearly influenced 
by a number of factors both external and internal to the individual. Given the 
possibility of such multiple influences, the validity of interpreting bivariate associations
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becomes questionable.
In this study, the writer proposes to maintain the integrity of his level of analysis. As 
was argued in chapter three, the individual is the appropriate level of analysis for the 
questionnaire data and to investigate the effect of "strategy" on scanning behaviour of 
individual managers, it must be operationalised meaningfully at the individual level. 
This implies that the writer of this thesis must reject the traditional and increasingly 
popular "objective" measures of strategy - such as the extent of formal planning, 
creation of patent rights, market share, product diversity, record of acquisitions and 
merger, et cetera - as not particularly useful for this thesis. What is much more useful 
in this study are the "subjective" measures of strategy - subjective on the part of the 
responding manager. The manager's behaviour is shaped by, inter alia, his perception 
about his organisation, his goals, methods, and criteria of desirable or acceptable 
behaviour. It is also influenced by his own attitudes and orientations - his beliefs and 
styles, his personality and his own way of doing things - that can, to a large extent, be 
taken as independent inputs to his behaviour within the organisation. The writer of this 
thesis is of the opinion/view that the individual manager (Western and/or Eastern) 
develops an overall "strategic orientation" and this orientation is the composite of two 
different factors; the manager's perception about the strategic orientation of the firm to 
which he belongs and his individual strategic orientation which is an intrinsic 
personality trait.
Perception about Firm's Strategic Orientation
As argued by Miller and Friesen (1981), managerial perception about the strategic 
orientation of their firm can be operationalised through two dimensions. The first is a 
measure of perceived analytical orientation of the firm; the second is a measure of the 
emphasis on innovation. In the research instrument section of this thesis, there are four 
questions pertaining to the issue of analysis: how far ahead does the firm look into the
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future for strategy making, time spent by top managers in analysing key decisions, the 
extent of industry and competitive analysis carried out by the firm, and the use of 
quantitative analytical techniques. The extent of innovation was addressed through 
three questions : the rate of new product, process and service innovation relative to 
those of competitors, the attempt to lead rather than to follow competitors, and the 
willingness to take risk (see appendix for actual wordings). All the indicators were 
measured through five point rating.
Table 5:8 - Correlations between indicators of perceived 
strategic orientatbn of firm
Industry and U sage of Extent A gressiveness
Futurity of Analysis by competitive quantative of risk in
analysis top management analysis techniques taking competition
Innovativeness 0.34 ** 0.37 ** 0.44** 0.39** 0.20 0.40'
0.23* 0.27* 0.45** 0.23** 0.36**
Agressiveness
in
competition
pjgk
taking 0.14 0.08 0.22 0.02
Use of
quantitative
techniques
Industry and
competitive
analysis
0.51
Analysis by 
top
management 0.32'
Note : * significant at 0.01 
** significant at 0.001
To analyse and improve the construct, the responses were factor analysed using 
unweighted least square technique with varimax rotation. The rotated factor matrix is 
shown in Table 5:9.
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Table 5:9 - "Strategic orientation of the firm" - underlying 
perceptual dimensions
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
1. Futurity of analysis 0.60 -
2. Top management involvement
in analysis 0.41 -
3. Industry and competitive
analysis 0.76 -
4. Use of analytical techniques 0.64 -
5. Extent of risk taking - 0.57
6. Agressiveness in competition - ■ 0.66
7. Product/process/
service innovation 0.50 0.35
Total variance explained 41%
The overall structure of the two factors is somewhat different from the two dimensions 
on which the questions were based. The first factor reflects the respondent's 
perception about the analytical orientation of the firm. The second captures his 
understanding of the firm's attitude toward risk. The two dimensions that emerge from 
the analysis are, therefore, not analysis and innovation, but analysis and risk taking. 
One consequence of this differences is that the only question that directly addressed the 
issue of innovation get loaded on both the factors reflecting perhaps the vary plausible 
situation that innovation is a composite of these two underlying dimensions.
As in the case of the environmental and task characteristics variables, additive scales of 
the measured responses falling uniquely in the two factors rather than the factors 
themselves were used to represent the dimensions of perceived strategic orientation of 
the respondent firms. Thus, two additive scales were constructed to measure the two 
underlying dimensions of analysis and risk-taking. The scale for analysis was 
constructed by adding the scores of the four responses loading on the first factor. The
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scale had a very satisfactory level of reliability (combatche's alpha of 0.71). Similarly, 
the two variables loading uniquely on the second factor, viz., attitude to risk and 
competitive aggressiveness, were added to form a scale for risk. Here again, the 
combatche’s alpha was 0.56 and, being greater than 0.5, suggest acceptable scale of 
reliability.
Conceptually, this analysis leads to a representation of the respondents' perceptions 
about the strategic orientation of their firms in two orthogonal dimensions (Figure 5:1). 
Considering each as a two state variable leads to the two by two matrix shown in the 
figure.
The cells correspond exactly to the Miles and Snow typology of organisational strategic 
types. The reactor carries out little analysis, is risk-averse, and reacts to events after 
they have occurred.
Figure 5:1 - The strategic types
Willingness to take risk 
Low High
High
Extent of 
analysis
Low
The defender avoids risks but is analytical in depending the existing domain. The 
analyser combines a high degree of analysis with the willingness to take risks while 
the prospector is risk-seeking but not particularly given to analysis.
To follow through the analysis, the analyser and risk scales were collapsed into two 
state variables - low if below the mean of the scale, high if above the mean. Figure 5:2 
shows the distribution of the sample into the various categories.
Defender Analyser
Reactor Prospector
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Figure 5:2 - Distribution of study sample among 
different strategic types
Willingness to take risk
Lower than Higher than
sample average sample average
Higher than 
Extent of sample average 
analysis
Lower than 
sample average
Before proceeding with the discussions, it is necessary to note again that the typology 
is based on the respondents’ perceptions about the strategic orientations of their 
firms/institutions. In terms of the way the measurement was carried out, they cannot 
be taken to represent the reliability of the strategies of the firms. However, it may be 
recalled from chapter three and, in particular, from the discussions about the unit and 
level of analysis, that this is one of the very few variables where the firm/institution is a 
significant discriminator for the responding managers. In other words, the perceptions 
of the individual managers about the strategic orientations of their firms/institutions are 
reasonably similar for managers within each firm. It may be worthwhile to recall that 
"perceived strategic orientation of the firm" is one of the few variables for which a 
significant part of the variance in individual level measures is explained at the level of 
the institution (see Table 3:17 in Chapter 3). Thus, while the writer measures 
perception here, in actual practice the homogeneity of perceptions within individual 
organisations suggest that such perceptions may indeed be indicative of an internal 
consensus about the firm's strategy. And in the modem view of interpretive strategy 
(Chaffe, 1984), it is this socially constructed consensus that represents the reality of a 
firm's strategy. To quote Chaffe," . . .  reality is defined through a process of social 
interchange in which perception are affirmed, modified, or replaced according to their 
apparent congruence with the perceptions of others" (Chaffe, 1984, p9). The writer
Defender 
(n = 28)
Analyser 
(n = 15)
Reactor 
(n = 24)
Prospector 
(n = 43)
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submits in this thesis that it is this congruence that he captures through perceptional 
measures.
The Individual's Strategic Orientation
The writer of this thesis had begun this section by arguing that to analyse the 
differences in the activities of individual managers, it is necessary to consider not only 
the differences in their perceptions about the environment, their tasks, and about their 
organisations but also differences in their own intrinsic attitudes and orientations. The 
writer has so far described the way in which he measured the relevant environmental, 
task and company characteristics. For all these variables, empirically tested measure 
were available from the literature. But, as indicted earlier, the effect of individual 
characteristics on managerial activities such as scanning has not been explored so far 
and there was no validated measure of such characteristics available in the literature for 
ready adoption. However, a conceptual framework for operationalising this dimension 
has been suggested by Stevenson (1984) and this framework was used in this study for 
differentiating the respondents along the dimension of entrepreneur-trustee in terms of 
their intrinsic strategic orientation.
In what he calls "a rough paradigm of entrepreneuralship", Stevenson suggests that 
individual (and corporate) behaviour can be characterised as ranging on a spectrum that 
runs from the entrepreneurial -"the type who says I can make it happen" - to the 
trustee "who says I must guard what I have". He establishes five dimensions for 
differentiating between entrepreneurial and trustee-like behaviour. These dimensions 
are shown in Figure 5:3.
The first dimension is strategic drive. The entrepreneur is truly opportunity driven and 
sees his managerial task as acquisition of resources required to pursue the opportunities 
presented by the environment. The trustee also recognises the need to pursue 
opportunities but includes in his feasible set only those opportunities that can be
exploited by the slack resources currently available to him. Thus, better exploitation of 
currently controlled resources rather than opportunities per se drives the strategy of the 
trustee.
The next dimension moves beyond the identification of opportunity to its pursuit. The 
entrepreneur "is a person willing to act in a very short time frame and to chase 
opportunity quickly... they are able to engage in commitment in a rather revolutionary 
fashion". A trustee, on the other hand, moves slowly, takes a longer time in deciding 
on his commitments but once the decision is made, the commitments are of long 
duration.
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Figure 5:3 - Distinctions between entrepreneurs 
and trustees
Entrepreneur Key business dimension Trustee
Driven by 
perception of 
opportunity
< ---------------------►
Entrepreneurial domain
Managerial domain^ 
Strategic orientation
Driven by 
resources 
currently 
controlled
Revolutionary 
with short 
duration
< -------------------- ►
Entrepreneurial domain 
< --------------- ►
Managerial domain
Commitment to opportunity
Evolutionary 
of long 
duration
Multistaged 
with minimal 
exposure at 
each stage
< ------------------►
Entrepreneurial domain 
< ----------►
Managerial domain
Commitment of resources
Single-staged 
with complete 
commitment 
upon decision
Episodic use 
of rent of 
required 
resources
< ---------------------►
Entrepreneurial domain
Managerial domain 
Control of resources
Ownership or 
employment of 
required 
resources
Flat with 
multiple 
informal 
network
< ------------------►
Entrepreneurial domain 
< ------ ►
Managerial domain
Management Structure
Formalised
hierarchy
Source : Stevenson, 1984
Commitment of resources is the third dimension along which Stevenson differentiates 
between these two extremes on the behavioural spectrum. A trustee maps all the 
decision points (Miles, Snow and Pfeffer, 1974) along a particular strategic thrust and 
undertakes the move only when he is reasonably assured of being able to meet all the 
resource requirements that are expected to arise along the way. An entrepreneur, in 
contrast, is much more willing to 'bootstrap* the process. His commitment of 
resources is multistaged, with minimum exposure at each stage. To quote Stevenson,
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"he is willing to do a little more with a little less".
The fourth discriminating dimension is the individual's attitude toward control of 
resources. Trustees believe that they do not control a resource unless they own it,
i.e., have in-house. An entrepreneur, on the other hand, owns only what he must 
and rents the others as and when needed. He is adept at using others resources and 
leverages himself far more and pursues more opportunities than a trustee with similar 
resources can engage in.
Finally, with the organisation, an entrepreneur prefers to work through informal 
networking rather than through the formal structure. He prefers an organic system 
rather than mechanistic one. A trustee controls through systems while an 
entrepreneur control through personal contact with all the key actors and through one- 
to-one relationship.
Measurement and Scaling.
In the questionnaire, the writer directly used the questions proposed by Stevenson (see 
appendix). As of that time, the questions had not been administered before and no 
estimates were therefore available of their reliability or validity (The geographical 
distance of Malaysia and Glasgow, Scotland to have the questionnaire tested before the 
final introduction of it for this thesis, was a big hindrance and caused the encumbrances 
encountered afterward).
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The Spearman rank correlations among the four dimensions are shown in Table 5:10
Table 5:10 - Correlation between indicators of individual 
strategic orientation
Strategic Commitment to Commitment Control of
drive resources of resources resources
Management
structure - 0.29* 0.34** 0.20 0.09
Control of
resources -0.32** 0.00 0.29**
Commitment of 
resources - 0.14 0.13
Commitment to 
opportunity - 0.12
* significant at 0.01 
** significant at 0.001
This table highlights a significant problem in the construct, for the measure of strategic 
drive is negatively correlated with all the other measures of what has been proposed as 
the same underlying dimension. The first hints of this problem were manifest when the 
questionnaire was personally administered to the writer's friends or former 
collegemates and graduates of the same alma mater in the United States 
(managers/respondents) in selected organisations in Malaysia. The respondents had, 
almost without exception, expressed difficulties in answering this question. They did 
not perceive the statements at the two end of the scale to be contradictory per se. To 
be opportunity driven was not seen as a counterpoint to more efficient utilisation of 
existing resources. Besides, to get more out of existing resources may also be seen as 
an entrepreneurial characteristic. Thus, this negative association between what has
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been measured as strategic drive and the other measures perhaps is indicative of 
ambiguity in the way the question was framed rather than of any significant underlying 
relationship.
This issue emerges even more clearly when the responses are factor analysed. Recall 
that the dimensions are proposed at different aspects of the same basic distinction - that 
of between a trustee and an entrepreneur. Yet, on factor analysis (principal 
component with varimax rotation), two factors emerge with loadings as shown in Table 
5:11. Strategic drive loads negatively on both the factors. Further, management 
structure and commitment to opportunity do not emerge as unambiguous 
discriminators, loading almost similarly on both factors. On the other hand, 
commitment of resources and, particularly, control of resources emerge as very 
powerful discriminators.
Table 5:11 - Factor analysis: indicators of strategic of individual
Factor 1 Factor 2
Strategic drive - 0.03 0.03
Commitment of resources 0.38 - 0.01
Control of resources 0.79 - 0.62
Management structure 0.62 0.65
Commitment to opportunity 0.27 0.29
It has already been argued that the problem with the measure of strategic drive may be 
improper formulation in general. The ambiguity in the effect of the management 
structure variable may, on the other hand, be due to situational factors. In the U.S., 
where the measures had been proposed, the reliance on formal versus informal 
mechanisms within the organisation may indeed be a valid discriminator between 
entrepreneurs and trustees. But, in Malaysia, given the formal and highly structured 
social and institutional systems, this distinction may not be valid. In fact, as can be 
seen from Table 4:14, the respondents leaned much more to the trustee side on this
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question than on any other. In Malaysia, relationships are formal and social and 
cultural environment may negate the entrepreneurial-informal connection proposed in 
the model.
Finally, commitment to opportunity fails to discriminate, probably because of language 
difficulties on the part of the respondents. During the application of the instrument, this 
question, more than any other, required elaborate explanations. (It could have been a 
disaster, had not the method of applying them i.e., face-to-face, been used). The 
problem is perhaps two fold. First, the question has a complex language structure 
which Malaysians, in general, even though they understand English, have some 
difficulty in interpreting. Second, it is also a complex construct which, as a concept, 
they find difficult to understand. Note, however, that unlike the question on strategic 
drive, they have no difficulty in understanding the dimensions and in accepting the two 
extreme as valid opposites once the construct is explained to them. In other word, the 
problem is not one of validity of the construct but one of framing the question and the 
same question may perform very well among respondents with greater skills in the 
English language.
Given these problems with three of the five measures, and in view of the excellent 
discriminating power of the remaining two, a decision was taken to ignore the three and 
to use only the two unambiguously differentiating variables for constructing a 
composite scale for measuring individual strategic orientation. Thus, the respondents' 
scores on the two dimensions of commitment of resources and control of resources 
were added to form this scale labelled ENTRPR. The scale had a rather poor but 
marginally acceptable reliability (alpha of 0.47). The scale was further split in two 
halves, as in the case of the other variables, to create dichotomous categories of 
respondents as entrepreneurs or trustees.
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RELATING PERCEPTIONS OF ENVIRONMENT, TASK AND STRATEGY.
In this chapter, the writer has established the scales and measures for the various 
variables that are a-priori expected to influence scanning behaviour of managers. Some 
of these measures are direct and simple - such as the hierarchical level of the manager. 
Some others, at the level of individual attributes, are operationalised as complex and 
composite variables, for example, the manager's experience with diversity. For the 
environment, two composite scales for measuring predictability and heterogeneity 
was established. The task was also characterised in terms of one dimension - the extent 
of structure - and have established and additive scale for its measurement. Finally, the 
writer of this thesis has proposed and constructed scales and measures both for the 
manager's perception of the firm's strategic attitude and for said manager's own 
intrinsic strategic orientation. Before moving on to the actual data on scanning, it is 
necessary to explore how these variables, which may influence or moderate scanning 
behaviour or be influenced and moderated by it, are associated among themselves. The 
writer’s objective at this point is only to note the associations and not really to interpret 
them. The language used may imply a certain causal direction, but this is only for the 
convenience of exposition {i.e., to avoid repetition of the statement "or the other way 
round"). Do very kindly note that the writer of this thesis claim no specific direction of 
causality.
Environmental characteristics and strategic orientation.
Table 5:12 shows the Spearman correlation between the two dimensions of 
environmental characteristics and the three measures of strategic orientation - two for 
the firm and one for the individual. Only correlations significant at 0.05 or less have 
been shown in the table. As can be readily observed, environmental predictability is 
not correlated with any of the other variables, while environmental dynamism is
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positively and significantly correlated with both the measures of perceived 
organisational strategy, and also the measure of personal strategic orientation of the 
manager.
Table 5:12 - Correlations between environmental characteristics 
and strategic orientation
Individual Risk taking Extent
entrepreneurial by analysis in firm's
Predictability
orientation firm strateev making;
of environment - -
Dynamism of
environment 0.23 0.30 0.35
The finding that strategic orientation is associated with environmental dynamism but 
not with predictability, is entirely consistent with Miller and Friesen's (1981) findings 
in their study of successful and unsuccessful U.S. and Canadian firms. The results are 
not directly comparable here since the writer use only two dimensions to describe the 
environment while Miller and Friesen used three. They however, did not carry out any 
investigation to see if their conceptual scheme proposing the three dimensions were 
indeed supported by the data.
But, their results were unambiguous and the distinction between successful and 
unsuccessful firms was unequivocal only with regard to the association between 
environmental dynamism and organisational analysis and innovation; a result that is 
validated by the data used in this thesis.
A possible explanation may lie in what has already been discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Environmental predictability is largely perceived through experience of the 
past: it is based on the pattern of confirmation or disconfirmation of expectations based 
on previous events or facts. To an extent, therefore, perception of environmental
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predictability is more objective (refer, for instance to the finding that this perception 
does not vary systematically across the organisation hierarchy). Environmental 
dynamism, on the other hand, is much more subjective; like beauty, it lies much more 
in the eyes of the beholder. A more proactive company - more intrusive, in the 
language of Daft and Weick (1984), makes salient a wider array of interlinkages and 
interdependencies and also enhances members' sensitivity to external changes. Thus, 
managers in such relatively intrusive firms, firms/institutions that are more analytical or 
risk-seeking or both, tend to see their environments as more dynamic and 
heterogeneous.
Environmental characteristics and perception of structure in task.
Environmental characteristics are found not to have any association with the managers 
perception about the extent of structure in their task.
Daft and Macintosh (1981), in their survey in Canada, had found a significant 
association between task analysability (the principal component in the task stmcture 
variable used in this study) and equivocality of information (measured quite similarly to 
the writer's measure of environmental predictability). This finding cannot however be 
validated because the data in this thesis did not yield any significant correlation between 
the two variables.
Strategic orientation and perception of task.
Table 5:13 shows the associations between the respondents'l perceptions about the 
extent of structure in their tasks, their individual strategic orientation and their 
perceptions of their firm's strategy. Only correlations significant at 0.05 are shown in 
the table.
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Table 5:13 - Corelation between task characteristic and 
strategic orientation.
Individual's Risk taking Analytical
entrepreneurial by orientation of
orientation firm of firm
Perception of task
structure - 0.14 - 0.12
The more entrepreneurial the manager, the less structured the task is perceived to be. 
Conversely, trustees tend to consider their task as relatively more structured.
The second association is also logically consistent. The more unstructured the task, the 
more the organisation has to be and is seen to be analytically oriented. Unstructured 
task create uncertainty and necessitate analysis for uncertainty reduction.
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Chapter Six 
The extent of scanning
CHAPTER SIX
THE EXTENT OF SCANNING
In this chapter, the respondents' overall attitudes and behaviour with regard to the 
environmental scanning function are explored. Principally two issues are addressed: 
how important do they perceive the scanning task to be, and how much of their total 
work time do they allocate to this task. The effects of different environmental, 
organisational and individual attributes on such attitudes and behaviours are 
investigated.
IMPORTANCE OF SCANNING
The respondents to the questionnaire had been asked to rate the importance of 
environmental scanning for carrying out their own jobs. They had a choice of three 
categories: 'not important', 'moderately important', and 'extremely important'. The 
distribution of responses is shown in Table 6:1.
Table 6:1 - Importance of scanning
Frequency Percent
Not important 7 6.3
Moderately important 38 34.2
Most important 65 58.6
For clearer analysis, the two categories of 'not important' and 'moderately important' 
were combined into one - "not very important" which was then contrasted with the 
category "most important". Private firms' and/or WCF managers consider scanning to 
be relatively more important than do their counterparts in the NWCF (Table 6:2). This 
seems to be consistent with the nature of their businesses; information being the chief 
asset and stock-in-trade for the WCF.
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Table 6:2 - Effect of firm's business on perceived
importance of scanning
Types of institutions/firms 
WCF NWCF
Not very important 18 27
Perceived 
importance of 
scanning
Very important 40 25
Significant at 0.01
Top managers appear, in general, to consider scanning to be more important compared 
to their lower level colleagues (senior/middle and junior managers). This can be seen 
from Table 6:3.
Table 6:3 - Effect o f management level on perceived 
importance of scanning
Top management Others 
Not very important 4 41
Perceived 
importance 
of scanning
Very important 16 49
Significant at 0.05
As could be expected, entrepreneurs were found to consider scanning to be relatively 
more important than do trustees (Table 6:4).
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Table 6:4 -  Effect of individual strategic orientation
on perceived importance of scanning
Entrepreneur Trustee
Not very
important 17 27
Perceived 
importance 
of scanning
Very
important 33 31
Significant at 0.05
Predictably, a perception of tasks being relatively unstructured lead to enhanced 
importance of scanning (Table 6:5)
Table 6:5 - Association between perceptions of task 
characteristics and scanning importance.
Structured task Unstructured tasks
Not very
important 19 26
Perceived 
importance 
of scanning
Very important 21 44
Significant at 0.05
Scanning importance is not associated with the predictability of the environment. 
Perhaps, in an unpredictable environment, information ceases to be very important 
since it cannot reduce uncertainty or guide action. But heterogeneity of the 
environment increases the perceived importance of scanning (Table 6:6) as more 
sectors or environmental actors become salient the need for monitoring them become 
more manifest.
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In interpreting these associations, it must be cautioned that some of them may be quite
/
spurious, due either to the nature of the sample or the correlations between the different 
criterion variables. In the chapters that follows, a multivariate model building approach 
will be employed where the interactions among the influencing variables will be 
specially considered. The objective of looking at the bivariate relations is primarily 
descriptive - to develop in a step-by-step manner the smaller pieces of the model so that 
the final multivariate picture can be interpreted more meaningfully.
Table 6:6 - Effect of environmental heterogeneity on 
perceived importance of scanning.
Environment perceived as
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Not very
important 28 16
Perceived 
importance 
of scanning
Very
importance 30 35
Significant at 0.05
TIME SPENT ON SCANNING
The respondents had been requested to estimate the total number of hours in an average 
work week that they devoted to scanning. On the average, the sampled managers 
spent fourteen hours a week on different activities of weekly scanning time for the 
sample shown in Table 6:7. It can be seen that there are a few extreme scores - eight 
respondents claiming to spend more than fourty hours per week on this function. On 
investigation, they were found to belong to the formal scanning units of their 
organisations, devoting their full time to this activity.
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Table 6:7 - Distribution of weekly scanning time.
Number of hours per week 
spent on scanning Frequency
0 to 12 
11 to 20 
21 to 30 
31 to 40 
41 to 50 
51 to 60
34
51
15
1
4
4
Effect of management level on scanning time
Almost all past researchers on scanning have explored at considerable length the effect 
of management level on scanning behaviour - searching for evidence to support the 
traditional conception of top executives as the primary link between the organisation 
and the environment. Hambrick (1982) has recently reviewed the evidence, along with 
his own findings, and has shown that research findings so far do not provide any 
evidence to support this contention.
The data in this thesis generally confirms the past findings about the absence of any 
significant association between management level and scanning time. However, it does 
show a statistically significant difference in total time spent on scanning by WCF and 
NWCF managers. NWCF executives used as sample in this thesis spend an average 
sixteen hours per week on scanning, considerably more than the twelve hours spent by 
their counterparts in WCF. Perhaps WCF executives need to scan only the output 
market while NWCF managers need to monitor the input, throughput and out markets, 
thereby requiring more scanning effort and time. Or, perhaps, given the nature of their 
work, WCF executives do not perceive certain activities as scanning, while NWCF 
executives classify them as such.
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Table 6:8 - Joint effect of firm's business and management 
level on total scanning time. [Figures in brackets 
are cell counts].
Total scanning hours per week
WCF NWCF Total sample
Junior managers 12 (29) 16
(34) 14 (63)
Senior/middle managers 11 (18) 24
(8) 14 (26)
Top managers 12 (11) 11
(9) 11 (20)
Average 12 (58) 16
(51) 14 (109)
Scanning and perceived structure in tasks.
More time is spent on scanning by managers who perceived their task as unstructured 
compare to those who see their tasks as relatively structured (one way analysis of 
variance F = 1.94 significant at alpha 0.11)
Table 6:9 - Scanning time and perception of task structure.
Hours per week on scanning 
Task is seen as structured 12
Task is seen as unstructured 15
This is a reconfirmation of a pattern in the relationship between scanning and 
perception of task that has consistently emerged earlier: unstructured tasks enhance the 
importance of and the effort and time invested in collecting information. That 
association, as a number of organisation theorists have argued, is the basic premise of 
the information processing view of organisations and the pattern of consistent results
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emerging from this study provides a degree of support to that theory.
Effect of environment and strategy
Curiously, neither the environmental characteristics nor perceived orientation of the 
firm, had any significant main effect on the amount of scanning time. Similarly, the 
personal strategic orientation of the individual also does not appear to have any 
discernible influence on the time spent by managers in collecting external information. 
Note that many of these variables were found to have significant effects on the 
perceived importance of scanning and the time devoted to it. This is a phenomenon 
which will be dealt with in greater details in the chapters that follows.
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Chapter Seven 
The content of scanning
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CONTENT OF SCANNING
In the preceeding chapters, the respondents' attitudes and their behaviour was explored 
with regard to the overall function of environmental scanning. This chapter, attempts to 
develop a more disaggregated understanding of environmental scanning at the individual 
manager level. What kinds of information do the responding managers consider to be 
important?. What kind of information do they acquire? What sources do they use? Are 
these choices affected by the personal, organisational and environmental attributes 
discussed in chapter two? These are the questions addressed in this chapter. The findings 
are compared with those of previous studies on scanning behaviour of managers in the 
U.S. institutions and its is seen that similarities are indeed remarkable. Finally, the kinds 
of information acquired are juxtaposed with the sources used to develop a profile of how 
external information flows into an organisation.
THE FACTOR CLASSIFICATION
Aguilar (1967) evolved a categorisation scheme for grouping different kinds of information 
along different factors. The schema was developed empirically rather than normatively and 
has stood the test of time, having been adopted successfully by a number of different 
researchers including Keegan (1967) Collings (1968), and Kefalas and Schoderbek 
(1971). This study, adopts a similar factor classification, making it easy to compare the 
findings about Malaysian managers with the earlier findings about American managers.
The factor classification provides a descriptive grouping of different kinds of information 
collected. As suggested by Keegan, the norms for a proper factor classification schema 
are:
1. Collectively, the factors must be exhaustive, i.e., each item of information 
should find a place in one of the factors.
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2. The factors must be mutually exclusive. Any given item of information must 
belong, as unambiguously as possible, to one of the factors.
3. The classification must be functional and must be related to actual scanning 
practices.
While a number of researchers have used the overall factor classifications scheme proposed 
by Aguilar, all of them have also made minor changes to the actual definitions of the 
different factors so as to suit their specific purposes. In this study, the same schema is also 
used which in essence is synthesis arising out of those previous studies. The different 
factors and the kind of information included in each are as below:
1. Competitive Factors:
All information connected with competitor, present and potential, including their actions, 
decisions, strategies, plans, strength, weaknesses, et cetera.
2. Market factors:
All information about the markets excluding issues connected with competition. Examples: 
market potential, customers' needs and taste, distribution channels, promotion responses, 
et cetera.
3. Technology Factors:
All information about present and potential products and process technologies.
4. Regulatory Factors:
All information regarding regulations that can affect the respondents business operations, 
including information about regulatory agencies and personnel.
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5. Resource Factors :
All information on financial, labour and raw-material markets that affect goods and 
services, resources and services procured by the firm for carrying out its operations.
6. Broad issues :
All information on demographic, social, economic and political trends.
7. Other Factors :
Information on factors not included in any of the earlier categories, e.g., indigenous 
(bumiputras) interest, (the indigenous group of citizens of Malaysia are given special 
priviledges in term of relaxation of the stringent regulations imposed on trade and 
commerce enshrined in the country's constitution), et cetera.
Testing the Factor Classification Scheme
While the factor classification scheme was adopted primarily in the interest of comparability 
of findings, the appropriateness of the construct was also tested.
All respondents were asked a direct question about their reaction to the construct and 
whether the categorisation scheme captured the way they think about external information. 
Out of the 108 valid responses received, 105 or 97% agreed that the classification scheme 
was appropriate and reflected the way they thought about information. This was a clear 
and strong vote in favour of the construct.
Next, there is a possibility that underlying the seven factors was a smaller number of 
distinct and non-overlapping groups. This possibility was explored in two ways: through 
a study of correlations between the factors and also by direct factor analysis.
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Only two significant correlations were found among the factors. Competitive and market 
factors were correlated with each other as were the broad issues and residual "others" 
factors. These associations are expected and logical. But on factor analysis using 
unweighted least squares, no more parsimonious factor structure emerged and after the 
third iteration, the eigenvalues and vectors were not calculable. Thus, overall, the factors 
were quite independent and distinct.
On the basis of this analysis, it was concluded that the factor construct used in this study 
was appropriate and that the seven categories of factors were non-overlapping enough to be 
meaningful.
IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULTY ASSOCIATED WITH FACTORS
Respondents were asked to rank the factors on a seven point scale in terms of their relative 
importance for the respondent’s own work and also in term of the difficulties in collecting 
valid information on them. The average scores (both mean and mode) for importance and 
difficulties are shown in Table 7:1.
Table 7:1 - Importance and Difficulties scores
Importance Difficulties
Means Modes Means Modes
Competitive 5.3 7 4.6 6
Technology 4.4 5 4.9 7
Regulatory 3.7 3 3.8 3
Resources 4.0 3 3.8 4
Broad Issues 3.1 2 3.8 2
Others 3.0 1 3.1 1
The importance and difficulties scores for all the factors are correlated positively and 
significantly at 0.01 level. Thus, there is a clear and direct one-to-one mapping between the
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perceived importance of factors and the difficulty in collecting information on them.
In a survey of American managers carried by Ghoshal (1983), he collected the factor 
importance scores from each of thirty-two Fortune 500 U. S. multinationals. In that 
survey a classification scheme using only five factors were used. In Table 7:2 the rating 
obtained from the Ghoshal’s study are compared with the findings from the present study 
of Malaysian managers.
Table 7:2 - Perception of factors importance: comparison 
of US.managers and Malaysian managers
Relative importance Relative importance 
of factors to the U.S. of factors to Malaysian
managers (scale 1-5) managers (scale 1-5)
Score Rank Score Rank
Competitive 4.3 1 4.6 2
Market Nil Nil 4.9 1
Technology 2.9 5 4.2 3
Regulatory 3.2 3 3.8 6
Resource 3.3 2 3.8 4
Broad Issues 3.0 4 33.8 5
Others Nil Nil 3.1 7
Both groups of managers consider competitive and market information as the most 
important. However, there are interesting and fairly sharp differences between the groups 
with regard to the other factors. The sample of U. S. managers had given the lowest 
importance rating to the technology factor. The Malaysian, in contrast, consider 
technological information to be second in importance only to market and competitive 
information. There are limitations in this comparison arising out of the research 
methodologies - primarily the rather severe non-response bias in the Ghoshal study and its 
focus on general managers in the international divisions of American multinationals. But, 
the hierarchical and functional distribution of the samples are not different enough to
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warrant such a major differences in the scores. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that 
the Ghoshal study saw U.S. managers are of international operations - looking from the 
U. S. outward. These managers do not focus on technological information, for they 
perceived that there is little to learn on that front from abroad. The Malaysian respondents 
are managers/leaders looking from Malaysia - mostly outward, the U.S. and Japan. 
Monitoring technology is much more important for them. Another possible explanation 
may be that technology monitoring is a highly specialised and differentiated function in the 
U.S. and the regular line managers, therefore, do not concern themselves with this aspect 
of scanning. Such specialisation may be far less in Malaysia, thereby making the line 
managers more involved in looking out for technological information.
Another significant difference lies in the score for regulatory information. U.S. managers 
consider regulatory information to be relatively more important than do Malaysian 
managers. One possible explanation is that most of Malaysia's international business is 
conducted with relatively free-market countries - the U.S., EEC and the Middle East. For 
the U.S. firms, the share of business conducted in developing countries was higher, and 
the share of problems possibly even more so. These are controlled markets for which 
regulatory information assume greater importance. Besides, the findings may be indicative 
of concern often voiced inside and outside Malaysia - that Malaysian managers are often 
not sensitive enough to regulatory developments. Actions by the U.S. government, at the 
time of writing this thesis, affecting Malaysian exports of tin and palmoil et cetera and a 
host of other products will perhaps soon reduce this difference.
TIME SPENT ON FACTORS
The respondents were also asked to estimate the percentage of their total scanning time 
spend on the different factors. The average scores along with the standard deviation are 
shown in Table 7:3.
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Table 7:3 - Distribution of scanning time among factors
Percentage of scanning time spent on factors
Mean Standard deviation
Competitive 20 10.1
Market 27 12.5
Technology 13 11.0
Regulatory 12 7.5
Resources 12 6.4
Broad Issues 10 8.5
Others 5 4.4
A number of earlier studies have investigated the same issue - though they have adopted 
different methodologies and instruments. Table 7:4 compares the findings of this study 
with those of the five major studies conducted in the U.S. This table shows that the 
scanning pattern of Malaysian managers, at least in terms of the relative amount of time 
spent on different kinds of information, is not dissimilar to that of their American 
counterpart. For each factor, the average score for the Malaysian sample lies within the 
range defined by the previous survey in the U.S.
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Table 7:4  -  Factors scanned: a comparison of findings
Factors
Financial Meat Farm
Chemical serv ices packing equipment
industry in industries in American industry industry
the U.S. the U.S. multinationals jn the y  s  jn the y  s
(Aguilar) (Collings) (Keegan)
Leading 
govt, backed 
firms in
Malaysia (WCFs 
and NWCFs) 
(Kefalas and Schoderbek) (Yunggar)
Competitive 58
Market
Technical 18
Regulatory
Resource
Broad issues 8
General
conditions
External
growths
Others 9
Acquisition
leads
54
17
12
17
9
20
27
16
15
33
20
18
N = 190 238 139
7
23
44
35
30
8
6
21
45
20
13
13
10
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Influences on the allocation of scanning time among factors.
Compared to NWCF, WCF spend relatively a greater share of their scanning time in 
monitoring competitive and market information. The NWCF, in turn, focus relatively 
more on technological information (Table 7:5). There is no significant difference between 
them with regard to the share of scanning time spent on other factors. These differences 
are entirely expected and plausible, given the nature of their businesses and the functions 
they carry out.
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Table 7:5 -  Scanning in WCF and NWCF in Malaysia
Nature of the firm's business
WCF NWCF Is difference significant?
Competitive 23 18 Yes, at 0.001
Market 31 23 Yes, at 0.001
Technology 9 18 Yes, at 0.001
Regulatory 12 11 Yes, at 0.100
Resource 11 12 No, at 0.100
Broad Issues 9 11 No, at 0.100
Others 4 5 No, at 0.100
Hambrick (1982) has reviewed quite exhaustively the existing literature attempting to relate 
scanning with the hierarchical level of managers. As shown by him, no unambiguous 
relationships have been found despite the common notion that scanning behaviour of senior 
managers is quite different from that of their junior colleagues. The only exception (though 
this study was not covered in Hambrick's review, perhaps because it has not been 
published) was the survey of the U.S. financial services industry by Collings (1968) who 
found that, in comparison to lower level managers, top managers spent a far lower share of 
their time scanning for market information and far more of their time on regulatory 
information. But this may well have been a peculiarity of the industry and not a general 
phenomenon. Hambrick found some weak evidence of positive association between 
management level and scanning only for the output sector (market, et cetera) and that too, 
only for the insurance company sample, reinforcing the hint that this is an industry-specific 
relationship.
Table 7:6 shows the distribution of factor-wise scanning time segregated by manager’s 
level for the Malaysian managers sampled in this study.
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Table 7:6 - Effect of management level on share of
time spent on different factors.
Percentage of total scanning time
Junior Middle/Senior T o p
managers managers managers
Competitive 21 21 19
Market 24 33 27
Technology 15 11 13
Regulatory 12 10 12
Resource 12 11 11
Broad Issues 9 9 14
Others 5 4 4
None of the differences are statistically significant even at the 0.01 level, except for the 
market factors on which middle managers are found to focus much more than either the top 
or the bottom of the hierarchy.
This is a veiy weak first sight of a phenomenon that will surface again in this thesis that 
middle managers play a different and particularly crucial role in scanning. For the time 
being, however, it should be noticed that, overall, the data confirms the previous finding 
that management level is not a significant explanatory variable of differences among 
managers in terms of the kind of information they spend their time to acquire.
The fact that marketing managers spend more of their time on marketing information, or 
that financial managers focus relatively more on financial information is neither very 
surprising nor probably very interesting. However, such associations serve one important 
purpose; their presence enhances credibility of the data and, thereby, of the other 
associations suggested by the data. All previous research on managerial scanning had 
found such associations between functional affiliation of the managers and their allocation 
of scanning time among the various factors. This relationship emerges very clearly in this
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study also : marketing executives scan the market more than others, R&D managers 
concentrate on technological information, finance managers monitor resource related issues 
and planning functionaries pay relatively greater attention to the regulatory factors (Table 
7:7).
Table 7:7 - Effect of functional affiliation on factor-wise scanning
Factor Marketing R&D Planning Finance Gen. Mgt. Others
Competitive 23 17 18 20 20 26
Market I 33 I 24 22 29 30 19
Technology 10 I 21 I 12 10 12 18
Regulatory 10 12 E 13 9 13
Resource 10 10 13 | 17 | 12 13
Broad issues 10 9 11 9 12 9
Others 4 3 6 6 2 4
Note : Figures within boxes are significantly different (at 0.10) from 
others in the same row (Ftest)
The effect, if any, of a number of other variables on allocation of scanning time was 
explored. It was observed that perception about the task and about the strategic orientation 
of the company did not have a significant effect on the kind of information a manager 
emphasised in this scanning efforts. But, perceived environmental predictability and the 
personal strategic orientation of the individual had significant effect on one or more of the 
factors (Table 7:8 and 7:9).
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Table 7:8 - Effect on perceived predictability of the
environment on factor-wise allocation of scanning 
time.
Percentage of total scanning time
Environment Environment Significant 
perceived as perceived as of ANOVA 'F
predictable unpredictable statistics
Competitive 22 18 0.04
Market 29 25 >0.14
Technology 12 14 >0.10
Regulatory 10 13 >0.10
Resources 10 13 0.10
Broad Issues 10 10 >0.10
Others 5 4 >0.10
In a predictable environment, scanning is relatively more concentrated on the output 
market; on market conditions and on monitoring customers and competitors' behaviour. 
This is the behaviour under condition of stability and during time of peace - the stability 
often arising from oligopolistic industry structures. Other factors play a relatively 
unimportant role as players depend their niches and focus their strategy on incremental 
progress. There is change in the environment, caused mostly through competition, but no 
discontinuity. When, on the other hand, the environment is perceived as unpredictable, the 
present ceases to be very relevant for projecting the future because of the possibility of 
discontinuities. The discontinuities often occured outside the traditional industry domain 
defined through the supplier-producer-customer nexus. They are produced by 
technological break-through, by regulatory actions or other forces that are largely 
unpredictable.
The principal concern for the firm then becomes its ability to respond flexibly to such 
changes, as and when they arise. The critical factor becomes the capability to respond
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which often depends on the availability of resources. This perhaps makes the resource 
sector more critical and its scanning more important in an unpredictable environment.
The other significant associations, that correlate with the entrepreneurial orientation of the 
manager, is also consistent with intuitive expectations. The entrepreneur concentrates 
much more on the output market than does the trustee. As trustee's scanning practice is 
much more evenly balanced, with a relatively (compared to the entrepreneur) greater 
emphasis on information relevant to the throughput process. The difference is just what 
one would expect between a prospector of opportunities and a defender of the current 
position.
Table 7:9 - Effect of individual strategic orientation on 
allocation of scanning time
Percentage of total scanning time
Entrepreneur Trustee 
Competitive 22 19
Market 28 26
Technology 10 16
Regulatory 12 11
Resources 12 12
Broad Issues 11 10
Others 5 5
Importance of factors, difficulty in collecting information on them, and the allocation of 
scanning time.
It was shown earlier in this chapter that there is a close association between the perceived 
difficulty in acquiring different kind of information and the importance a manager attaches 
to such information. What is difficult to get is also important, whatever may be the causal 
direction. What is more interesting, however, is that the shares of scanning time spent by 
managers on different factors are not consistent either with the perceived importance of 
those factors or with the difficulty in collecting information on them. Table 7:10 shows the
121
Spearman rank correlation between the importance and difficulty scores and between the 
importance scores and time shares for the different factors.
Table 7:10 - Correlations between importance, difficulty 
and time shares
Spearman rank correlations between
Importance and Importance score
difficulty scores and time share
Competitive 0.45 (0.000) 0.13 (0.082)
Market 0.34 (0.000) - 0.01 (0.445)
Technology 0.34. (0.000) 0.27 (0.002)
Regulatory 0.13 (0.080) - 0.05 (0.309)
Resource 0.24 (0.007) 0.11 (0.128)
Broad Issues 0.43 (0.000) 0.22 (0.011)
Others 0.55 (0.000) - 0.05 (0.315)
The source of the discrepancy is that managers spend disproportionately large amount of 
their time scanning the market and competitive factors and too little on regulatory and other 
socio-economic issues. Their importance scores are distributed in a far more balanced way 
across the factors than is their allocation of scanning time. Here is evidence of a 
phenomenon often commented on {e.g., Willensky, 1967) - of short term interests driving 
out long term interests; of managerial myopia. What is interesting is that the behavioural 
outcome is not due to any problems of perception and understanding. It occurs in spite of 
and in contradiction to the perception. As Wellinsky comments, the desire for immediate 
predictions and the reliance on "hard facts", results in managers spending 
disproportionately large share of their scanning efforts on the immediate output market. 
The contradiction is between perceived urgency and importance.
An interesting hypothesis follows. The gap between what is seen as important and what is 
actually done often results from a manager’s lack of control on his or her time. External
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pressures of immediacy rather than perceived importance of a task dictates allocation of 
managerial time. However, top managers probably enjoy relatively greater freedom with 
regard to how they should allocate their time and can, therefore, allocate it more 
consistently in terms of the relative importance of different categories of tasks. One can, 
following this argument, expect to see a stronger correlation between factor-wise 
importance scores and distribution of scanning time for top managers compared to their 
junior colleagues. As can be seen from Table 7:11, the data in this thesis provides fairly 
strong support for this hypothesis. Five of the seven correlations are significant for top 
managers, while three are significant for senior/middle managers and only one is 
significant for the junior manager. What we have, however, is evidence of an association 
for which many causal explanations can be offered beside the argument of control overtime 
that has been presented. It can, for instance, be argued that top managers become top 
managers because they focus on the important and can allocate their time accordingly. A 
more complex organisational argument can be that in scanning, as in any other function, 
there are certain routine aspects that may not be very important but that need to be done any 
way, and these routine tasks are mostly left to managers at relatively lower levels.
In other words, while there may be a gap between what is seen as important and what is 
actually done at the individual level, there may be no such gap at the organisational level.
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Table 7:11 - Importance of and time spent on factors - effect 
of NWCF level
Correlation between importance of time 
spent on different factors
Top Senior/Middle Junior
Competitive * *
Market Sfttft
Technology 5ft5fC5f: s f t s f t *
Regulatory SftSft
Resource 5ft
Broad Issues *  *  5ft
Others 5ft
*** Significant at 0.001
** Significant at 0.05
* Significant at 0.10
USE OF SOURCES
In scanning research, sources have been principally categorised as internal and external to 
the organisation. An individual manager can receive information about the environment 
directly from external sources like customers, suppliers, consultants, publications, et 
cetera.
He can also receive such information from within the organisation; from supervisors, 
subordinates or peers; from reports and computer data bases, and so on. Sources have 
also been categorised as personal and interpersonal, depending on their relationship with 
acquirer.
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Internal and External Sources.
Internal sources contribute, on the average, about 43% of all external information acquired 
by the managers/leaders sampled in this study. The share, ranges from a minimum of 10% 
to a maximum of 90%. Conversely, external sources are relatively more important than 
internal sources and contribute 57% of all external information acquired.
Table 7:12 compares the relative usage of internal and external sources by the Malaysian 
managers to the corresponding findings of the three major studies investigating scanning 
practices of U.S. managers. As can be readily observed, the Malaysian survey results are 
remarkably similar to the findings of Aguilar from his sample of managers in the U.S. 
chemical industry. But, the Malaysian managers use internal sources considerably more 
than Collings' estimate for managers in the U.S. financial services industry or Keegan’s 
estimate for managers in U.S. multinationals.
Table 7:12 - Use of internal and external sources
U.S. managers
Aguilar Collings Keegan Malaysian 
study study study managers
% Internal sources 45 26 34 43
% External sources 55 74 66 57
The relative use of internal and external sources was found to be almost identical in WCF 
and NWCF firms. Similarly, the characteristics of the environment or differences in 
individual strategic orientation or in perceptions about organisational strategy has no 
significant effect on the relative use of internal and external sources. The only variable that 
systematically affect the pattern is the organisational level of the manager. Middle 
managers use external sources much more than do either junior or top managers. This
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observation is valid for both WCF and NWCF firms and is another glimpse of a 
phenomenon that has been encountered earlier, viz., that middle managers constitute the 
key organisational probe into the external environment of the firm.
Table 7:13 - Effect of management level on use of 
external sources.
Percentage of external information acquired 
from external sources
Top
managers
Senior/middle
managers
Junior
managers
WCF
NWCF
Overall
58 (11)
57 ( 9)
58 (20)
66 (18) 
63 ( 8) 
65 (26)
50 (29) 
56 (35) 
54 (35)
Internal sources:
Table 7:14 shows the principal internal sources of environmental information and their 
contribution to the total share of all internal sources.
The results are entirely consistent with those obtained by Aguilar and Collings. They are, 
however, contradictory to the findings of Kefalas and Schoderbek who had reported 
meetings as the single most important internal sources.
Table 7:14 - Relative use of different internal sources
Share of all internal sources %
Colleagues in same office 32
Colleagues in other (including 
branch/overseas) offices of firm 26
In house meetings 10
Internal reports 8
Computer database 8
Others 6
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The importance of internal reports as a source of information has been debated in the 
literature. Kefalas and Schoderbek, had found it to be very important source; others, 
particularly Collings, had found it to be relatively unimportant. This study finds that 
perceived structure in task significantly affects the relative importance of internal reports as 
a source of external information. Reports become more and more important when the task 
is seen as structured compare to when the task is felt to be unstructured (Table 7:15). 
Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the different findings in previous studies. It can be 
argued that service companies in general, are relatively, less differentiated and specialised, 
and managers in such firms face relatively less structured tasks compared to managers in 
NWCF firms. The greater structuring of managerial tasks in the sample firms may be the 
reason that Kefalas found meetings to be as important as he did.
Table 7:15 - Effect of task on use of internal reports as 
a source of external information.
Task perceived as
Structured Unstructured 
Use of internal reports 20 16
(as % of all internal
sources) (n = 40) (n = 70)
(ANOVA F = 2.83, significant at 0.09)
Superiors, subordinates and peers information sources.
Respondents had been requested to indicate which, out of superiors, peers and 
subordinates, were most and least useful sources of external information. Results are 
shown in Table 7:16 (there was some overlap since some respondents marked more than 
one as most or least important). Clearly, subordinates are felt to be less important, in 
general, then either superiors or peers.
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Table 7:16 - Usefulness of superiors, subordinates and peers 
as sources of external information.
Usefulness as a source of external information 
(percentage of respondents)
Most important Less important
Superiors 49 28
Peers 49 27
Subordinates 36 46
As can be expected (and observed by Aguilar and others), the lower the level of the 
manager, the greater the usefulness of superiors as information agents.
Table 7:17 - Effect o f management level on importance of 
superiors as information sources
Hierarchical level of management
Top Senior/middle Junior
Superior most important 7 10 32
Superior least important 9 6 13
(Figures are cell counts)
Also, the more unstructured the task is perceived to be, more useful is the superior (Table 
7:18). With structured tasks, most useful information is of the "hard" or "facts and 
figures" variety described by Willensky (1967). With unstructured tasks, softer or 
judgmental information becomes more useful enhancing the importance of superiors who, 
with their broader perspective and experience, are better equipped to provide soft rather 
than hard information.
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Table 7:18 - Effect of task characteristics on usefulness 
of superiors as information sources
Task perceived as
Structured Unstructured
Superior most important 14 35
Superior least important 12 16
(Figures are cell counts)
Perceived environmental characteristics also affect the usefulness of superiors as 
information sources : they are seen as more important when the environment is considered 
to be unpredictable and heterogeneous (Table 7:19). This observation is entirely consistent 
with the explanation that has been suggested above for the effect of perceived task 
characteristics.
Table 7:19 - Effect of environmental characteristics on
importance of superiors as information sources.
Superior Superior
most important least important
20 19
29 9
(Significant at 0.01)
Environmental characteristics
Homogeneous 20 16
Heterogeneous 29 12
(Significant at 0.05)
Predictable
Unpredictable
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The importance of subordinates is almost a mirror image of the importance of superiors - 
all the significant relationships exist in reverse order. However, there is one variable that 
affects the importance of subordinates as information sources but not that of superiors - the 
nature of the firm's business. Subordinates are seen as relatively more important sources 
of external information in WCF compared to NWCF. (Table 7:20).
Table 7:20 -Importance of subordinates as information source:
WCF and NWCF
WCF
Subordinate is most important 25
Subordinate is least important 17
(Significant at 0.001)
This numerical observation confirms something that emerges quite clearly as one spends 
some time in these companies/firms. The NWCF in Malaysia work in very traditional ways 
which, consistent with its social and institutional culture, are highly feudal and top-down. 
With such organisational arrangements, there are enormous problems in information 
flowing up. Information, particularly useful external information, almost by definition 
flows down, the WCF firms, in contrast, are far more informal and westernised in then- 
work styles and both structurally and culturally they are more conducive to the upward 
flow of information. This can be seen as organisational isomorphism of a sort (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1982) - the WCF firms, dealing as they are with foreign firms, adopt 
ASEAN/Eastern (as seen in the Look East Policy, among other moves), and of course, 
Western styles and systems. This is manifest in the way the offices are laid out, in the way 
people at different levels interact and is visible even to a casual visitor to both kinds of 
firms. One of the effects of this difference is reduced emphasis on hierarchy and a freer 
flow of information both ways across organisational levels.
NWCF
11
29
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External sources.
Table 7:21 shows the relative usage of different external sources by the sampled group of 
Malaysian managers. Customers, suppliers and publications are relatively important 
external sources; advertising agents, consultants and trade shows are relatively 
unimportant. The pattern is entirely similar to the relative importance of different external 
sources observed in the U.S.
Table 7:21 - Use of different external sources
Percentage of all external sources
Customers 16
Suppliers 12
Bankers 8
Advertising agents 5
Agent and distributors 10
Consultants 6
General publications 16
Trade publications 15
Trade shows 6
Others 5
With regard to the relative use of internal sources, there was no significant different 
between WCF and NWCF. However, the usage of external sources are quite different in 
the two (Table 7:22). The WCFs rely a lot more on customers and suppliers than do the 
NWCF. This, however, is not surprising, given the nature of the two kinds of businesses.
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Table 7:22 - Usage of external sources. WCF and NWCF
Percentage share of all external sources
WCF NWCF Different significant at
Customers 21 10 0.001
Suppliers 15 8 0.050
Bankers 8 9 0.050
Advertising agents 
Agent and
4 9 NA
distributors 9 11 NA
Consultants 6 7 0.050
General publications 14 19 NA
Trade publications 14 16 NA
Trade shows 5 7 0.050
Others
NA = Not available
4 6 NA
Perceived environmental characteristics or individual perceptions about company strategy 
or about their own strategic orientation, do not have any significant influence on the use of 
different sources. Neither do perceived task characteristics.
FLOW OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION INTO THE ORGANISATION
So far in this chapter, a review of the different kinds of information the sampled managers 
acquire and the different sources they use was made. In this section factors and sources 
are put together so as to depict the way external information flows into the organisation. 
The question being addressed here is, how do the sources relate to the factors? Which 
sources are particularly useful for which factors? Different statistical methods to find 
answers to this question is employed.
Before the explanation of the methods being used here, a word is appropriate about the 
method that was not used. That is, that the respondents were not asked to directly estimate 
the relative usefulness for the different factors. To ask them to do so would have meant
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presenting them with a 7*10 matrix (7 factors, 10 sources) to fill out and given the 
complexity of the question, the responses would have little reliability. However, in the 
absence of this direct data, all that the writer has, are the main distributions of the two 
variables (factors and sources), and the task becomes to estimate their joint distribution 
based on this available information about them. This was attempted by the use of three 
methods: First, using a simple cross tabulation process, then validate the crosstabs results 
using simple regression technique. Finally, an attempt (which however failed) to correlate 
the result using canonical correlation analysis.
The underlying premise of the crosstabs analysis is that of time spent in the common 
dimension that links the factors and sources. If a particular respondent spends an unusually 
large share of his scanning time on a particular factor, and also obtains most of his external 
information from a particular source, that source can be expected to be particularly useful 
for that factor. Thus, firstly, respondents who spend more than (fij+Yj) percent of his 
scanning time on factor i was identified (fij is the mean share of that factor for the entire 
sample and Yi is the standard deviation). Also respondents who obtain more than (|ij+Yj) 
percent of total external information from source j (where (Xj and Yj have the the usual 
meaning) was identified. Then the two pieces of information was combined to identify the
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number of respondents who spend more than ((ii+Vj) time factor i and obtain more than 
( |i j+ Y j)  percent of external information form source j. This is what was use as a rough 
estimate of the joint distribution of factor i and source j (Table 7:23)
Table 7:23 -  Number of respondents recording a score of 
more than (mean + standard deviatbn) for 
both time spent on factors
Factors
Competitive Market Technology Regulatory Resource Broad-issues
Source
Customer 5 6 1 1  2
Suppliers 2 3 2 1 -
Bankers 2 - 1 3 2 1
Agent/
Distributors 4 1
Consultants 1 4 4 4
General/
Publication 1 1 1  2 2 2
Trade
Publication 1 2 2 2 2 4
Trade
Show 1 1 1 2
Figure 7:1 shows a graphical representation of the data in Table 7:23. The heights of the 
histograms represent the percentage of total scanning time spent on the factors. Each 
histogram is subdivided into areas that represent the relative importance of the different 
sources for that factor.
The resulting picture of how external information flows into an organisation conveys a 
clear message, for domain specific information such a competitive and market information, 
the principal sources are the other members of the domain - or, in simpler language, 
information specific to a business are available from those who are involved in that 
business. More general information such as information on regulatory developments or on
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broad social, economic and political issues that are not specific to a particular business, is 
available from general sources such as publications and consultants who are not member of 
the domain. The picture is clearly oversimplified, because in certain cases, consultants may 
indeed be excellent sources for market or competitive information while, under certain 
circumstances, suppliers can be most useful for monitoring regulatory or social 
developments. But in general, the picture is not counter-intuitive. Most consultants or 
publications cannot really specialise in particular products or markets and must, in the 
interest of viability, spread their nets more widely across industries or functions. Insiders 
to a particular industry can be expected to have greater access to information specific to the 
industry. In a way, this finding is consistent with the appropriability theory of Von Hippel 
(1982). Information accumulates with those who can appropriate it most Domain-specific 
information can be most desseminated fairly uniformly by domain members and, therefore, 
it is not surprising that they are the best source for such information. The findings also 
provides quantitative support for the "close to the customer" doctrine of Peters and 
Waterman (1980). Customers are not only vital agencies for innovation but also the 
principal source of market and competitive intelligence. This finding also suggests why 
staff scanning specialists may not be very effective in acquiring domain related business 
intelligence; they simply do not have the newtork required for such intelligence gathering. 
Line managers, with their regular contacts with customers, suppliers, agents and 
distributors, are far better equipped for such scanning, at least for the regular product- 
markets covered by the company. By the same logic, line managers may not be 
particularly suitable for scanning beyond the domain, for they often have relatively less 
access to sources such as consultants, publication, et cetera. Wellinsky had suggested 
long ago that both "experts" and line managers are required to be involved for building up 
organisational capabilities in the intelligence function. Figure 7:1 suggests why that must 
be so.
135
Figure 7:1 - Flow of external information 
into the organisation
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The proceeding analysis suffers from many limitations. The most serious one is that it is 
based on very litde data - only the extreme tail ends of the distribution of factors importance 
and source usage scores. Regression analysis was therefore used as an alternative 
approach to investigate the same issue. The objective was to use all the data in this thesis 
to look for corroboration of the picture that emerged from the crosstabs analysis where 
only a small part of the data was considered. The factor scores were treated as the 
dependent variable and percentage shares of all the sources were treated as the dependent 
variables to identify the sources that emerge as significant explanators of differences in time 
spent on the factors. For two factors - market and technology - the regression results were 
unusable. The F statistics were not significant for any combination of the variables. 
However, significant F scores were obtained for the other factors (Table 7:24) and the 
results are not inconsistent with the findings shown in Figure 7:1. Customers, suppliers,
136
bankers and trade publications are identified as important sources of competitive 
information. All these sources, more or less in the same order of importance, were 
identified through the cross-tabulation procedure. For more general information, such as 
information on the resource factor, bankers and consultants emerge as the significant 
sources - again consistent with the findings from the preceeding analysis.
Table 7:24 - Association between sources and factors : 
regression results.
Advt./ General Trade F
Customers Suppliers Bankers agents Consultants publication publication Others Values
Competitive
beta 0.48 0.17 021 0.31 0.16 6.49
t 5.07 1.73 2.16 3.03 1.74 0.00
sig.oft 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.08
Regulatory
beta 027  0.27 9.61
t 3.08 3.06 0.00
sig.oft 0.00 0.00
Resource
beta 0.20 0.14 4.47
t 2.12 1.52 0.04
sig.oft 0.04 0.13
Broad issue
beta 027  0.25 0.19 6.54
t 2.97 2.79 2.08 0.00
sig.oft 0.00 0.01 0.04
Canonical correlation analysis was the third procedure adopted to validate the pattern of 
association between factors and sources. This is a multivariate procedure that assumes the 
factor scores as mutually interacting dependent variables and the sources scores as joint 
covariants. The analysis extracts linear composites of variables from the two sets that are 
maximally related (see Joreskog and Wold, 1982) for explanation of the procedure and for 
an illustrative application of such analysis). The analysis confirmed that the predictor set 
(sources) has statistically significant impact on the predicted set (factors). The multivariate 
F statistics was 1.964, significant at 0.001. However, in terms of specific association 
between factors and sources the technique was not very useful, for it extracted only one
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significant canonical function. The reason is quite simple; domain related scanning of 
competition, market and technology using within domain sources such as customers and 
suppliers dominates managerial scanning, and is the only significant cluster of associations 
that swaps the analysis.
At the time of the writing of this thesis, the writer is not aware of any previous studies that 
have tried to identify sources useful for specific kinds of information. To that extent, the 
focus here is to identify the association between factors and sources that can probably be 
considered as a first step to explore empirically an area that has obvious importance for 
practitioners. In any case, it has all the weaknesses of a first step. The evidence is not 
strong and the association shown in Figure 7:22 are, at best, suggestive. But the pattern of 
associations suggested in this analysis is derived from what the actual practice of the 
sampled managers would seem to suggest. And, as had already beenv argued earlier, the 
excellent performance of Malaysian managers in highly competitive ASEAN and 
international markets is suggestive of efficient scanning. To that extent, the associations 
may have a normative content. Clearly, however, considerable further research in a 
number of different organisational settings would be required before any prescriptive help 
can be given to managers about the general usefulness of specific sources for different 
kinds of information.
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Chapter Eight 
The process of scanning
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE PROCESS OF SCANNING
Scanning can be both problem triggered and information triggered (Collings, 1968). In 
the first case, a specific problem may suggest the information needed for solving it and 
scanning can then be directed to searching for that information. In the later case, a 
particular piece of information obtained quite by chance, may suggest a course of action 
(including searching for further information). However, to benefit from such 
information that a manager may stumble on, he must be sensitive to the implications of 
information that continuously flow to him in the routine course of his work. The first 
process is called the search mode of scanning; the second is referred to as surveillance 
(Keegan, 1968).
In this chapter, the typology of scanning modes is elaborated on a rather more detail, and 
then after that, description of the relative use of different modes by managers responding 
to the survey is to be subsequently made. It will also be shown that the pattern of usage 
of different modes by Malaysian managers is very similar to the corresponding behaviour 
of manager in American companies as revealed through earlier research findings. In 
addition to that it will also be shown that the use of different modes is influenced by a 
number of personal, organisational and environmental factors as discussed in chapter 
two. In the conclusion of this chapter, the findings are to be related to the conceptual 
framework of Daft and Weick (1984) that suggests how organisational and environmental 
characteristics might affect managerial scanning behaviour.
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SCANNING MODES
As has been noted the process of scanning was conceptualised by Aguilar in terms of the 
extent of structure built into the way scanning was carried out. He classified the modes 
of scanning as undirected viewing, conditioned viewing, informal search and formal 
search, in an ascending order of specificity of information and the extent of structure in 
the viewing process. Collings (1968) and Keegan (1967) adopted the same type of 
classification but called the modes viewing, monitoring, investigating and research. 
Each of the modes were defined as below:
Viewing:
Viewing is keeping in touch with the environmental through oriented exposure to 
information which might be relevant to a person's job or organisation. This mode is 
more focussed than random or even general curiosity but less focussed than monitoring 
or directed exposure. The objective of viewing is to acquire background information and 
to pick up warning signals on matters which may become significant or relevant - to 
quote Aguilar, "to give the first dull impression that there is something more to be 
learned".
Monitoring:
Monitoring is focussed attention to a more or less clearly defined information subject 
agenda or information sources. The agenda may undergo a constant change but, at any 
point of time, it exists and can be enumerated.
140
Investigation:
Investigation is a relatively limited informal system of seeking out specific information. 
It involved an active seeking out as contrasted with the more passive watching over or 
surveillance involved in monitoring.
Research:
Research is formally organised effort to acquire specific information, usually for a 
specific purpose. Research is typically an effort to answer a formulated questions and it 
usually has definite start and end points.
In the research instrument for this study, these definitions were explained to the 
respondents and they were asked to indicate the shares of external information acquired 
by them through the different modes (see Appendix 1). The result are summarised in 
Table 8:1.
Table 8:1 - Usage of different scanning modes
% of external information
obtained
Viewing 23
Monitoring 27
Investigation 30
Research 21
Testing validity of responses.
Given the relatively complex constructs for the classification scheme for scanning modes, 
it was felt necessary to test the validity of the responses and to see if needed, the 
respondents understood the differences implied in the definitions. As Keegan had
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suggested, the viewing and monitoring modes, collectively, represents a general 
surveillance while the investigation and research modes involve specific search. 
Information obtained through surveillance is, to a degree, obtained by chance, for the 
recipient was not looking for it. In other words, there ought to exist positive associations 
between the relative use of viewing and monitoring and the extent of external 
information perceived as obtained by chance and between the usage of the investigation 
and research modes and the extent of external information believed to be received 
through specific search. Chance and search are relatively simple constructs that are 
generally well understood. So, in order to test the validity of responses about the usage 
of the four scanning modes, a question was asked, in a separate section of the 
questionnaire, that required the respondents to estimate the percentages of external 
information they obtained by chance and through search. The correlations between the 
responses to these two different questions are shown in Table 8:2.
Table 8:2 - Response validity for scanning modes
Percentage of external 
information obtained
Search Chance
Viewing - 0 38 ** 0.26**
Percentage of
external Monitoring -0.01 0.08
information
obtained Investigation 0.28** - 0.20
Research 0.15** - 0.11
* Significant at 0.10
** Significant at 0.01 
*** Significant at 0.001
The signs of all the coefficients are in the right direction and five of the correlations are 
significant. The constructs are not entirely overlapping and therefore, the actual values of
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the coefficients are not interpretable. However, overall, this pattern of associations tends 
to suggest that the respondents understood the meaning of the different scanning modes 
and that the responses have at least face validity.
Comparison with previous findings.
Table 8:3 compares the usage of modes by the sampled Malaysian managers with those 
of U.S. managers found in earlier surveys.
Table 8:3 - Comparison of scanning modes : Malaysian 
and US. managers
Percentage of external information 
obtained through:
Viewing Monitoring Investigation Research
Malaysian managers 23 27 30 21
U.S. managers
: Collings1 survey 40 42 12 6
: Keegan's survey
- local 13 60 23 4
- overseas 7 59 30 3
: Kefalas' survey
- dynamic
industry 25 27 25 23
- stable
industry 23 21 25 30
As can be seen from Table 8:3, the findings of Kefalas are very different from those of 
Collings and Keegan. The research findings in Malaysia are remarkably similar to those 
of Kefalas. Malaysian managers, compared to managers in American multinationals or in 
the U.S. financial services industry, use the search mode much more. It can be seen 
from Keegan's results that search takes on added importance in scanning outside the 
firm's home market. This also appears plausible, for in the home environment, the firm
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is much more closely integrated with the industry network and the resultant familiarity 
and involvement with the environment makes surveillance relatively more effective. In 
foreign markets, the firm has to make special effort to acquire information and therefore 
rely more on search. In Malaysia, almost all major firms, and certainly all firms included 
in the sample, are involved in extensive international dealings and a major part of their 
scanning efforts is directed to foreign markets especially those of its neighbouring 
countries. Given this condition, the relatively greater use of search is not surprising.
Factors that influence relative usage of scanning modes.
It has been argued earlier in this thesis that surveillance is more effective when the firm 
has a wider network within the relevant environment. Among the sampled firms, the 
WCF (firms) have far more extensive networks (through their own establishments in 
many part of ASEAN and other countries) compared to the NWCF (firms). The 
argument therefore suggests that WCFs should be using the surveillance mode more than 
the NWCFs. The data provides weak support for this hypothesis (Table 8:4).
Management level does not have any significant effect on the choice of modes, though 
junior managers, predictably (because of their inferior network), depend relatively more 
on search than do their senior colleagues.
Table 8:4 - Usage of scanning modes by WCF and NWCF
Usage of scanning modes (%)
WCF NWCF Significance difference
Viewing 23 22 -
Monitoring 29 24 0.02
Investigation 29 31 -
Research 19 24 0.07
The argument that search becomes more important when manager lacks a personal
144
network within the industry environment is also supported by the pattern of scanning by 
managers in different functional departments (Table 8:5).
Table 8:5 - Use of scanning modes in different functions 
Percentage of scanning through different modes 
Viewing Monitoring Investigation Research
Marketing 29 29 30 14
Finance 22 34 29 16
Planning 21 22 30 27
R& D  22 25 28 25
General
management 20 30 30 22
Marketing executives, with their large external networks, use viewing much more than 
others. Planning managers, in contrast, lack this external network and depend more on 
research. Finance managers occupy an intermediate position; they have a strong network 
within the financial community, particularly among bankers and stock market operators, 
but their networks are not as broad as those of marketing managers. They depend 
relatively more on monitoring.
A general experience with diversity enhances the use of surveillance (Table 8:6). As has 
been argued earlier that experience with diversity may increase a person's cognitive 
complexity and thereby his ability to capture the relevant out of the flow of information 
around him. In other words, he may develop a more sensitive antenna. Besides, it may 
also expand his network.
145
Table 8:6 - Effect of experience with diversity on
usage of scanning modes
Experience with diversity
Low Medium High
Significance of 
difference
Viewing 23 22 26 >0.10
Monitoring 28 23 32 0.07
Investigation 30 30 28 >0.10
Research 19 25 14 0.001
The entrepreneur depends more on surveillance; the trustee on search (Table 8:7). This 
is quite consistent with the respective stereotypes.
Table 8:7 - Effect of individual's strategic orientation on 
usage of scanning modes
Significance of 
Entrepreneur Trustee of difference
Viewing 23 22 >0.10
Monitoring 30 24 0.04
Investigation 30 30 >0.10
Research 17 25 0.01
By far the most significant effort on the usage of scanning modes arise from the nature of 
the environment. In an unpredictable environment, the two search modes become more 
important (Table 8:8) - perhaps because in the face of possible discontinuities, mere 
sensitivity to the present is not very useful for predicting the future.
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Table 8:8 - Effect of environmental predictability on
usage of scanning modes
Percentage use of different scanning modes
Significance
Predictability Unpredictability of difference
Viewing 24 22 >0.10
Monitoring 29 25 0.09
Investigation 29 30 >0.10
Research 19 23 0.06
Similarly, if the environment is seen as heterogeneous, search becomes more important 
as a scanning mode compared to when the environment is seen as relatively 
homogeneous (Table 8:9).
Table 8:9 - Effect o f environmental heterogeneity on 
usage of scanning modes
Percentage use of different scanning modes
Significance of 
Homogeneous Heterogeneous difference
Viewing 25 20 0.05
Monitoring 27 26 >0.10
Investigation 28 31 >0.10
Research 19 24 0.03
Figure 8:1 shows the overall effect of the two dimensions of the perceived environment 
on the way scanning is carried out. In a predictable and homogeneous (i.e., non-
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complex) environment scanning is more a process of surveillance; and of a general 
sensitivity to the external world. In a complex environment, with a number of actors and 
influencers and a high degree of unpredictability, surveillance is less effective perhaps 
because issues are more complex and it is no longer possible to make sense of them 
intuitively.
In such a complex environment, more directed attention is required for interpreting the 
signals and therefore search becomes relatively more important.
Figure 8:1 - Effect of environmental characteristics on 
usage of scanning modes
Unpredictable
Environmental
Predictability
Predictable
Homogoneous Hetrogeneous
Environmental Heterogeneity
THE ORGANISATIONAL INTERPRETATION MECHANISM.
In the first chapter, a reference to the recent conceptualisation by Daft and Weick (1984) 
of organisation as interpretation systems was made. The authors have suggested that the 
interpretation process is carried out in three stages: scanning, interpretation and learning. 
The interpretation mechanism in organisations, they argue, are influenced by their 
assumptions about the analysability of the environment and by the extent of their 
intrusiveness, by which term the authors actually refer to the pro-activeness of the 
organisation in learning about the environment.
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Based on this conceptualisation, the authors proposed a model that relates organisational 
scanning and strategy making behaviour to these two influencing factors. Figure 8:2 
shows the predicted scanning behaviour of organisations, depending on their 
assumptions about the environment and on their intrusiveness.
Figure 8:2 - Scanning and the organisational interpretation 
process (Daft and Weick, 1984)
Unanalysable
Assumptions 
about the 
environment
Analysable
Passive Active
Organisational intrusiveness
The authors proposed the model at the organisational level. But, the variables they use 
and the theoretical arguments they make, are essentially based at the individual level. 
They use a classification system for scanning modes that was proposed and used by 
Aguilar for describing scanning behaviour of individual managers. Clearly organisations 
do not view nor search; individual do. Daft and Weick also based their construct and 
argument about the learning mechanism on an individual level learning model. Even for 
the environment, they consider perceptions which apply only at the individual level. 
Thus, the model can be operationalised at the individual level, though it is not clear if the 
results can be interpreted at the organisational level. The model was tested, at the 
individual level, using the available data. The results are shown in Figure 8:3.
Undirected
viewing
Enacting 
(experimenting 
rather than 
scanning)
Conditioned
viewing
Formal
search
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Figure 8:3 - Intrepretation modes at the individual level
Unpredictable
Environmental
predictability
Predictable
The test fail to discriminate between the four cells; the scanning processes of defenders, 
prospectors and analysers appear to be extremely similar. All the three are significandy 
different from the scanning process reactors (Miles and Snow typology, as used by Daft 
and Weick). The principal scanning mode of the reactor is surveillance, particularly 
monitoring or conditional viewing. This is entirely consistent with the suggestion of 
Daft and Weick. However, the main effect of environmental unpredictability does not go 
the way Daft and Weick proposed. In an unpredictable environment, managers in both 
the intrusive or, in the operationalisation usage in this thesis, analytically oriented firm as 
well as the passive or unanalytic firm; tend to expand their search activities. This is 
entirely consistent with the information processing view of organisations and challenges 
the perceptions that, in the face of high uncertainty, managers give up on analysis and fall 
back on either passive floating or "enacting". This inconsistency between the findings in 
this thesis and the conceptualisation of Daft and Weick may be entirely an artifact of the 
sample and methodology employed in this thesis. May be, none of the organisations 
included were truly passive; after all, they were selected from a list of large and highly 
successful Malaysian firms. Their conceptualisation as analytical or otherwise is 
essentially related to the rest of the sample and not to any absolute standards.
Low High
Viewing 23% Viewing 22%
Monitoring 24% Monitoring 25%
Invstgtn 30% Invstgtn 30%
Research 23% Research 23%
Viewing 25% Viewing 23%
Monitoring 32% Monitoring 27%
Invstgtn 26% Invstgtn 31%
Research 17% Research 21%
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Similarly, the perceived environmental characteristics have also been categorised relative 
to the sample and may not correspond to the conceptual definitions of the authors. 
Besides, organisational intrusiveness is a concept that is closely related to, but is not 
synonymous with analaytical orientation as defined in this study.
Finally the model and the data pertain to two different levels of analysis, even though, as 
has already been argued earlier, the conceptual support for the model is built at the 
individual rather than the organisational level. So, both the consistencies and the 
inconsistencies between the Daft and Weick model and the data in this study need to be 
interpreted with caution. Broadly, there is one area of consistency: managers of passive 
firms in an analysable environment depend more on monitoring than do any managers of 
any other kind of firm. The main inconsistency is with regard to the effect of perceived 
environmental characteristics. Contrary to the prediction of Daft and Weick, managers 
sampled in this thesis, irrespective of the strategic orientation of their firms, enhance 
search activities when the environment is perceived to be unanalysable. A much more 
precisely defined measurement model is required to further explore the concept of 
interpretation systems proposed in the conceptual model but the inconsistency suggests 
an interesting hypothesis for such analysis.
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Chapter Nine 
A model of individual level scanning
behaviour
CHAPTER NINE
A MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SCANNING BEHAVIOUR
This is the last of the four chapters that address the first of the two broad research 
questions of this thesis, viz., what affects the scanning behaviour of managers? The 
particular aspect of scanning behaviour that is considered here is the extent of domain- 
focus. The concept is elaborated later but the central hypothesis is simple: for long term 
adaptation to environmental changes, an organisation must look beyond its immediate 
task environment. Yet, most managerial scanning is centred around the current domain 
of the organisation. What factors promote managerial scanning of the broader 
environment? This chapter is devoted to answering that question.
The issue is important for both theory and practice. At the level of theory, identifying 
the factors that affect scanning attention, can help in developing an understanding of the 
organisational learning and adaptation processes. With regard to practice, such an 
inquiry may suggest managerial actions to promote long term effectiveness of the firm.
This chapter begins with an explanation of the concept of domain-focus and then 
propose a causal model that suggests how the extent of domain-focus in managerial 
scanning may depend on both direct and mediated influences of a number of factors. 
The final model confirms many of the proposed hypotheses but it also challenges a few 
of them. The implications of these findings are discussed at length and this discussion, 
in turn, becomes the basis for a model of the organisational learning that is proposed in 
the chapter that follow (and the concluding chapter of this thesis).
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SCANNING CHARACTERISTICS : DOMAIN-FOCUSSED VERSUS GENERAL
One of the older debates in the field of Business Policy has been between what 
Mintzberg (1973, 1978) calls the "planning” and the "adaptive" models of strategy 
formulation. Historically the two sides to the debate have followed non-intersecting 
parallel paths. Proponents of the planning view (e.g., Andrews, 1980, rev.) have 
based their arguments on normative models of how purposeful organisations (or 
leaders) should behave. Supporters of the adaptive view, in contrast, have depended on 
deductions from empirical observations. They (e.g., Pettigrew, 1973; Quinn, 1980) 
have shown that in actual practice organisations do not follow the "rational" process 
assumed in the normative models. Organisations are constrained by cognitive limits to 
rationality and by the heterogeneity of objectives and agenda of internal members. 
Strategy formulation, according to the adaptive view, is an incremental process of 
navigating along the corridors of indifference; of internal bargaining and coalition 
building that become manifest as a stream of disjointed decisions. Thus, they have 
rejected the planning view, labelling it as a "heroic view of management" that is both 
unreal and unrealisable. Believers of strategic planning, in turn, have repudiated the 
incrementalist view as neither accurate nor useful. A recent rebuttal from Andrews is 
typical:
"There is something to be said, I must admit, for the 
owlish adherents to the primacy of incrementalism and 
administrative process. Repelled by the best and brightest 
analysts, they asserts the wisdom of the practitioner and 
believe that an organisation, properly nurtured, can lay out 
like a snail in the path of its own progress. So it can, but 
the path is visible only behind the snail. Those who 
believe that life is too uncertain to permit planning and that 
purpose must remain mostly intuitive, are a kind of Greek 
chorus keeping the rest of us honest while they hymn their 
classic cop-out". (Andrews, 1983, p3).
153
Only recently a conceptual synthesis is emerging out of this debate. The synthesis is 
perhaps best summarised in a paper by Burgleman (1983) where he argues that the 
strategy of a firm has both an autonomous and an induced component (Mintzberg, in 
his 1987 paper, called them deliberate and emergent components of strategy). To 
quote:
"'Induced' strategic behavior uses the categories provided 
by the current concepts of strategy to identify opportunities 
in the 'enactable environment' (Weick, 1979). Being 
consistent with the existing categories used in the strategic 
planning system of the firm, such strategic behavior 
emerge around, among others, new product development 
projects for existing business, market development projects 
for existing products, and strategic capital investment 
projects for existing businesses. Such strategic behavior is 
shaped by the current structural context...This is the type 
of strategic behavior documented by Bower (1970). It 
follows corporate strategy...
During any given period of time, the bulk of strategic 
activity in a firm is likely to be of the induced variety. The 
present model, however, proposes that large, resource-rich 
firms are likely to possess a reservoir of entrepreneurial 
potential at operational levels that will express itself in 
autonomous strategic initiatives. Autonomous strategic 
behavior introduces new categories for the definition of 
opportunities. Entrepreneurial participants, at the 
product/market level, conceive new business opportunities, 
engage in project championing efforts, and mobilize 
corporate resources for these new opportunities, and 
perform strategic forcing efforts to create momentum for 
their further development. Middle level mangers attempt to 
formulate broader strategies for areas of new business 
activity and try to convince top management to support 
them. This is the type of strategic behavior encountered in 
the study of internal corporate venturing". (Burgleman,
1983, p.65)
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Burgleman's conceptualisation is useful. He argues convincingly why strategy of a 
firm should have the two components. However, he does not go into the issue of how 
the two kings of strategic behaviour actually manifest themselves within the formal 
strategic planning process of the firm.
There is sufficient empirical literature that documents the increasing use of formal 
planning in large business institutions. In their three-year, multiphased study involving 
over 1,500 of the world's largest corporations, Klein and Linneman (1984) have 
shown that over 90% of such companies have fairly extensive systems for long term 
planning and that most of these systems are at least designed to achieve the ''rationality" 
implied in the normative models. Yet, as Burgleman argues, the output of the system is 
not fully "autonomous". The question then becomes this : how does "induced" strategy 
emerge out of the process of "rational" formal planning that most modem firms adopt? 
In other words, what is the process through which, in the planning mechanism, the 
current strategy or structure of the the firm affect its future strategy?
Bower (1970) had provided one answer to this question - an answer that focussed on 
the internal process through which problems are defined, alternative proposals are 
initiated and, finally, one of the proposals receive the "impetus" that leads to its 
acceptance. Internal structure, in the process model of Bower, affects strategy by 
influencing these sub-processes of definition, initiation and impetus.
Scanning, can be another mechanism through which current strategy, despite an 
intendedly rational planning process, can circumscribe further strategy. Scanning is 
assumed to provide the external intelligence that is the starting point for all normative 
strategic planning models. If, however, the current situation of the firm determines
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what aspect of the environment will be paid attention to (i.e., the enactment process of 
Weick, 1979), then even if the actual strategy making process follows the normative 
models, the output may be incremental or, in Burgleman's terms, induced strategic 
behaviour.
If scanning is entirely limited to what Dill (1958) called the "task environment" and 
Thompson (1967) called "domain", the information base on which future strategy will 
be based is limited to the current activities of the organisation. Such scanning cannot 
lead to ventures in new fields - to " autonomous strategy" as defined by Burgleman. 
For autonomous strategy to emerge, the planning process must have an information 
input that is not constrained by current understanding of what the firm's domain is: i.e., 
a part of scanning must look beyond the task environment to the broader "general 
environment".
Therefore, an important issue in studying scanning behaviour is the extent to which 
scanning is either limited to the current domain or extends beyond it. This is the topic 
that this chapter addresses. First of all a method to characterise scanning as domain- 
focused versus general, is developed then after that, the respondents will be classified 
according to their characteristics based on this categorisation scheme. Finally, the 
effect of different environmental, organisational and individual level variables is 
analysed in determining the scanning characteristics of managers.
OPERATIONALISING SCANNING BEHAVIOUR
To operationalise scanning behaviour in terms of the extent to which it is domain- 
constrained, functional definition of what might be called "domain-focused" and 
"general" scanning is needed. In this thesis, three major attributes of scanning is 
considered - the kinds of information scanned (the factors), the sources through which
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information is acquired, and the modes of acquisition. Among them, both factors and 
sources are related to the concept of domain and it is through them that the functional 
distinction between the different kinds of scanning behaviour is operationalised.
The concept of a "domain", as developed by Thompson (1967) is based on the notion 
of the "task-environment" suggested by Dill (1958) as those parts of the broader 
environment which are relevant to the setting and attainment of goals. Specifically, Dill 
suggested that the task environment consists of customers, suppliers, competitors and 
regulatory groups. These, according to Thompson, constitute the membership of the 
firm’s domain. A concept quite similar to that of the domain, is the notion of 
"organisation-set" developed by Evan (1966). Defining members of a focal 
organisation's organisation-set is a subjective task and "there may be as many 
organisation-sets as there are different status for an organisation to occupy" (Aldrich 
and Whetten, 1981). However, generally, the important members of the set are those 
who are members of the organisation's task-domain, for ultimately both the concepts 
are tied together through the notion of goals-membership as both are determined by the 
actors who can affect the organisation's attainment of goals (Caplow, 1964).
Following these arguments, this thesis defines domain-constrained scanning as 
scanning for information related to the current task-environment and obtained through 
other members of the domain. In other words, information about market, competition 
and technology obtained through customers, suppliers and agents and distributors, 
characterise domain-focussed scanning behaviour. In contrast, information about 
general regulatory, social, political, economic or resource-related issues obtained 
through publications, consultants, advertising agents et cetera, characterises what the 
writer likes to call unconstrained scanning.
The underlying scheme for categorising scanning behaviour is shown in Figure 9:1. 
Note that the division between the two types of scanning behaviour is fuzzy and the
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distinction is made primarily in terms of what is the principal component of the 
manager's scanning activity.
Figure 9:1 - Categorisation of scanning behaviour
Residual 
"broad" 
environment 
Information 
Factors
Immediate 
task
environment
Within domain Outside domain
Information Sources
To operationalise the construct, two scales were constructed. The "TASKINFO" scale 
added the respondents scores on the percentage of time spent on market, competitive 
and technology related information. The "ORGSET" scale added their scores on the 
percentage of environmental information collected through the principal members of 
their firm's organisation-set, i.e., customers, suppliers and agents and distributors. 
Both the scales showed acceptable reliability (combatche’s alpha of 0.67 and 0.64, 
respectively). Finally, a composite scale of "DOMAINFOCUS" was built by adding 
the two scale scores for each respondent. A high value on this scale showed a highly 
domain-focused or constrained scanning behaviour.
A low score, on the other hand, represented broad and unconstrained scanning. This 
composite scale was tested for reliability and found acceptable (Combatche’s alpha 
0.59). The scale had a mean value of 98.782 and a standard deviation of 34.357. 
Scores of individual respondents ranged from 25 to 175.
UNCONSTRAINED
SCANNING
DOMAIN
CONSTRAINED
SCANNING
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The central argument of this thesis is that scanning behaviour of individual managers is 
influenced by a number of environmental, organisational,and individual characteristics. 
So far, the writer has explored the nature of these influences separately and individually 
on different aspects of scanning (chapter six, seven, and eight). In the ensuing part of 
this chapter, the writer proceeds to the next level of analytical complexity by 
considering, collectively, the effect of the different influencing variables on what he 
proposes as a composite measure of scanning behaviour. This is done by building a 
causal model that attempts to explain the influences that determine the extent of breadth 
versus focus in the managerial scanning. The model is first developed based on 
available theoretical concept and then tested against the data.
The research methodology of this thesis is inappropriate for proving causation. In any 
case, the technique (using LISREL - Joreskog and Sorbom, 1982) that is used, can 
never prove a model but can only disprove it. There is also no alternative model to test 
the writer's proposed model against. The most optimistic objective is internally 
consistent, theoretically acceptable, and is not rejected by the data.
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MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
The proposed model is shown in Figure 9:2. The conceptual arguments underlying it 
are summarised below.
Figure 9:2 - A model of individual level 
scanning behaviour
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The more unpredictable the environment is perceived to be, the more does a manager 
feel the need to monitor a diverse range of issues. In a predictable environment, there 
is a linearity - a continuity - and the continuity often arises from a relative stability in the 
task environment. When there is such a stability, say, due to the existence of a stable 
oligopoly, there is usually an effective signalling system within the domain and it 
suffices if these signals are monitored and responded to. In other words, in a 
predictable environment, the needs of external intelligence may be served by monitoring 
existing members of the domain. In an unpredictable environment, in contrast, the 
cause of uncertainty may lie in the instability of the domain itself and a broader range of
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environmental actors and issues may need to be monitored to cope with uncertainty. 
Hence it can be hypothesised that:
s
Hypothesis 1:
When the environment is perceived as predictable, scanning 
will be domain-constrained. In an unpredictable 
environment, scanning will be relatively unconstrained.
Given the nature of the scale used in this thesis (high score 
on PRED scale represents unpredictability; high score on 
DOMAINFOCUS represents high domain-constrained 
scanning), this implies Y31 will be negative.
Environmental analysis is a response to environmental uncertainties. An integral 
argument of this information processing view of organisations is that the more the 
perceived uncertainty in the environment, the more will be the need for the organisation 
to develop an analytical orientation. Hence, in the model, analytical orientation of the 
firm is not taken as an independent variable but as a variable that depends on the 
perceived environmental characteristics. However, environmental predictability and 
environmental heterogeneity are expected to affect the need for analysis differently. As 
argued by Daft and Weick (1984), when the environment is seen as unpredictable, 
experimentation rather than analysis is used to cope with uncertainty. An environment 
is unpredictable because either the causal relations between actions and outcomes are 
unknown or because there exists discontinuities that cannot be anticipated. Under such 
circumstances, analysis is of little value. This inverse relationship between 
environmental unpredictability and analysis has been noted by Kobrin et al, (1980), 
Boulton et al., (1982) and Keegan (1974). In contrast, when the environment is 
heterogeneous, the need for analysis goes up for a large number of actors and issues 
need to be monitored. This lead to the hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2 :
In an unpredictable environment, the company will be less 
analytically oriented. This implies that V11 will be negative.
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Hypothesis 3 :
When the environment is perceived as heterogeneous, the 
firm will be more analytical in its approach; i.e., V12 will be 
positive.
Further, a heterogeneous environment results in a very large organisational networks 
(Aldrich and Whetten, 1980) and it becomes increasingly difficult to define a domain 
parsimoniously enough for the term to have any practical connotation or to limit 
scanning attention to any specified set of actors to which the firm is directly linked. At 
the limit, in the case of extreme heterogeneity of the environment, the entire 
environment becomes a part of the firm’s task environment. Thus, as the environment 
is perceived to be more and more heterogeneous, scanning has to become broad, 
involving more and more environmental actors. In other words,
Hypothesis 4 :
In a heterogeneous environment, scanning will be relatively 
unconstrained. This suggests that V32 will be negative.
The greater the heterogeneity of the environment, the greater is the amount of 
information that has to be processed by the manager to cope with environmental 
uncertainty. Also, as shown by Daft and Macintosh (1981), the amount of 
environmental information processed by a manager is positively associated with his 
perception of task variety. This finding can be extended to suggest that when a 
manager perceives his environment to be heterogeneous, he also perceives his task to 
be unstructured. This is plausible for the multiplicity of issues that need to be 
considered for effective task performance (the cause of environmental heterogeneity) is 
an essential feature of an unstructured task (Perrow, 1967). Therefore:
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Hypothesis 5:
When the environment is perceived to be heterogeneous, the 
respondent will perceive his task to be relatively 
unstructured. In other words, V22 is positive.
A strong emphasis on analysis is usually associated with a firm's commitment to its 
current domain. Analysis is useful when there is some understanding of the causal 
effect of events on outcomes. The further away one goes from the immediate task 
environment, the more difficult it becomes to discern such causal implications. 
Innovation and risk-taking rather than analysis are the characteristics of firms that look 
for opportunities in the broader environment. Managers in highly analytical oriented 
firm focus their scanning within the task environment, for it is only such domain- 
constrained information that are amenable to formal analysis, Or,
Hypothesis 6:
The more analytically oriented the firm, the more is scanning 
restricted to the current domain, i.e., (3 31 is positive.
An individual's experience with diversity enriches his cognitive script (Abelson, 1976) 
and enhances his capacity to deal with ambiguities. A manager more exposed to 
diversity feels less compelled to limit the ambiguity and equivocality in his task (Daft 
and Macintosh, 1981; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). He is more willing and able to see 
the ill-structured aspects of his tasks and to acknowledge rather than ignore the 
multiplicity of issues and influences that must be considered in managerial judgment 
and decision-making. Therefore,
Hypothesis 7 :
The greater the manager's experience with diversity, the 
more he will recognise the unstructured aspects of his tasks.
In terms of the model, therefore, Y23 is positive.
In this thesis, the individual's strategic orientation has been categorised as 
entrepreneurial or trustee-like,. The trustee has the characteristics of bureaucrat; he
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attempts to find standard operating procedures and rules and he sees his task as 
relatively structured. He ignores those aspects of the job that are ill-structured and not 
amenable to standardisation or formalisation. He avoids complexity and ambiguity. 
His simple schema does not require him to explore the equivocal and often weak cues 
from the broader environment. The entrepreneur, in contrast, typically explores the 
broad environment for opportunities and is more willing to acknowledge the ill- 
structured aspects of his managerial tasks. Two hypotheses follow:
Hypothesis 8:
The more entrepreneurial the individual, the more 
unstructured he perceives his task to be. In the ENTRT 
scale, high scores represent the trustee and low scores 
characterise the entrepreneur. Therefore, in the model, Y24 
should be negative.
Hypothesis 9 :
The more entrepreneurial the individual, the more 
unconstrained is his scanning, or, V34 is positive.
Information and, extension, analysis act as symbols and as signals that guide 
managerial actions and perceptions (Feldman and March, 1981). The more analytical a 
firm is, the more it creates an internal environment that suggests analysis to be the basis 
for decision and actions. But, the essential characteristics of ill-structured tasks is that 
they are not amenable to formal (and quantitative) analysis because of the variety and 
ambiguity inherent in them. Therefore, in companies where analysis is emphasised, a 
linearity of thinking will prevail and managers will see their tasks as more structured, or
Hypothesis 10:
The more analytically the firm is oriented, the more 
structured managers see their tasks to be. Stated otherwise,
(3 21 is negative.
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The higher the position a manager occupies in the organisation hierarchy, the less is the 
extent of internal differentiation (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) and the more 
unstructured are his tasks (Willensky, 1967). Compared to junior managers, decisions 
that a top manger has to take involve greater complexity and explicit or implicit 
consideration of a far diverse range of issues and influences. Top mangers are more 
involved in long term decisions that are relatively more impacted by factors outside the 
current task environment of the firm, Hence,
Hypothesis 11:
The higher up a manager in the organisational hierarchy, the 
more unstructured his task is, and appears to be. Therefore,
Y25 is negative.
Hypothesis 12:
The higher the position a manger occupies in the 
organisational hierarchy, the less constrained is his 
scanning. Or, Y35 is negative.
Finally, the more unstructured a manager sees his task to be, the greater is the variety 
and diversity of information that he needs to form the qualitative judgements that are 
essential to take decisions on unstructured problems. The whole notion of a domain 
becomes fuzzy, because when the task is unstructured, it is difficult to determine the 
actors who can affect the outcome of a particular course of action. Therefore, a broader 
attention to the overall environment rather than focussed attention to a particular part of 
it, characterises the scanning behaviour of managers who perceived their ask to be 
highly unstructured. Hence the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 13:
The more unstructured a manager feels his task to be, the 
more unconstrained becomes his scanning, i.e., (3 32 is 
negative.
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Therefore, to summarise the hypotheses in terms of the model presented in Figure 9:2,
HI : V31 is negative 
H2 : Y ll is negative 
H3 : V12 is positive 
H4 : Y32 is negative 
H5 : Y22 is positive 
H6 : (331 is positive 
H7 : Y23 is positive 
H8 : Y24 is negative 
H9 : Y 34 is positive 
H10 : (321 is negative 
H l l : y25 is negative 
H13 : (3 32 is negative
TESTING AND REFINING THE MODEL
The complete model includes eight variables that are linked together in a system of 
sixteen simultaneous equations. As a whole, the system is block recursive but 
individually the equation are non-recursive. Besides, the errors across the equations 
need not be uncorrelated. As such, application of ordinary least squares methods is 
inappropriate for testing the model. More complex estimation procedures such as 
multi-stage least squares or some maximum likelihood approach such as LISREL 
(Joreskog and Sorbom, 1978) is required for estimating and testing the model.
One of the principal objectives of the study is to build up an overall model for 
explaining variations in individual level scanning behaviour. Thus, the overall fit of the
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whole model to the data is of greater interest than the testing of individual equations or 
even estimation of individual path strengths. Besides, structural equations associated 
with a causal model imply specific consequences for the moment structure of the data, 
specifically the variances and covariances of the measured variables. To quote Bentler 
(1980), "causation implies correlation- but of a very specific form. If the hypothesised 
caused process is correct, only certain values will be observed for these variances and 
covariances . . . "  Any observed covariances other than the expected ones would be 
inconsistent with the proposed model. . .". Having proposed the model in a causal 
form, therefore, a covariance structure testing approach would clearly be more 
appropriate.
The general linear model developed by Joreskog provides such an approach. In its 
current form (LISREL VI), it allows for both maximum likelihood of ULS estimation 
procedures and, as shown by Burt (1950), the estimates are "optimally efficient. . . 
over variable sample sizes" and are "robust over nonnormality". It also provides 
overall goodness-of-fit indices for the model as a whole. This fact, as argued by Burt, 
"allows the researcher to determine how good one’s model is and to diagnose an 
incorrect specification of cause and effect. It also provides a useful way to build 
theory". No other method, to the writer's knowledge, offers so many advantages in 
terms of this thesis specific research objectives. Accordingly, this method was adopted 
for testing and refining the proposed model.
In the model, there are six theoretical concepts (environmental predictability, 
environmental homogeneity, analytical orientation of the firm, extent of structure in 
task, manager's experience with diversity, and manager's strategic orientation) and one 
measured variable, viz., manager's level in the organisational hierarchy. The 
conceptual variables, in terms of the methodology of structural equation modelling, are 
latent variables and a total of twenty-four measured variables are used as indicators for 
them. Moreover, the dependent variable, the extent to which managerial scanning is
167
domain-constrained, is another latent variable construct out of a total of seven measured 
variables. To build the model using all the concerned measured variables would require 
the inclusion of thirty-two variables and, following the arguments of Lawley and 
Maxwell (1971), a sample size of 111 rules out that option. Further, between two and 
three of the measured variables loaded significantly on the factors that, through the 
process of exploratory factor analysis, defined the measures of the latent variables. 
Thus, the sample size limitation prevents construction of even a simplified measurement 
model including only the most significant measured variables for each of the latent 
variables. The only alternative, therefore, was to use the measures of the latent 
variables as arrived through the factor analysis procedure, in other words, to use the 
latent variables as if they were measured variables. This ignores all measurement errors 
and prevents testing of the measurement model. In essence, therefore, the writer uses 
LISREL for its path analysis capabilities. However, at each stage of the analysis, the 
writer looked at the correlations between the different indicators and at the reliability of 
the composite variables. Besides, the objective is not to test theory, for there does not 
exist enough theoretical or empirical work on the topic to justify such approach. To test 
a theory using causal modelling, one must not only have a theory to test but also an 
equally believable alternative theory against which to test it. The attempt, therefore, is 
much more of an exploration of possible causation.
LISREL VI offers a choice between the unweighted least squares and the maximum 
likelihood estimator methods for parameter estimation. The ML method depends on the 
assumption for multinominal normal distribution of the variables but has the advantage 
of readily providing standard errors and t-statistics for the estimate. Thus ULS method 
does not assume any distribution for the variables, but does not generate either standard 
error or t-statistics for the estimates nor an overall statistic for goodness of fit.
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Given that most of the variables in the model are either ordinal or are computed by 
summation scales of ordinal measured variables, ULS is clearly the theoretically 
superior method. However, the difference between the ULS and ML estimates of the 
parameters are usually small and so, the analysis, the ML method was used for model 
testing and refinement but the final model was also estimated on ULS.
Finally, before proceeding with estimating and testing of the model, it is necessary to 
check the system of the equations for identification. All the equations clearly pass the 
order condition, i.e., the number of predetermined variables excluded from each 
equation is greater than the number of included indigeneous variables minus one. As 
the testing process show, they also pass the rank condition. Infact, all the equations are 
overestimated, thus making it possible to test a number of alternative causal paths 
besides the ones proposed in the model.
Model Building versus Model Testing
Instead of simply testing the proposed model and reporting the results, the writer 
adopted the approach of an interactive process of model testing, modifying and 
retesting. The original hypotheses provided the starting point of the refinement 
process. Parameters whose estimates are small compared to their standard errors are 
eliminated and the resulting model refinement is guided by the analysis of normalising 
residual of the variance-covariance matrix and legrange multipliers of the log likelihood 
function what Joreskog and Sorbom (1986) call "modification indices".
The problem associated with this approach is that in the absence of appropriate control, 
the final model may be strongly influenced by chance sampling error in the data. One 
way to control for this possibility is to split the sample into two halves so that one half 
can be used for model building and the other half can be used to provide a clean test of 
the developed model (Bender, 1980). In this case, however, the limited sample size 
clearly mled out this possibility.
169
The only solution available was to adopt a tight control on model-refinement so as to 
minimise the possibilities of "capitalising on chance". This was done by stopping the 
refinement process as soon as p(x)^ >0.10. as proposed by Lawley and Maxwell 
(1971), is most likely to correct real specification errors in the model without 
overcorrecting the model for spurious sampling error (reference in Anderson, 1976).
The initial run of the hypothesised model yielded results summarised in Table 9:3. As 
can be seen, for all but two of the thirteen parameters, the signs are as proposed in the 
hypotheses. But, the goodness-of-fit index is relatively poor (0.683) and all but five of 
the t-values are not significant even at >0.10.
This result of the first run is provided only as a record of the starting point. All further 
discussions refer to the final model that emerged at the end of the refinement process.
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Table 9:1 -  The first run of the structural equation model
Parameter
Hypothesised
sign
Lisrel
estimate
Standard
error
t-
values
P 21 + ve 0.079 0.106 0.744
P 31 + ve 0.098 0.109 0.905
P 32 - ve 0.194 0.100 1.942**
* 1 1 + ve -0.035 0.088 -0.398
* 1 2 + ve 0.475 0.930 5.118**
* 1 3
* -0.133 0.086 -1.558
* 1 4
* -0.143 0.090 -1.589
* 1 5
* 0.090 0.087 1.033
* 2 1
* 0.033 0.095 0.343
* 2 2 + ve 0.149 0.113 1.326
* 2 3 + ve 0.176 0.094 1.870**
* 2 4 - ve -0.246 0.099 -2.499**
* 2 5 - ve -0.063 0.095 -0.664
* 3 1 - ve -0.166 0.097 -1.707**
* 3 2 - ve -0.027 0.166 -0.238
* 3 3
* -0.015 0.097 -0.154
* 3 4 + ve 0.155 0.103 1.503
* 3 5 - ve 0.036 0.097 0.373
* No association hypothesised 
** Significant at 0.10
FINDINGS
Before reviewing the parameter values, it is desirable to review the overall goodness- 
of-fit. Thus ULS run of the model yielded an adjusted goodness-of-fit index of 0.985 
and an RMS residual of 0.937. The total coefficient of determination for structural 
equations was 0.297 with ULS and 0.316 with ML. None of the variances were 
negative, no correlation coefficient was more than one. The correlations between the 
estimates were small, the largest being -0.297. The largest modification index was
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2.18 (Gamma element 13) - less than the value of 5.0 suggested by Joreskog (1986) as 
positive indicator for further model trimming. The normalized residual plot has a slop 
very near one compared to the fourty-five line (there is some skewness at the top).
The goodness-of-fit index in LISREL cannot be directly interpreted for it does not 
follow any known statistical distribution. All that can be said is that it sets an upper 
bound on the percentage of variance explained by the model (the coefficient of 
determination set the lower bound). However, as per Bentler (1982), such a measure 
of goodness-of-fit is "relatively high . . . and suggests that a major portion of the 
variance in the data is explained by the model as a whole". All the fact reported in the 
previous paragraph leads to the conclusion that the data does not reject the model. It 
should be repeated that the nature of the data in this thesis, the methodology of LISREL 
as well as the fact that the writer tests only the causal model and not the measurement 
model prohibit any claim of confirming the model. But the close data-fit along with the 
rather strong support to the theory derived hypotheses do indicate the model to be 
plausible.
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Table 9:2 -  The final model
Hypothesised ULS ML Standard t
Parameter sign estimate estimate error value
P 31 + ve 0.095 0.096 0.095 1.003
P 32 - ve 0.178 0.187 0.096 1.936
* 1 1 + ve 0.420 0.450 0.087 5.163
* 2 2 + ve 0.211 0.183 0.097 1.884
* 2 3 + ve 0.165 0.167 0.093 1.797
v 24 - ve -0.246 -0.258 0.097 -2.660
* 3 1 - ve -0.171 -0.170 0.095 -1.798
V34 + ve 0.136 0.151 0.098 1.544
^21 + ve Not significantly different from
* 1 2 - ve zero. Hypothesised association
* 3 2 - ve not confirmed.
* 2 5 - ve The variable X5 (Management level) had
* 3 5 - ve no significant relationship and was
dropped from the model.
** significant at 0.05 
* significant at 0.10
Table 9:2 - shows the path structure with the estimated parameters. The total effects of 
the different variables (relabelled to reflect the scale directions) on scanning behaviour 
are summarised in Table 9:3.
These findings and their implications are discussed in details later in this chapter. 
These findings must, however, be interpreted with caution in view of the many 
limitations of the methodology and of the data in this thesis. A review of these 
limitations precedes the discussion on the findings.
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Table 9:3- Total effect of influencing factors on
managerial scanning behaviour.
Explanatory variables
Total effect on individual 
scanning behaviour (extent 
of domain focus).
Environmental unpredictability -0.171
Environmental heterogeneity 0.078
Individual’s experience with diversity 0.029
Individual's trustee-ship orientation 0.089
Analytical orientation of company 0.095
Lack of structure in task 0.178
LIMITATIONS OF MODEL
There are clearly a number of reasons why these findings may be plain wrong. They 
may be due to modelling error - after all the model explains anything between thirty-two 
(coefficient of determination) and ninty-seven (adjusted goodness-of-fit index) percent 
of the variance and there can be many alternative models that may fit the data equally 
well and they may either not reflect these relationships or may even show significant 
relationship the other way. One difficulty with structural equation models not often 
highlighted by users of the methodology is that a number of different models with very 
different path-structures and path-strengths may fit the data equally well and the only 
claim that can be made on behalf of a particular model is that it is superior to another 
model that shows a worse fit with the data. Not having such an alternative model (few 
users of this technique ever have), even that claim cannot be made for the model 
adopted in this thesis. Besides, the relationships may be spurious, arising out of 
measurement error. Finally, they may be an artifact of sampling - caused by the non- 
random selection of institutions and individual respondents.
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Figure 9:3 - Causal Path Diagram
-0.171
0.420 0.095
0.178
0.136
0.211 Extent of Task 
Structure
0.165 ,0.264
Environmental
Homogeneity
Experience with 
Diversity_____
Entrepreneurial
Orientation
Environmental
Predictability
Domain Focus in 
Scanning_______
Analytical Orientation 
of Company/Firm
Having laid out in such explicit details why the model and the relationships may be 
wrong, let us assume that they are not. After all, as was shown repeatedly, the survey 
data confirm many intuitive expectations. Most of the findings are also entirely 
consistent both with theoretically derived predictions and with findings of previous 
empirical research on the topic. There have been no strong reasons so far for 
questioning the reliability of the data used in this thesis. Most of the causal associations 
suggested by the model are intuitively plausible, anyway. Only two of the associations 
appear to be contrary to received wisdom. But, as the writer shall argue, even these 
relationships, though unexpected at first sight, are not entirely implausible in view of 
some recent and not-so-recent findings in the field of cognitive psychology.
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INTERPRETATION
Out of the six total effects, four are consistent with expectations but the other two are 
not. As the environment is seen as unpredictable, individuals scan a broader sector, not 
limiting themselves only to their task environments. Note also the finding reported in 
chapter seven : in an unpredictable environment, search becomes more important than 
surveillance. This is consistent with a pattern that has manifest itself consistently in 
the data, viz., that surveillance is more effective within the familiar territory of the 
immediate task environment and for collecting and understanding signals from the 
broader environment, a more directed attention is required. This is why sources such 
as consultants or publications are seen as more important for acquiring information on 
the broader environment and not for domain related information. Within the firm, staff 
specialists act as instruments of search. They are most effective in scanning beyond the 
firm's current area of operations but, within that area, line managers are more useful 
scanners for they have the networks required for effective surveillance. This 
phenomenon will become even clearer when the writer present the case study data in the 
following chapter.
This link between environmental unpredictability, the need for broad scanning for 
"political and ideological intelligence" and the usefulness of "policy experts" as 
opposed to "facts-and-figures experts" had been suggested by Willensky (1967) based 
on his sociological study of the organisational intelligence function. The same 
phenomenon was observed by Aguilar in his case studies. The association may have 
an important implication for organisation design. Perceived environmental 
unpredictability is influenced by the structure of the organisation : by the extent of its 
internal integration and differentiation (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Therefore, at 
least to a limited extent, how unpredictable the managers of a firm feel the environment 
to be, can be manipulated through these design variables. This perception of
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unpredictability, in turn, would affect the nature of scanning and, in the long term, the 
adaptive capability of the firm. Normatively, such an argument has been made before. 
For instance, it has been suggested by Thompson (1967) that an organisation needs to 
both protect its core and to expose it for effective learning and adaptation. Exposure to 
the broad environment is useful in sensitising the organisation (or a sub-unit) to the 
need for change; protecting and isolating it, is desirable in the process of effecting and 
institutionalising the change. Thus, according to that author (Thompson), the structure 
of the organisation or the sub-unit should vary depending on the particular phase of 
adaptation that it is going through. The findings in this thesis add credibility to this 
normative argument. An organisation needs to be overintegrated at the sensitising 
phase so that managers perceive the environment to be more unpredictable and broaden 
their scanning to the wider environment. At the change-embedding phase, it needs to 
be overdifferentiated so that it perceives the environment to be relatively more stable 
and can institutionalise the change while paying attention only to the more limited task 
environment.
A number of authors have pointed out the dangers of an overly analytical approach of 
firms that can curb innovation, experimentation and risk-taking. Peters and Waterman 
(1980) have spoken about the "bias for action" of the need to follow the ready-fire-aim 
sequence and to overcome the hubris of analysis. A second hypothesis that was 
confirmed in the final model is consistent with this argument. When managers perceive 
the firm to be highly analytical, their scanning becomes domain-constrained. That is 
the posture of the defender organisation and such scanning is incapable of digging bold 
new opportunities. In an era of environmental unpredictability and discontinuity, there 
may be a valid argument for deemphasising analysis and linear thinking so as to 
promote the organisation's sensitivity to the broader environment and to enhance its 
ability to innovate. A firm's opportunities and threats increasingly arise from outside 
its task environment particularly in the high technology industries where innovations in
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one industry can revolutionise another with which, till that time, it had little in common. 
In such an era, a healthy dose of unconstrained scanning is essential for proactive or 
even reactive coping. Analysis is useful only when there is a causal model that 
connects events to their effects. In the face of possible discontinuity, there is often no 
such causal model to help managers interpret changes in the broad environment and 
intuition and gestalt rather than logic and analysis may be preferred learning tools under 
such circumstances. The first signs of an opportunity or of a threat arising from 
beyond the task domain is usually a gut-feel that cannot be justified with analytical 
precision. If such gut-feel are not felt to be acceptable within the firm, managers will 
gradually stop looking beyond the immediate task domain.
Managers with greater experience with diversity are less constrained in their scanning. 
The more entrepreneurial the personal orientation of the manager, the more 
unconstrained is his scanning. These are the two other hypotheses that were 
confirmed. Both have interesting implications for the training and staffing functions. 
Streufert and Driver (1965) had suggested that organisational placement of managers 
should match their cognitive complexities with the requirements of their jobs. Certain 
functions in firms may require managers who are sensitive to the broad environment; 
strategic planning or new venture development are possible examples. Even among the 
more traditional functions, marketing may need a greater awareness of the broader 
environment trends compared to accounting. An organisation can benefit by 
systematically placing more entrepreneurial managers and those with greater exposure 
to diversity in such functions. Similarly, internal training and development 
programmes may be tailored so as to expose managers in such functions to greater 
diversity by rotating them in different assignments in different locations. These 
suggestions are not new and firms' have been following them traditionally. It is 
comforting, however, that these implications, the model is not counter-intuitive.
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All these are expected results and they confirm past theoretical suggestions and 
empirical observations. What may be more interesting to review are the two surprises 
in the model. First, as environmental heterogeneity increases, scanning, instead of 
being more diverse as hypothesised, becomes more restricted and domain-bound. 
Second, as the task is perceived to be less and less structured, scanning becomes less 
diverse and more focussed on the narrower task environment. The path diagram 
confirms that the effect of environmental heterogeneity is also mediated through the 
perception of task structure. In effect, therefore, the surprise is really one : why does 
the perception of the task being unstructured lead to more constrained rather than less 
constrained scanning?
Schoeder et al (1968) have demonstrated the existence of an inverted U-shape 
relationship between environmental complexity and integrative complexity of 
individual’s cognitive maps. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have built on these findings 
to suggest that beyond a level of information complexity, innovation and learning are 
hampered due to limitations in human information processing capacity. Similarly, it 
can be argued that beyond a level of task complexity, "information avoidance" 
behaviour becomes predominant as a means to reduce cognitive overload. Beyond this 
point, search becomes simple-minded problematic search - " . . .  in the neighborhood 
of problem symptoms and. . .  in the neighborhood of current alternatives" (Cyert and 
March, 1963, pl21). In this range, we can indeed expect to see decreasing scanning 
diversity with increasingly unstructured tasks. Further, all the respondents in this 
thesis occupy managerial positions and thereby face relatively unstructured and 
judgmental tasks. Therefore, it is not impossible that the data in thesis pertains to this 
range.
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There are also several research done to suggest that stress in the decision situation 
reduces the dimensionality of decision behaviour. It does not affect the extent of risk- 
taking but leads to a more unidimensional focus on one action domain. Extending this 
argument, it is not implausible that when tasks become too complex, decision makers 
narrow rather than extend their scanning focus.
Reviewing the literature on human performance in information search tasks, Connolly 
and Serre (1982) have noted that" . . .  human skills in balancing the most and benefits 
of information acquisition may be seriously deficient, even in a laboratory task in 
which the balance is made highly salient and extended opportunities of learning are 
provided. If these findings generalise to the real world information acquisition tasks 
noted earlier, they imply significant non-optimalities may be found in such tasks".
(P3).
It has also been suggested that perceived cue validity affects information acquisition 
behaviour. Low validity cues may not yield enough reduction in decision error to 
justify acquisition of such information (Connolly and Gilani, 1982). Edwards (1965) 
has suggested this relationship normatively, based on the Bayesian model of decision 
behaviour. Snapper and Peterson (1971) have confirmed the suggestion in their 
laboratory experiments which show that subjects information behaviour depart 
substantially from optimum : subjects overacquire information when diagnosticity is 
low, underacquire at intermediate levels of diagnosticity, and acquire information 
optimally only for highly diagnostic information. Connolly and Serre (1982) have 
extended the finding to show that the pattern of overacquistion of information for low- 
consquence decisions and under-acquisition of information for high-consquence 
decision is robust to variations in overall cue validity. Further, they have also shown 
that such sub-optimal information acquisition behaviour persists with feedback and 
learning is often limited.
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The pattern of these findings is not inconsistent with the following scenario : managers 
face a high degree of cognitive stress when they perceive their tasks to be highly 
unstructured. This leads to an unidimensional focus in their information acquisition 
behaviour. Given the ambiguity and equivocality in information that accompany 
unstructured tasks, information from the broader environment have even lesser cue 
validity than information from the more interpretable immediate task environment. 
Therefore the unidimensional focus is directed toward that domain. Hence the finding 
that the more unstructured the task, the more domain-constrained the manager's 
scanning behaviour.
Another explanation for the finding may lie in the notion of slack. Managers carrying 
out structured tasks may have more slack to invest in scanning the broader 
environment. When tasks are highly unstructured, little slack may be available for any 
activity other than getting the immediate task done. The slack in question may not be 
physical slack in the sense of time or other tangible resources but intellectual slack in 
the sense of cognitive capacity. The scanning needs for unstructured tasks may be 
biased toward the broader environment precisely because the task is structured and the 
immediate environment is predictable and unambiguous and therefore does not need to 
be constantly monitored.
It is not possible, given the nature and limitations of the data used in this thesis, to go 
beyond this stage of conjectures about the relationship between task structure and 
scanning behaviour. The writer cannot suggest which, out of the many possible 
explanations, is more plausible. But, as the writer had started out saying, the 
relationship may not be spurious. It is contrary to all normative suggestions but, as the 
writer has tried to show, there is enough evidence to suggest that human information 
acquisition behaviour does not follow normative guidelines. What the writer may have, 
is another example and another evidence of such non-optimal behaviour; one that is 
obtained from real life rather than from structured laboratory experiments.
181
Chapter Ten 
Organising the institutional scanning
function
CHAPTER TEN
ORGANISING THE INSTITUTIONAL SCANNING FUNCTION
So far in this thesis, the scanning function has been presented entirely at the individual 
level, with the focus on how managers acquire external information and how their 
scanning behaviour are affected by their personal traits and by their perceptions about the 
environment and the organisation. In this section, the focus will be on the organisation, 
to explore the implications of such individual level scanning behaviour on corporate 
organising of the external intelligence function.
The primary data for this section are interviews with managers in two large Malaysian 
institutions (name of institutions are not mentioned specifically as explained in chapter 
three). However, for reasons that will be explained shortly, the way the scanning 
function was organised in both institutions was very similar. So, in the interest of 
avoiding needless repetition, the writer describes the scanning organisation and system in 
only one institution, in full detail. Materials from the other case is used more anecdotally, 
to explain a point or to highlight a difference.
As the writer was conducting the case studies in the two institutions, it gradually become 
manifest that the formal organisation for the scanning function were remarkably similar in 
both. The scanning units, in both, were lodged within the corporate planning function. 
In each firm, the scanning unit had two groups; one responsible for what was classified 
as strategic information and mostly referred to information relevant for the long term 
planning function, and the other for handling information pertinent for day-to-day 
operations. The unit was also labelled the same way : it was called the Research and 
Analysis Department. The formats for their daily and weekly reports were similar, often 
indistinguishable. Even the objectives of the departments as narrated by the managers in 
charge, were almost identical. This observation led the writer to an inquiry about the
182
reasons for such startling similarities and the finding that cause lay in one man : Mr 
Othman Zakaria (All names used in this chapter are fictitious since it was specifically 
agreed - as per explanation in chapter three - that identity of persons, institutions, et 
cetera will not be revealed or mentioned in anyway in this thesis).
Mr Othman is an ex-intelligence officer of the Malaysian armed forces who entered the 
business world in the early 1970's as an executive of the XYZ Berhad group of 
company. He had set up the scanning organisation in the XYZ marketing division which 
was later adopted by the whole company. In 1981 he resigned from XYZ Berhad after 
completing an MBA degree from an American university to head the newly formed 
KUMA Sdn Bhd, an American/Malaysian owned independent consulting firm, of which, 
at the time of this study, he was the CEO and a managing partner. The principal activity 
of KUMA Sdn Bhd (which is based in Kuala Lumpur) is to advise Malaysian institutions 
about setting up and improving their intelligence systems and a major part of the service 
is to train managers in client firms both on how to scan for information and also on how 
the scanning function should be organised within the firm. Mr Othman has a blue-print of 
the scanning organisation and over 15 of the major Malaysian firms (including XYZ (P) 
Berhad where it was developed) have adopted this system. Managers from these firms 
regularly attend formal courses that help them to maintain and upgrade the systems. They 
also attend informal get-togethers organised by KUMA Sdn Bhd where they exchange 
their experiences with the existing systems and their ideas for system improvement.
The result of this process is that the scanning organisations in many of the large 
Malaysian firms have come to become remarkably similar. Even minor modifications in 
formats or in task groupings, if found useful in one firm, are soon adopted by others. 
The only significant difference lies in how extensive the formal scanning system is in the \
j
different firms. It is widely believed that XYZ Berhad has the most extensive scanning | 
system in Malaysia. The formal scanning department is larger in this firm compared to all
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others and it has made the largest investment in specialised manpower for acquiring and 
interpreting external information. The system in ION Sdn Bhd, for instance, was almost 
exactly a small scale replica of the XYZ system. The scanning system in XYZ 
Engineering was an even smaller version of the same model. (The writer conducted a 
few interviews in this institution but did not carry out a case study precisely for this 
reason.) Therefore, in this chapter, the writer describes the scanning system of XYZ 
only and base most of the examples and inferences on what was seen here in this 
institution.
XYZ (P) BERHAD
XYZ (P) Berhad, is the primary international arm of the XYZ group of companies and 
was the first to be designated by the Malaysian Federal Government under the New , 
Economy Policy (NEP) concept as a Model Business Institution (MBI) of the year (and 
has been, and will be striving for the position in years to come). In 1983, its sales 
totalled $2.6 billion on which the company recorded a net profit of $11 million. During 
that year, the company employed 4,700 people, had 52 branches around the world and 
conducting business in export and import very extensively.
THE XYZ GROUP
The XYZ group, of which XYZ (P) Berhad, is a part, is listed in the references 
mentioned in chapter three, page 41 (although the exact name is not reveal, for reasons 
already mentioned earlier), and other publications (see also chapter one for the source 
reference). In 1982, the sales of the group was $5.8 billion and its net income was $27 
million. Over the preceding decade, the group has registered a staggering growth rate of 
45% per annum. In 1982, its total assets exceeded $4.6 billion and it employed a large 
number of people in its world-wide operations..
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Beginning with business activities in the rubber and tin industries XYZ grew rapidly to 
become Malaysia's largest companies in the 60's and 70's. During this period, it rapidly 
diversified its activities, entering service industries such as insurance, banking, retailing, 
shipping, timber and a number of traditional manufacturing industries including fertiliser 
and paper. In the early 1970s the group invested heavily in capital-intensive sectors such 
as petrochemicals, construction, off-shore resource development and shipbuilding. From 
the late 1970s the group reoriented its diversification strategy to enter more technology­
intensive sectors. This strategy led the group into the electronic, semiconductor, 
telecommunications and precision instrument industries fostering in practice and principle 
the Look East Policy concept of the Mahathir government.
The XYZ group was the creation of the entrepreneurial genius of Tun Tan Sri Kwok, 
fabled to be one of the richest individuals in the world. Tun Kwok now 74, continues to 
be the strong bulwark of the group as Chairman and hold majority share of most group 
companies, either directly or indirectly. The Presidents of the companies report to Tun 
Kwok through a secretariat known as "The Office of the Executive Staff (OES) which 
functions as an advisory body to the Chairman. However, each company within the 
group enjoys considerable autonomy to take decision about its own operations. By 
Malaysian (and even ASEAN) standard at least, the extent of strategic autonomy enjoyed 
by the companies is exceptional and is a direct result of Tun Kwok's firm faith in a 
decentralisation form of management. This faith is manifest from the following statement 
made by him in one of his very rare press interviews :
"I have never made any decisions for the past 15 years.
Even when a President of a member company comes to me 
to ask my approval, I never answer. I believe that XYZ 
succeeded because I delegated authority very early. For 
years, I have never attended the weekly meeting of the group 
presidents only once or twice a year" (From a leading 
Malaysia/Singapore newspaper)
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XYZ (P) Berhad
Exporting out of Malaysia/Singapore is the principal activity of the (P) Berhad and 
accounts for 76% of the company total sales. Imports into Malaysia/Singapore are the 
next important function contributing, in 1986, approximately 13% of the firm's total 
turnover. Other companies in the group absorb 30% of the import volume and the 
remaining 70% is imported for other customers, including the Malaysian and Singapore 
Government. Domestic sales and some neighbouring ASEAN sales are both relatively 
minor operations, contributing 4 percent and 3 percent respectively of sales and even 
less of the company's profits. To provide a measure of comparison, these shares of 
different activities of the XYZ are compared in Table 10:1 with similar shares for the 
Japanese Sogo Sosha as a group. (Source: XYZ data bank)
Between 1979 and 1987, sales of the company has grown by over 1000% increasing 
from $243m to $2.6b. During this period, the number of overseas branches have 
increased from 16 to 52 and profit have expanded from $650 thousand to $11 million 
(Table 10:2).
Table 10:1 - XYZ (P) Berhad and the Japanese 
Sogo Sosha. A comparison of sales 
by type of activity.
XYZ (P) Berhad Japanese Sogo Sosha
Exports 
Imports 
Domestic sales 
Third country sales
74%
19%
4%
3%
21%
24%
40%
15%
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Table 10:2 -  XYZ (P) Berhad
General information sales (Unit: US$1,000)
Year Domestic Exports Total Net Profit
79 17,708 225,903 243,610 653
80 34,147 363,587 397,734 4,671
81 160,951 492,285 481,456 2,347
82 97,788 493,394 591,182 1,738
83 165,041 772,290 937,331 1,105
84 164,171 1,237,106 1,401,273 3,592
85 176,113 1,657,158 1,833,271 5,687
86 403,641 1,860,356 2,263,997 3,928
87 411,139 2,225,275 2,636,414 11,060
Number of employees
Year Domestic Abroad Total No. of overseas branch
79 2,700 34 2,734 16
80 2,657 60 2,719 20
81 3,465 96 3,561 34
82 3,407 114 3,521 37
83 3,186 103 3,289 33
84 3,593 114 3,706 35
85 4,061 „ 149 4,210 39
86 4,340 172 4,512 48
87 5,554 175 4,729 52
The company is divided into twenty-four divisions which are devoted to exports, to 
imports, to domestic sales and to production. Each division is divided into departments 
by product categories with a total of seventy-one departments within the twenty-four 
divisions. These departments are further divided into one hundred and seventy seven 
sections for dealing with separate products or functions within the department. Each 
division is headed by a Managing Director and operates as a profit centre with 
responsibility for both formulating and implementing its own strategies.
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The overseas branches report directly to the President of the company. These branches 
vary in size from a minimum of two employees to a maximum of seventy employees. A 
few of the larger branches such as those in the U.S. and a few Western European 
countries are organised as subsidiaries and enjoy considerably more autonomy 
compared to the smaller branches. Subsidiaries can set their own prices and can conduct 
business independently as long as individual transactions do not exceed $10 million. 
The smaller branches, in contrast, have to obtain head office approval for almost all 
business transactions.
NEED FOR A FORMAL SYSTEM TO COORDINATE SCANNING
Past authors on the issue of corporate scanning have suggested that the large 
organisations need to formalise their scanning mechanisms and not leave it to the best 
judgment of individual managers. According to Aguilar (1967 and 1981), the absence 
of formal coordination, the "George will do it" attitude may prevail with regard to 
scanning and it may be left as no one's direct responsibility. This would be a 
consequence of the Gresham's law of planning described by March and Simon (1958): 
"We predict that when an individual is faced with both highly programmed and highly 
unprogrammed tasks, the former tend to take precedence over the latter even in the 
absence of strong over-all time pressures".
Kalff (1980) has also argued that "there are a number of reasons why environmental 
scanning should not be left to individual decision maker, but should be insitutionalised". 
Formalising, according to Kalff, is required to improve coordination, to develop a 
common understanding of societal developments, to systematise evaluation and for 
overall enhancement of organisational learning that can occur to the firm out of the 
scanning process. Similar arguments have also been made by Collings (1968).
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In the writer's study of the scanning function in XYZ (P) Berhad, two issues were 
highlighted to support these normative arguments in favour of institutionalising 
scanning. First, the data shows the enormous diversity in individual level scanning 
behaviour that exists with the company. As shown in chapter three, the diversity that 
exists within the company is no less than the diversity that exists across companies. 
This diversity provides empirical evidence to support the need for formal and 
institutional coordination suggested by Collings (1968). Second, as this survey of 
Malaysian managers reveal, over 60 percent of information collected by individual 
managers is perceived to be useful to other managers in the company. This supports the 
argument of Kalff (1980) that a special scanning unit is required to ensure effective 
communication of external information within the company.
Diversity of individual-level scanning behavior within XYZ
Total time spent on scanning by managers of the company varied from 2 hours to 28 
hours per week with a mean of 11 hours and a standard deviation of 6 hours. The 
distribution of scanning time on different factors was similarly diverse (Table 10:3): the 
maximum percentage for all factors exceeding the maximum percentage for all others 
(except for the residual 'others' category).
Table 10:3 -Intra-company diversity in time spent 
on different information factor.
Percentage time spent 
on different factors Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Competitive 22 8.8 10 40
Market 34 11.4 15 50
Technology 10 5.3 5 20
Regulatory 10 4.1 5 20
Resources 10 5.4 2 25
Broad issues 9 6.3 0 25
Others 5 3.3 0 10
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There was similar diversity with regard to use of sources. The relative importance of 
internal sources varied from ten to eighty percent; that of external sources varied from 
twenty to ninety percent. Similarly, relative usage of personal and impersonal sources 
varied widely among managers within the firm (Table 10:4).
Table 10:4 - Intra-company diversity in use of sources.
Percentage usage 
of sources Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
Internal sources 50 21.2 10 80
External sources 50 21.2 20 90
Personal sources 58 20.0 20 90
Impersonal sources 42 20.0 10 80
The extent of intra-company diversity was no less in usage of scanning modes (Table 
10:5).
Table 10:5 - Intra-company diversity in usage of scanning modes
Usage of scanning 
modes Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Viewing 24 15.0 0 60
Monitoring 30 12.3 10 60
Investigating 27 11.6 10 50
Research 17 12.9 0 60
It has been argued in this thesis that individual level scanning behaviour is influenced by 
the individual's personal attributes as well as his perceptions about the environment and
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the organisation. If the scanning behaviour of individuals within the company shows 
such enormous diversity, it would be expected that they would display similar diversity 
with regard to those influencing variables.
It has been pointed out earlier (chapter five) that, compared to NWCFs executives, 
WCFs managers find the environment to be both more homogeneous and more 
predictable. Looking within an individual WCF, the same pattern is generally observed 
- more managers feel the environment to be homogeneous rather than heterogeneous and 
predictable rather than unpredictable (recall that the categories were created with a mean 
split of the relevant scales). However, the company does not serve as a homogenising 
factor with regard to the managers' perceptions about the environment (in Figure 10:1 is 
not significant).
Figure 10:1 - Perception about the environment
Environmental homogeneity 
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Predictable
Environmental 
Predictability
Unpredictable
(d. f. = 0.016 [p> 0.8])
Similar diversity exist with regard to managerial perceptions about the strategic 
orientation of the company. Overall, the company is seen as analytical and risk averse 
(an opinion about XYZ that is widely shared in Malaysian/Singaporean business circle), 
but intra-company variance in perceptions is quite large (Figure 10:2) and the test of 
significance does not reject the hypothesis that the managers are randomly distributed 
among the four cells in the table.
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Figure 10:2 -  Perception about strategic orientation 
of company: managers in XYZ (P) Berhad
Perception about company's 
attitude toward risk
Not highly 
analytical
Company's
analytical
orientation
Highly
analytical
(1 d.f. = 2,28 [p>0.13])
Further, Table 10:6, and 10:7 show that neither the hierarchical level of the manager nor 
his departmental affiliation has any systematic effect on managerial scanning behavior 
(ANOVA F's are significant for 3 levels and 4 departments out of the 22 measures).
This extensive and non-systematic variation not only in the way managers of the same 
company scan the environment but also in the way they perceive the company’s strategic 
orientation and the characteristics of the external environment provide empirical 
validation to Codings' arguments in favour of institutionally formalising the scanning 
function in large firms. Such formalisation is required to coordinate the scanning 
activities to avoid "holes" in scanning that are bound to exist in its absence.
Risk-averse Risk-seeking
7 2
CO CO
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Table 10:6- Effect of Management level on scanning behaviour
Scanning Time/Factors
Management level
Junior
Middle Senior Top
P Value 
of ANOVA 'F'
Total scanning time (hours/week) 11 11 11 11
% time competitive factors 20 25 21 0.47
% time market factors 31 37 39 0.28
% time technology factors 10 10 11 0.96
% time regulatory factors 11 9 8 0.34
% time resource factors 12 9 7 0.18
% time broad issues 11 6 11 0.18
% time others 6 4 6 0.56
Sources
% internal 58 32 65 0.01
% external 42 63 35 0.01
% personal 39 59 54 0.91
% interpersonal 42 41 46 0.91
Usage of external sources
% customers 23 24 24 0.97
% suppliers 16 13 26 0.10
% bankers 6 6 3 0.77
% advertising agents 3 2 8 0.39
% agents & distributors 9 10 11 0.91
% consultants 4 5 3 0.83
% general publications 14 13 14 0.98
% trade publications 16 15 9 0.66
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Table 10:7 - Effect of departmental association on
scanning behaviour
Departmental affiliation
Scanning time/factors Marketing Planning
General
Management
P value 
ofANOVA
Total scanning time (hr/wk) 12 12 9 0.71
% time competitive factors 24 22 24 0.59
% time market factors 35 30 33 0.56
% time technology factors 10 8 12 0.28
% time regulatory factors 10 10 8 0.76
% time resource factors 9 13 9 0.68
% time broad issues 9 - 10 0.91
% time other factors 4 6 6 0.63
Sources
% internal 43 71 51 0.01
% external 57 29 49 0.01
% personal 66 52 56 0.13
% impersonal 34 48 44 0.13
Usage of external sources
% customers 29 25 19 0.06
% suppliers 21 14 17 0.11
% bankers 3 4 6 0.56
% advertising agents 3 2 8 0.41
% agents & distributors 10 12 11 0.52
% consultants 5 3 5 0.76
% general publications 8 13 16 0.05
% trade publications 16 18 9 0.25
% trade shows 2 5 6 0.36
% others 4 4 1 0.22
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Organising the corporate scanning function is required not only for this coordination but 
also for internal communication of information acquired by individual managers. In the 
survey, managers were asked to categorise external information collected by them in 
four categories: information useful to self only, information useful to self and to others 
in the organisation, information useful to others but not to self, and information not 
useful to anyone in the company. The responses are summarised in Table 10:8. As can 
be seen, approximately 60 percent of external information acquired by mangers is seen 
as potentially useful to others in the organisation. For such use to materialism, the 
information needs to be communicated and, for both efficiency and effectiveness, the 
communication system needs to be organised.
Table 10:8- Need for internal communication of 
external information.
Total sample 
(n = 111)
Only XYZ 
(n = 27)
Mean Std. deviation Mean Std. deviation
% useful to self only 27 18 29 21
% useful to self and others 41 20 41 23
% useful to others and not self 20 14 18 11
% useful to none 12 11 12 14
Coordination and communication are the two justifications for a formal scanning 
organisation that are suggested in the questionnaire survey data. The interviews within 
the firms suggest two more justifications. Of the 36 executives interviewed in the three 
firms, 23 mentioned the need for collecting different pieces of information as the most 
important reason for creating a special "Research and Information" department. Among 
the XYZ (P) Berhad executives, 12 out of 14 did so. The collating process involves 
both validation and interpretation and these according to the respondents, require a
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specialised staff to devote their full-time attention to.
With this brief review of why a formal scanning organisation may be necessary, a 
description of the scanning organisation at the XYZ (P) Berhad is appropriate. Later, 
the writer shall return to this question of need for formalisation when the review as to 
the extent to which the scanning unit of the company is perceived by the managers to 
fullfill the needs, is done.
THE CORPORATE SCANNING UNIT IN XYZ (P) BERHAD
Interviews after interviews, managers of XYZ (P) Berhad emphasise that information 
was the firm's most important asset and that its success depended largely on its ability to 
collect, interpret and react to external information with speed and insight.
A comment of Datuk Samshuddin, Executive Vice President of the company and a 
member of the corporate board, is a typical example : "Few companies face as intense a 
level of competition as does a global functioning operation. Many of our competitors 
are much larger and have been operating for a much longer periods. They have very 
extensive network all over the world. And, in the world of business, things move very 
fast. Too fast. We have to have the latest information and it must be accurate. That, I 
consider, is more important than anything else".
Datuk Chin, Executive Director of the Engineering and Construction Division 
highlighted another important requirement of scanning. "Information that is in the 
public domain is mostly of no use in the current business. It helps for future planning 
but for actually transacting business, we need information before they are made public. 
We need to know when a government in the Middle East starts thinking about importing 
a large volume of engineering/construction equipments, so that we can research the
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actual need, evaluate possible competition and offer the right equipment at the right price 
when the tender is actually issued. If we start working only after the tender is made 
public, there may be too little time for effective ground work".
While these comments were typical of the managers' concern about external information 
for current operations, the need of external intelligence for long term planning was also 
highlighted by many. Datuk Yap, Managing Director of the Financing and General 
Administration Division emphasised the complex information processing requirement 
for managing the finance function : "As internationally operating organisation, we 
operate on narrow margins. Financing cost is a very important part of our total costs 
and it must be kept down if we have to compete internationally. We raise money all 
over the world - or at least we can, if we wish to. We must carefully monitor the fiscal 
and monetary policies of the governments where the major capital markets are located, 
must read the analysis and expectations of experts and then decide our long term 
financing plans. We have help - the analysis reports from banks and consulting 
organisations - but ultimately we decide based on our own assessments. Six months 
ago, the three-year interest swap was 11 percent. We should have made our deal but we 
did not. That was a mistake. Now the rate is 12 and a half percent. To me, that is an 
intelligence failure."
These comments are not empty words. The institution has put a lot of money where its 
mouth is. It has invested significant resources on scanning - both in terms of having 
specialised manpower devoted exclusively to the scanning task, and also by insisting on 
the line managers to become more aware of their scanning responsibilities and by 
instituting procedures so that they collect and communicate external intelligence on a 
regular basis.
The central scanning group for the company is lodged in the corporate headquarters 
within the Planning Department. Planning is considered to be high priority function
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within the company and the division has a strength of over 100 full-time employees and 
is directly supervised by Datuk Samshuddin, the company EVP. The department is 
composed of five major functional groups (Figure 10:3).
Figure 10:3 -  Structure of the corporate planning 
division at XYZ (P) Berhad
Corporate Planning
Overseas Overseas Corporate Overseas Research and 
Administration Marketing Planning Planning Information
The Corporate Planning department is principally responsible for formulating long term 
plans and for providing special support to the top management in formulating broad 
strategies. The Overseas Administration department deals with human resource issues : 
assessing manpower requirements for the overseas organisation, arranging recruitment, 
placement and transfers. Overseas Marketing is a special unit responsible for marketing 
in countries with which Malaysia does not have diplomatic relations (mostly the 
communist countries and countries that are not friendly with the Association of Islamic 
Countries [AOIC]). The remaining two sections, the Overseas Planning (OP) and the 
Research and Information (RI) departments are devoted full-time to the external 
intelligence function. The RI section is specialised in dealing with publicly available 
information - mostly in the printed form - provided by general and trading publications 
and by special private and government organisations. It focus on the long term - into 
what Montgomery and Weinberg (1978) described as the Area of Interest - and monitor 
overall economic, social, cultural and political developments, broad trends of different 
products and markets, published studies about suppliers, buyers and competitors. The 
Overseas Planning section, in contrast, is involved only with current business. It
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receives market reports, competitors' intelligence, and other such information provided 
by the overseas organisation. It receives raw data, unprocessed, and it is their job to 
analyse and interpret the data and to explicate their implications at a tactical or operational 
level.
The OP section is headed by a General Manager and is structured into four groups 
(Figure 10:4). The groups are organised geographically, with three groups coordinating 
the scanning function for each of three regions; ASEAN countries, Middle East, and the 
Americas. The manager in-charge of each group is responsible for reviewing, 
analysing, and communicating intelligence reports received from overseas offices within 
the region that the group is responsible for. The fourth group coordinates the work of 
the three regional groups.
Figure 10:4 - S tructure of the Overseas Planning Section 
XYZ(P) Berhad
Manager
ASEAN
Manager 
Middle East
General Manager
Manager
Coordination
Manager 
North & South 
America
It is responsible for synthesising the reports from the other three groups and for internal 
circulation of consolidated reports to the senior managers, product division and overseas 
offices, as required. Manager of each of the groups is supported by three staff members, 
bringing up the total strength of the section to seventeen members, (five managers 
including the General Manager and twelve staffs).
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The General Manager (GM) of this group, Datuk Baharuddin, had considerable line 
experience both in a product division in the headquarter and in a major overseas branch 
(United States). He had been placed as a manager in the OP section after eight years in 
the company and was promoted as the GM of the section after spending two years in the 
section during which time he had been rotated among all the different groups. He had 
been a GM for a little over a year. "Line experience is critical for working in this 
section," Datuk Baharuddin emphasised during the interview, "otherwise you cannot 
either understand the problems of the overseas offices in collecting information nor can 
you properly interpret the implications of information you received. Every manager in 
this section has at least five years of line experience and that is their most important 
asset."
Every overseas office of the company employing more than five people must send a 
daily report to the OP section. Within the company, this report is called the DI - an 
acronym for Daily Information. The report includes all relevant external information 
collected by the branch during the day. The DIs are telexed at the day-end by each 
overseas office - often it is the last thing the Branch Manager does before leaving the 
office for the day. Offices with three to five employees must send the DI four times a 
week and a single or two empoyees office is required to submit the DIs at least thrice a 
week. These are important rules, any violation of which must have very good reasons. 
The reports came in from Iran, over the telex line of the company's banker, even during 
the worst days of the Iranian revolution. Not a single DI was missed by the Beirut 
office when the city was under siege - being bombed by three different armies. On the 
average forty such reports are received and processed every day by the OP section.
To submit this report, the managers of the branches, in turn, require all field offices to 
turn in a daily report and there exists an unwritten law in the institution/company that 
officers must include at least one item of information each day in their report to the
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Branch Manager. Through the DI system, a great deal of pressure is exerted on all field 
personnel of the company to actively seek information through all their external contacts.
The OP section has both a communication and an interpretation function. On a daily 
basis, it summarises the important items in the different Daily Reports, translate the 
summary into Bahasa Malaysia (BM) [the Malaysian national language] and circulates it 
to all important managers in the company. This is the Outgoing DI, the document a 
majority of the company’s managers receive midday, everyday, containing field 
information reports of the preceding day. Every manager is expected to peruse the report 
and to circulate it within the department on the same day. The report usually contains 
just data or information, not an analysis or synthesis.
The analysis is communicated in a separate and highly confidential report - the Daily 
Dash Report. These are numbered and sent in sealed enveloped to Senior Managers 
only, who must read and destroy them immediately. "If Iraq is considering such large 
quantities of army uniform materials suddenly, fresh army recruitments must be 
anticipated. This may mean that an escalation of the war is imminent. That, in turn, 
implies that Iraq may face a further strain on its resources, particularly with regard to 
availability of foreign exchange for payment of non-defense materials. They may 
therefore be likely to defer payment on such materials. We are heavily involved 
supplying them with building materials, chemical and fertilisers. Caution must be 
exercised on future supplies and the payment situation must be monitored very closely." 
That is an example of the contents of the Dash Report (the name comes from a campaign 
that has been promoted within the company - The Dash to Prosperity - for motivating 
employees to work for the good of the company and the country).
While the DIs from overseas branches are the main information sources for the OP_ 
section, they are not the only ones. The other major source of information for the
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section are the four reports of headquarter managers visiting foreign markets. Each 
manager must submit a detailed tour report, conveying not only what he did during the 
tour but also his general impressions about the market(s), his conjectures about business 
possibilities that may be related or not related to this function and also significant piece 
of information collected by him during the tour. A copy of this report circulates through 
the manager’s chain of command but another copy goes directly to the OP Section who 
analyse the information it contains and incorporate them in the outgoing DIs and Dash 
Reports. In 1986, XYZ headquarters managers made over 500 business trips abroad, 
generating over 4,000 pages of tour reports. These were in many cases, the richest 
source of information for the OP section.
The Research and Information (RI) section was really bom when, in March 1981, the 
Mahathir government conferred XYZ Berhad the status of Model Business Institution 
(MBI) of the year, thereby entitling the firm to special benefits with regard to tax 
relaxation, domestic credits, foreign exchange allocations, facilities of overseas 
spending on offices and travel, et cetera. From 1975, when the company started 
operating as an international concern, it had a small section with two to five staff 
members for collecting relevant information from different publications. But, being 
acknowledged as one of the MBIs resulted in a thorough review of the company's 
position and one of the outcomes of this review was a feeling that to survive in the 
turbulent and highly competitive international business, the company needed a far 
stronger information base. This perception led to a significant expansion of the RI 
section which now consists of four managers and seven staff members not including 
another four persons exclusively engaged in maintaining the corporate library, or rather 
the "data room" as company executives prefer to call it.
Mr Phang, General Manager of the section, was a political journalist by training and 
experience. He joined XYZ four years earlier, having been a political and economic 
columnist for about nine years in a number of Malaysian newspapers. In his career with
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XYZ, he had spent the entire time in the planning department and had no line 
experience. His predecessor as head of the section, Mr Kumar, was also a journalist 
and had been moved out on promotion as the Branch Manager of Hong Kong before Mr 
Phang took over charge of the section. Similarly, the two managers incharge of 
information collection and analysis were also career planners - having spent their entire 
professional life (seven years in one case, five years in the other) in the planning 
department of the company.
Figure 10:5 - Structure of the Research and
Information section: XYZ (P) Berhad
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Mr Phang identified the following as the key functions of the RI section:
1. To monitor the overall economic situation in Malaysia and in all major 
world markets, particularly the United States, EEC countries, and 
countries in the Middle East. The primary focus in the economic analysis 
of foreign market was on factors that influence exports to those markets, 
viz., their foreign exchange position, trade balance in general and with 
Malaysia in particular, domestic employment and production, 
government spending, private spending, et cetera.
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2. To monitor the Malaysian export situation, including competitive 
analysis of other Malaysian and Singapore MBIs, new products available 
for exports, Government policies with regard to exports, and long term 
national export plans and projections.
3. Monitoring other MBIs in the world, seen as global competitors, 
including, primarily, the Japanese MBIs and also the emerging trading 
companies in the United States and Europe and established trading 
companies in other South East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Korea.
4 Country risk analysis for all countries where XYZ had or could 
potentially have any business involvement.
5. Information related to political and military development in important 
markets, particularly in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.
6. Preparation of research reports on special topics, as and when required 
by the top management.
7. Wide diffusion of the information collected and analysed by the section 
to other managers in the organisation.
The principal instrument of communication from the section to other managers in the 
company are the weekly Information Summary Report and two forthnightly publications 
- one called "Bridge" to circulate significant economic and political information and the 
other called "Content Report" which is a bibliography of all important articles, 
pamphlets, books, et cetera, that are noticed during the two weeks and that are 
considered as potentially relevant to the business of the company. The report indicates 
the title of the piece, its author and source, and a two to three line summary of the 
information or analysis contained in the piece. The weekly report and both the 
fortnightly reports are sent to each and every manager of the company and the managers, 
in turn, are expected to encourage their staff to read them.
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Additionally, the RI section publishes a monthly "Economic Indices" that include key 
economic statistics for all important countries (ninety countries were covered in the latest 
report). The report is published as a pocket size booklet that managers can always have 
in their possession for ready reference. Information contained includes, for each 
country, latest figures of imports and exports, GNP, interest rates, level of 
unemployment and inflation and the exchange rate for a number of different major 
currencies.
Finally, the section publishes, twice a year, a major compilation of detailed information 
on fifty key markets in the world. Titled "Management Environment", the report 
contains brief descriptions of the countries, their principal export and import 
commodities including principal sources and destinations, external debt, and its 
implication on government policy, trade balance with detail breakdown for most 
important products, GNP with category-wise breakup, information about key products, 
including demand growth, competitive environment, government policy about trade and 
protection and an overall assessment of the business climate in that country as applicable 
to XYZ . This publication is based on DRI reports, OECD reports, Wharton Country 
reports, market reports from KUMA Sdn Bhd (refer to page 181) and Frost and 
Sullivan and a host of journal including Time, Euromoney, Institutional Investor, and 
special reports from private and public research institutions in Japan, the United States 
and Malaysia. During the rounds of interviews with managers in different branches of 
the company, it was observed that all of them invariably keep a copy of the latest 
"Management Environment" on their desks and most also carried a copy of the 
"Economic Indices" in their wallets.
It is also the responsibility of the RI section to maintain the "Data Room" which contains 
all important external publications, reports, books, et cetera, and also copies of all 
important internal reports and publications. The library also maintains copies of all tour 
reports, minutes of all important meetings, and also all information relevant to the
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company’s history.
A clearer view of the section's activities can be obtained from a discussion of its 
activities during the week in which the writer observed the units' work. Two major 
tasks dominated the attention of Mr Phang. The first was to prepare a detailed report 
about the current exports of the firm's main competitors - the other Malaysian MBIs. 
The president of the company had ordered the special review which he planned to 
discuss with all senior managers in a meeting prior to the annual strategy meeting 
scheduled to be held in two months. The second task was directly related to the strategy 
meeting : Mr Phang had to prepare economic forecasts for 1990 for all eighty countries 
in which XYZ does business. This forecast was different from the Environment report. 
It was to be briefer and was required to focus specifically on economic indicators related 
to the company's business. It was also a sensitive task, since the country-wise, 
product-wise annual sales targets were often influenced by what he reported about the 
overall economic trend and his report was, therefore, scrutinised very carefully and was 
frequently challenged - either by country and product managers resisting quota increases 
or by top managers suggesting the increases.
USE OF SCANNING: SOME EXAMPLES
In the preceding section, the writer has described the formal scanning system in XYZ 
(P) Berhad. As is manifested from that description, the company invests considerable 
resources on the scanning function. What benefits does the company receive from this 
investment of manpower, management time, and money?
During the interviews, all respondents were asked to describe instances when they had 
used external information made available by the scanning unit for taking decisions or 
actions relavent to their own work. The result was that the writer gathered a large 
number of "war" stories some of which were the same. In this section, a few examples
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of such use of scanning is provided. First, the writer describes how the company 
evolved a major new strategic thrust based almost entirely on a headquarter-directed 
large-scale environmental analysis effort. Next, a few examples, is provided, of how 
external information was used at a more tactical or operational level.
"Vision '87" : A new strategic thrust in XYZ
The later half of the 70s was a good period for all Malaysian MBIs in general, and for 
XYZ Berhad in particular. Malaysian wage rate were low and its products enjoyed a 
price advantage that made it easy to sell them internationally. Also, most of the major 
markets for Malaysian exports were enjoying relative economic prosperity. The Middle 
East was enjoying a boom. Even the U.S. and Europe, the initial effects of the oil 
shock was over, though some sectors of the economy were yet to come out of the 
recession, the sectors relevant for XYZ's product portfolio were on an upswing.
In early 1980, when the company was still in the midst of this benign environment, the 
RI section put up a report to the top management that was initially considered by some to 
be too alarmist but later proved to be highly accurate. Oil prices had started declining 
and the political climate in the Middle East had sharply deteriorated. Even in the West, 
the first signs of a new stagnation were visible and protectionist forces were gaining 
ground. These traditional markets of the company, the report suggested, might not 
remain as attractive in the 80's as they were the second half of the 70s.
This report was the starting point for a strategic redirection within the company. On 
reading the report, the president of the company ordered a thorough in-house analysis of 
all significant markets as a basis for a fresh evaluation of the company's long term 
plans. The planning department, and specifically, the scanning unit directed a massive 
effort to collect information and expert opinions on all those markets - a total of over a 
hundred countries - and finally produced a document that evaluated the company's
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prospects in each of those countries in the next ten years. The final result of this 
analysis was a new strategy and a long term (five year) plan that was labelled "Vision 
'87".
In effect, the plan called for a major diversification effort for both markets and products. 
All national markets were classified as advanced, strategic or developing as shown in 
Figure 10:6.
Figure 10:6 - Market classification : "Vision '87"
Advanced : Japan, USA, EEC
Strategic : Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, India, Indonesia,
Developing : Sudan, Yemen, Sri Lanka, Turkey
The classification was very different from the company's traditional approaches to these 
markets. In the advanced markets, the company adopted a focus strategy, 
concentrating, in each of them, on a limited number of products that were felt to have the 
best profit potentials. Usually these were high value-added products where the 
company felt that it had a distinct competitive advantages over rival companies. The 
"strategic" market countries were so termed because the company expected more than 
fifty percent of its volume and profit growth from these markets. Substantial additional 
funds were to be made available for developing these markets by expanding the 
branches, establishing a network of contacts within both the governments and the 
industry. As was the case with the advanced markets, specific products were designated 
for emphasis in each strategic country.
Classifying a particular country into one or the other of the three groups was the most 
difficult part of the exercise. The company neither based its decisions on any particular 
economic criteria nor did it blindly follow any on of the many country analysis reports 
that it used for the analysis. Instead, the facts were made available to a large group of
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senior managers and the classification emerged out of a slow process of consensus 
building.
Similarly, it was felt that in many traditional products such as tyres and textiles, the 
company (and the country) had lost its competitive advantage because of increasing 
wage rates in Malaysia and because of growing competition from other developing 
countries. These products were de-emphasised in the new strategy and were treated as 
cash sources for building up new products in areas such as electronics, machinery, et 
cetera. The overall objective of Vision '87 was to completely change the product- 
market portfolio of the company within five years.
In 1982, as the new strategy became ready for implementation, the company hit the rock 
that the 1980 RI report had cautioned about. The once flourishing Middle East market 
lay in a shambles, with Iran and Iraq, two of the largest markets, crippled by an 
unending war, it has very recently ended. Both the United States and the EEC were in 
the middle of deep recessions. The company's profits plunged from $5.6 million to 
$3.9 million. In the absence of the early warning, the experience would have been 
devastating. But, with the advance preparation, this performance decline only provide 
additional impetus to the new strategic thrust and the storm was weathered relatively 
easy.
Not facing the music in musical instruments.
In early 1981, the Manila office of XYZ included a small report from a local newspaper 
as an item in its DI. Filipino string instrument manufacturers, the report claimed, were 
facing extinction because of low-cost imports. Guitars, the wonderful symbol of the 
Filipino spirit acquired from its Spaniard mentors, would no longer be made in the 
country unless imports were curbed.
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The Manila office did not, at that point, think much of that report. Musical instrument 
was a small volume product category. Besides, there was no immediate threat of import 
restrictions. The interest group was not considered to be strong enough to go through 
the lobbying process necessary to get a restriction in place.
The headquarter managers of the company, however, thought differently. Top 
managers, seeing the report in the outgoing DI of the scanning unit, decided that trade- 
restrictions were highly probable given the emotional appeal of the product. They also 
compared the international cost with those of the local manufacturers and concluded that 
prices were bound to increase substantially after the restrictions were in place. Based on 
this analysis, the company took a number of steps. First, it "sold" a very large volume 
of guitars to its Philippines subsidiary, building up substantial inventory within the 
country. Second, it renegotiated its contract with the supplier and ensured that the 
minimum offtake terms were dropped. The actual import restriction came about 8 
months later generating the expected profits on the very substantial Philippine inventory. 
A year later, the humble Malaysian manufacturer, who had earlier expanded his capacity 
to meet the Philippine demand, went bankrupt.
Heard in the stock exchange
An office equipment salesman in the domestic sales division of XYZ (P) Berhad in 
Kuala Lumpur, while visiting prospects in the financial district, overhead a conversation 
that a particular large Indonesian construction company was trying for private placement 
of a rather large debt issue. Given the pressure to include as many items as possible in 
his Daily Market Information Report, he reported this information to the branch manager 
who, in turn, included it in his DI to the corporate scanning unit. What was not known 
to the domestic sales division is that XYZ supplied large quantities of building materials 
to this company for its international construction projects and that most of such supplies 
involved fairly substantial credit terms.
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The scanning department, on receipt of the information, referred it to the finance 
department for verification and comments. Within two days, the finance manager 
confirmed the news and also indicated that the debt issue had become important because 
some of the company's project schedules had slipped and the company expected a 
severe cash shortage within six months. He also reported that the company was having 
problems in placing the debt as the market was concerned about the long term viability 
of the company. It had grown very rapidly and was very highly leveraged even by 
construction company standards. There was a concern in the market that the company 
had overextended itself and might not have the managerial resources required to manage 
all the projects it had undertaken. Besides, in its efforts to grow at a rapid pace, the 
company had also accepted contracts at very low margins and many of the projects could 
turn out to be unprofitable.
This information was then circulated by the scanning department immediately in its 
confidential Dash Report. Within three days of the accidental "overhearing" by a field 
salesman, the information along with the detailed interpretation was made available to 
every divisional head within the company. Among the actions taken by different 
divisions were the following:
1. The building material division gradually restricted supplies to the 
company while strengthening efforts to reduce its outstanding dues. 
This was done carefully so as to avoid a situation where the company 
might become aware of the strategy and stop all payments. In three 
months, when the company finally declared bankruptcy, XYZ's 
exposure had been reduced to about 20 percent of its usual level.
2. The XYZ Construction Company, prepared a detailed evaluation of all 
the projects under execution by the company to explore if some of them 
might be interesting to take up, should the company fail to complete 
them.
3. At the level of the group headquarters, an evaluation was carried out to 
investigate if XYZ might be interested in buying the company, should it
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become available for sale.
These are merely three of many such examples that were described to the writer about 
how external information was used by the company to its own advantage. The writer 
recognised that many of the stories may be biased because of ex-post facto 
reconstruction. The actual processes may have been more serendipitous than their 
reconstructions may suggest. Yet these stories strongly indicate that organisations are 
not as constrained in their proactive use of external information as is suggested in the 
recent theories of environmental determinism. A few pieces of anecdotal evidence may 
not clinch the debate between environmental determinism and strategic choice. Yet, in 
all the three companies the writer found evidence that none of the internal or external 
constraints suggested by the population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1982, p. 931- 
932) are as severe as the authors assume them to be. Relative to their environments, 
none of the companies are large enough to be able to modify the environments. Instead, 
they demonstrate what can only be called true adaptive behaviour : contrary to the 
arguments of Aldrich (1979), they enter and exit markets and even though their 
structures may be similar, their interpretations and actions differ based on perceptions 
which not only may be idiosyncratic to the firm but even idiosyncratic to the individual 
manger (see Child, 1972). The theoretical discussion on this issue, will be reserved for 
the concluding chapter.
PERCEIVED USEFULNESS OF THE CORPORATE 
SCANNING UNIT
The examples in the previous section show that organisations find external information 
useful for achieving their purpose and at least on certain associations, but could use such 
information for actively avoiding threats and exploiting opportunities. However, these 
examples do not provide a measure of how useful, in general, managers of the company 
find the corporate scanning unit to be. To address this question, it is best to revert to the 
questionnaire survey data.
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Eighty-five out of one hundred and eleven respondents to the questionnaire were 
employed in firms that had a corporate scanning unit in one form or the other. In fact, 
for reasons that has already been explained in this chapter, most of these units were 
structured similar to that of XYZ and worked along the same lines though many of them 
were considerably less extensive than XYZ's both in their scope of operations and in 
staff strength.
All the respondents were asked if they found the corporate scanning unit useful for their 
own work. Table 10:9summarises the responses, both for the total sample eighty five 
respondents and also for the subsample of twenty four XYZ executives who responded 
to this question.
Table 10:9 - Perceived usefulness of scanning unit
Total sample XYZ (P) Berhad
of questionnaire executives
respondents (n = 8) (n = 24)
Yes 45 8
Corporate 
scanning 
unit useful?
No 37 16
In the overall sample, a majority of managers felt that the corporate scanning unit was 
not particularly useful for their work. Even within XYZ, a significant minority felt that 
way.
In most organizations, the scanning unit was seen as a staff support to top managers to 
help them both in planning and in control. It was not seen as particularly useful to line 
managers in the second and third levels of the corporate hierarchy, in their work of 
running the day-to-day business of the company. This is clear from Table 10:10 that
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shows the perceived usefulness of the scanning unit by managers at different 
hierarchical levels. Sixty-nine percent of top managers feel that the scanning unit is 
useful for their work while only thirty and forty-three percent of middle and junior 
managers, respectively, see any use of the unit for their work.
Table 10:10 - Perceived usefulness of the scanning unit 
at different levels of corporate hierarchy
Management level
Top Middle Junior
Yes 5 12 28
Corporate
scanning
useful
No 11 5 21
A different measure of the usefulness of the scanning unit is the extent to which other 
managers interact with the unit. Table 10:11 shows the distribution of such interactions 
within the XYZ Berhad. All the five respondents reporting six or more interactions over 
the preceding six months, were found to belong to the planning function. Thus, for 
managers in operating units, the average level of such interaction was less than one per 
month.
Table 10:11 - Interactions with the corporate scanning unit:
XYZ (P) Berhad
Number of interactions with scanning 
unit in preceeding six months 
0 1 -2  3-5 6 - 10 >10
Frequency 6 3 10 2 3
Another related question asked to the respondents was how seriously would their work 
be affected if the corporate scanning unit was abolished [measured in a scale of 1 (very
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seriously) to 5 (not at all)]. The results are shown in Table 10:12. As can be seen, the 
distribution is skewed toward the left but thirteen out of the twenty-four managers 
returned a score of three, four, or five which, given the context, must be interpreted as 
suggesting that no very serious impact of abolishing the scanning unit was anticipated.
Table 10:12 - Effect on work performance if scanning 
unit is abolished: XYZ Berhad
How seriously would your work 
be affected if the corporate scanning 
unit is abolished?
Frequency of 
response
Very seriously 1 3
2 8
3 9
4 2
Not at ah 5 2
In view of the strong corporate philosophy about the importance of scanning, the 
substantial resources invested on the corporate scanning unit and the high visibility and 
support available to the unit within the company, the response is surprisingly negative.
STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES OF A FORMAL 
SCANNING ORGANISATION
A corporate scanning unit has both advantages and disadvantages with regard to the 
overall external intelligence function of the organisation. This is manifest from the 
discussion in the two preceeding sections. On the one hand, each manager interviewed 
could readily provide instances where they benefitted from information provided by the 
scanning unit. Yet, their general perception about the unit showed only modest 
enthusiasm, at best, and the perceptions of the middle and junior managers were 
considerably more negative than the anecdotal evidence of the usefulness of the unit 
would suggest.
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To understand the benefits arising from a formal scanning unit, one should be 
distinguish between two kinds of external information that an organisation utilises for 
two different types of purposes. Information from the immediate task environment is 
primarily used for tactical or operational decision making; information from the broader 
environment is, in contrast, utilised for purposes such as long term planning. Whether 
this is as thing should be is not the issue here. What matters is that organisations tend to 
deal with external information in such a compartmentalised manner.
Figure 10:7- The "Policy" and "Operation" 
intelligence system
Environment sector
Area of Influence Area of Interest
(current task environment) (broader environment)
Tactical and 
operational
Use of
external
information
Strategic 
and long 
term
In both the institutions that the writer studied, the external intelligence function was 
managed through two quite distinct systems. The system for monitoring the broader 
environment - the Area of Interest, to refer back to the terminology of Montgomery and 
Weinberg (1978) - was almost entirely dependent on the formal scanning unit with very 
limited involvement of the operating managers. For monitoring the task environment - 
the Area of Influence - on the other hand, the principal responsibility for both acquisition 
of information and its interpretation lay with the operating managers and the main role of 
the scanning unit was only that of an internal PABX, i.e., for internal circulation and
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communication (see Figure 10:7).
Following Wellinsky, the first system, is adopted, as the "Policy Intelligence System". 
In this system, the scanning unit is responsible for all the functions of the information 
cycle : it directly acquires relevant information from sources such as publications, 
consultants, research organisations, et cetera, and carries the principal responsibility for 
analysis and interpretation. This information is then made available to the top 
management as an input for what is clearly a top-down planning process. Vision '87 is 
an example of this "Policy Intelligence System". The annual process in XYZ (P) 
Berhad also uses similar policy intelligence as a basis for quota setting. At ION Sdn 
Bhd too, information from the broad environment is used only for such long term 
purposes. Such information rarely has any direct or immediate effect on day-to-day 
operations and does not need a close integration with the tactical or operational decision 
making. Line managers are usually ineffective for collection of such information. It is 
for collection and interpretation of such information that specialised staff are particularly 
useful. Such information are also rarely available through modes other than formal 
search.
For interpretation of such information, special academic training or experience is usually 
helpful. Recall that the RI section in XYZ was almost exclusively staffed with 
specialists who had no line experience within the company but had experience as 
economic and political analysts. However, as was discussed later, this might be one of 1 
the weaknesses of the XYZ system. Interpreting the possible effects of broad economic 
and political trends on a particular business needs an understanding of both the 
concerned disciplines and theories and also of the nature of the business. Thus, while 
line managers are usually ineffective in collection of such information, their operating 
experience within the company may often be useful for the interpretation process.
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The second system, which is termed here as the "Operational Intelligence System" is 
managed quite differently from the first. In this system, the formal scanning unit plays a 
much less significant role. Acquisition of relevant information is almost entirely left to 
the line managers. As discussed in chapter six, the operative units have access to the 
information network consisting of industry members who are the principal sources of 
such information. Such information is also often available through surveillance rather 
than through search. Even for interpretation of such information, an intimate 
knowledge of the business is usually required and this makes the line managers rather 
than the scanning staff more suitable for this purpose. The principal function of the 
scanning unit, for the operational intelligence system, lies in internal communication. 
However, to serve even this role as a corporate PABX, the scanning unit needs the 
ability to relate the information to their possible business implications. For instance, OP 
section in XYZ needed to know about the company's involvement with the construction 
firm that was about to go bankrupt so as to be able to direct the information to the 
appropriate division. In other words, for satisfying the communicator's role in the 
operational intelligence system, the scanning units requires to have a certain amount of 
experience with the company's operations. XYZ clearly understands this need : recall 
that while the RI section was staffed with specialists, OP section was staffed exclusively 
with experienced line managers.
In specific terms, this communication functions of the scanning unit within the 
operational intelligence system provides two benefits to the company:
1. It reduce distortion and time-lag in the internal flow of information. 
Let us clarify the point here, by taking the musical instrument case as an 
example. A piece of information collected by a field manager in Manila 
reached every senior managers of the company, without distortion and 
within two days, through the DI system. In the absence of an 
organisational unit such as the scanning section, the same information 
would flow up through the regular organisational hierarchy and the 
probabilities are high that it would either not have reach the Executive 
Vice President (who initiated the action described in the case) or, even if
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it had reached him, it would have taken a far greater amount of time 
thereby reducing the organisation's flexibility of response. Wellinsky 
(1967) had highlighted this problem of organisational hierarchy affecting 
the organisational intelligence function.
Figure 10:8 - Overcoming the information 
pathologies of hierarchy
Executive Vice 
President
General Manager 
(Overseas Planning)
Field Manager
(Manila)
The scanning unit, in fact, exactly fits one of this proposed solutions to 
overcome what he calls "the information pathologies of hierarchy" : it 
provides a mechanism for communication outside of channel through 
"internal communication specialists" (See Wellinsky, (1967) p47). This 
advantage of bypassing hierarchy through the scanning unit was mentioned 
by three relatively junior line managers in the headquarters and, as far as 
foreign branches were concerned, this was perhaps perceived as the single 
most useful attribute of the formal scanning departments.
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2. The scanning unit provides an information matrix between product and 
market divisions. Like all other major MBIs, XYZ is organised in 
product divisions in the headquarter but area-wise in the branches (except 
major subsidiaries which are also organised by products). This creates a 
problem of information sharing between the product and country 
organisations. Information tends to travel upward but not across. This 
problem of information flow in multi-national corporations have been 
documented and discussed by many researchers (see Leksell, 1978; 
Hedlund, 1981; Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977). The only structural 
solution proposed is the matrix (Davis, 1976) but this has not proved to 
be very useful in practice (Bartlett, 1979). The scanning unit provides 
some of the benefits of the matrix without its cumbersome operational 
implications. At least important external information is distributed 
among both the product and the area units thereby providing a common 
data base for both to work from. An example of this benefit arose from 
the Dash report quoted earlier in this chapter. The country organisation 
in Iraq reported the sudden increase in purchase of clpth for military 
uniforms. The scanning unit circulated this information to all the product 
divisions as well as to the relevant country organisations along with a 
warning that the implication might be the possibility of a major escalation 
of the war and possible delays in payment for materials not related to the 
war effort. Based on this report, the fertiliser division delayed supplies 
and avoided a major problem of fund blockage. The country unit in Iran 
also used the same information to prepare for a possible increase of 
tenders for certain defense-related items. In effect, the scanning unit 
provided an information matrix within the company.
The principal disadvantage of having a separate scanning unit (or Environmental 
Analysis or by whatever name such a unit may be called) is that it tends to standardise 
the external intelligence function within the organisation. For organisations operating in 
different industries and in different markets, such standardisation may not be 
appropriate. The competitive position of a firm as well as its strategic objectives may 
vary by industry, product, segment and market. This may require different approaches 
to environmental information reflecting those differences in competitive positions and
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organisational goals. A formal scanning unit, through formalisation, standardisation 
and centralisation, reduces the organisation’s ability to differentiate its scanning to meet 
the specific circumstances for different operations.
Let us clarify this issue through two examples. Mr Stephen Chin, Executive Director of 
Electronics division at XYZ trading was one of the senior executives who clearly 
confirmed that the formal scanning was of little help to him. "The information needs for 
electronics are very different from those for steel, textile or chemicals. In electronics, 
product differentiation is vital. So, I need to know about new technologies that are 
available in the market; about new features introduced by different manufacturers; about 
changes in styling and designs. My TV business is not going to be affected as much by 
changes in national income as by the introduction of the compact disc or other leisure 
products. The product and the technology rather than the market is most crucial for me. 
On those, I get little (information) from the scanning unit. Even the country managers 
are not of much help now, though they are getting better as they are getting more 
familiar with the business. As of now, I have to mostly depend on tours of head office 
managers. Visiting trade shows and reading technical and trade journals are the most 
useful way for me to get market intelligence."
A similar view as expressed by Mr Pathman, manager of ION Berhad footwear 
division. ION Berhad is the largest exporter of footwear from rubber rich Malaysia and 
has the largest rubber footwear producing plant in Asia, perhaps . in the world, (daily 
production capacity of 150,000 pairs). The local demand for the product is insignificant 
and almost the entire production is exported. "Our position in the footwear market is 
entirely different from our position in, say, the toy market. Even small changes in 
regulations or competition affects the footwear business much more because of our 
competitively large volume. For my business, I need a much close monitoring of 
regulatory changes : I must see the warning much before the change actually take place. 
I cannot depend on the Research Department and have to collect my information
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myself. In effect, what Mr Pathman was saying was not adequate for him, given the 
company's leadership position in the industry.
This problem is not seen to be very serious in single industry firms, though even in such 
organisations scanning can be profitably differentiated by market or by segment. But, in 
multi-industry organisations, particularly in a multinational trading company, such 
formalisation may have serious adverse effects on the level of organisational ability to 
monitor external change. By enforcing a set of common rules about collection and 
internal processing of external information, the organisation may lose the advantages of 
diversity of spontaneous scanning by individual managers. Such a possibility was 
suggested by Aguilar : "Thus the seeming paradox could arise where creation of a 
special unit to institutionalize strategic search could lead to an overall decline of strategic 
scanning by the company." Aguilar, (1967, pl39).
INTEGRATING LINE AND STAFF:
THE USE OF SCANNING TASK FORCE
The managers responsible for the scanning unit in all the three companies were 
unanimous in their view that the single most important problem for a formal scanning 
unit was to obtain and maintain active involvement of line managers in the overall 
system for acquiring external intelligence. The DI system resulted in a degree of 
pressure that ensured their attention to external information but there was every 
possibility of the whole process degenerating into a paper shuffling exercise. The 
purpose of scanning was to help line managers and the only way it could be effective 
was if the line managers were actively involved in both the acquisition and interpretation 
process. Only then would the resulting intelligence be relevant and useful for the 
company. Yet, the scanning managers were also aware that they could not expect 
anything more than an absolute minimum of line managers' time or even interest, given 
their preoccupation with day-to-day operations. Herein lay the main organisational
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challenge : how to integrate the line managers with the system for managing external 
information without demanding more than a minimum of their personal involvement 
with the process.
The involvement of line managers was required not only for improving the quality of the 
output by utilising their knowledge and experience but also for ensuring that the 
resulting analysis was actually used in brganisational decision processes. If line 
managers did not feel a sense of involvement with, and ownership over, the intelligence 
output, it was only too simple for them either to deny its relevance or ignore it 
altogether. 7
The solution to the problem, in both XYZ and ION, was to use a structure of temporary 
teams to link the scanning unit with the different product divisions. Due to the 
isomorphic force of Mr Othman and his external coordination, the systems in both the 
organisations were quite similar. In XYZ, the teams were called "Marketing Task 
Force"; in ION, they were called "Departmental Information Monitors".
These structures are temporary teams that exist within each product divisions who are 
responsible for coordinating the external intelligence function of the division. Between 
one to four employees (depending on the size of the division) are nominated to the task 
force by the manager of the division. For the employees, it is an additional 
responsibility, over and above their normal duties. It is, however, an appointment that 
employee look forward to,for it conveys that the employee is doing well and has growth 
potential. Another attraction is a small budget that the task forces are given for 
entertainment, subscription to journals and other miscellaneous expenses.
All dealings between the division and the corporate scanning unit are channelled through 
the task force (see Figure 10:7). The members meet for about half an hour every 
evening to finalise the division's DI and for approximately the same length of time at 
noon to go through the DI from the scanning unit. The task force is expected to discuss
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the possible implications of any information that may come to the division either from 
the field organisation or from the scanning department and to communicate their analysis 
to the divisional manager who normally adds in his comments or suggestions before the 
analysis is sent to the scanning department through the DI. All too often, this is the only 
contact that the task force members have with the head of the division and the task is 
therefore considered to be important. For the manager, in turn, this becomes a quick 
and efficient way of keeping in touch with the latest scanning reports and also to 
contribute his analysis to the interpretation process. The task force is also involved 
when the annual divisional plans are finalised and one of the task force members actually 
works as the planning executive for the division.
The scanning unit arranges two annual meetings where all the task force members from 
all divisions are invited. In these meetings plans for improving the scanning system of 
the company are discussed. In addition, many of the task force members are also sent to 
the training courses and meetings arranged by KUMA, the consulting firm owned by Mr 
Othman. The meetings and training sessions are useful both for keeping up the morale 
of the employees and for updating their scanning and analysing skills.
One of the effects of the task force is that it allows for at least a degree of differentiation 
between the scanning system of the different divisions. The task force of each division 
is more aware of the specific scanning needs of the division and often can set up a 
separate system with the field units to meet those needs. The footwear division of ION, 
for instance, could arrange with the U.S. and Canada subsidiaries of the company so 
that a representative called on the concerned official of the Commerce departments once 
each month to discuss the regulatory situation and report directly to the footwear task 
force. In other words, the structure provided a mechanism for at least a partial 
decentralisation of scanning to the divisional level.
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Figure 10:9 - Scanning organisation in a
Malaysian commercial firm.
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The scanning managers in both the companies felt that introduction of the task force 
concept had helped a lot in terms of integrating the line management of the company 
with the scanning staff and had helped in reducing the apathy toward the scanning 
department that used to exist earlier. The scanning department is at times viewed by 
experienced managers in operative divisions as a group of outsiders who do not really 
understand the business and this create an ex-ante resistance toward accepting any input 
provided by the department. Routing all inputs through the divisional task forces
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reduced this resistance and helped to develop a more cooperative approach to the 
environmental analysis function. The system did not add much to the costs for it largely 
used slack resources available within the divisions. It used the strengths and resources 
of the line organisation while maintaining a centralised coordination and control over the 
overall scanning function. Finally, by using a temporary and ad hoc mechanism, it 
avoided the rigidities of a fixed structure.
To sum up, in this chapter, the writer described the organisational scanning system in 
one of the largest Malaysian business institutions and as well as some instances where 
the firm benefitted from the system. The evidence, however, suggests that such a 
formal scanning system with a separate corporate scanning unit offers both advantages 
and disadvantages and it had been suggested what some of them might be. Finally, the 
writer reviewed what he believes is a rather unusual innovation for overcoming one of 
the most difficult problems in institutionalising scanning, viz., the difficulty in 
integrating the line managers and specialised scanners so that the strengths of both can 
be utilised for effective environmental analysis. The temporary task force structure 
described in the last section, is believed to be quite common in Japan but relatively 
uncommon in Britain and may be something that British managers would find worth 
emulating.
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Chapter Eleven 
Conclusion
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION
The introductory chapter discussed the two scanning issues selected as the principal 
research questions of this thesis. The first was to describe how individual managers scan 
the environment and to investigate the effects of different environmental, organisational 
and individual attributes on the scanning behaviour of managers. The second was to 
understand how the function of scanning might be organised at the firm level, in 
particular, to investigate the role and functions of a formal scanning unit. The selection 
of these two out of the menu of alternative research questions was grounded on the 
premise that an inquiry focussed on these two questions could lay an appropriate base for 
a broader research programme into the general phenomenon of scanning.
In this concluding chapter the task of the writer is to summarise the findings and to 
explicate their broad implications. A laundry list of all the associations and relationships 
suggested in this study is not necessary for this purpose. Instead, the writer begins this 
chapter by describing a few of the more interesting findings and then moves to an 
explanation of their collective significance for the overall organisational intelligence 
function. In drawing such implications, however, one is always forced to go beyond 
one's data. As McGrath (1972) points out, the process of research is a series of spirals 
and not closed circles. Drawing the implications, therefore, involves equal doses of 
induction, deduction and speculation.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Importance of different kinds of environmental information and time spent in acquiring 
them:
An interesting finding of this study is the pattern of associations between perceived 
importance of different kinds of environmental information and the time spent on
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acquiring them at different management levels (see Figure 7:10) For top managers, there 
is a close association between the two. For junior managers, there is no such association 
at all. Middle managers occupy a middle ground between these two extremes. The 
primary reason for this difference is that the perceived importance of different kinds of 
information is quite similar across management levels and is more or less balanced 
between the immediate task environment {area of influence) and the broader environment 
{area o f interest). But scanning, at the lower levels of the organisation,is increasingly 
focussed on the immediate task environment, the broader environment, even though felt 
to be important, is ignored in terms of allocation of scanning time.
One possible explanation, in fact the hunch that lead the writer to this analysis, is that 
junior managers have less control over the allocation of their work time and the results are 
a manifestation of the urgent driving the important out of their work schedules. 
However, there is an alternative explanation and one that, based on the case-study data, 
the writer finds more plausible. The lack of a one-to-one correspondence between the 
importance of different kinds of information and the allocation of scanning time may be 
due to the organisational division of labour. Staff managers, as was argued in chapter 
nine, have an advantage over line managers in acquiring information on the broader 
environment. Such information is often readily available from published sources or from 
specialised consulting or research organisation which can be assessed centrally. At times 
special academic or professional expertise is useful for both acquisition and interpretation 
of such information. The business-specific knowledge and location proximity of line 
managers, on the other hand, are vital for acquisition and analysis of information related 
to the task environment. Thus, in most of the organisation included in this sample, 
information on the broad environment of the firm is collected by a special staff group 
(recall that 85 out of the 111 managers belong to organisations that had a formal scanning 
unit) and not by line managers. Therefore, what appears to be a discrepancy at the 
individual level may indeed be a manifestation of the efficiency of organising the 
scanning function at the firm level.
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For top managers this discrepancy does not arise for the kind of information that is 
important for their tasks. There is no such division of labour within the organisation. 
Regulatory information, for them, is not information about regulations in place but 
information about regulatory changes that may occur. Such information is available only 
through contacts at the highest level of the Government or other organisations and can be 
acquired only through participation in the relevant network of connections. Staff 
managers of the firm usually do not have access to such sources and are, therefore, not 
particularly useful for collecting such information.
The observations of the writer in both XYZ Berhad and ION Sdn Bhd support this view. 
As was described in details for XYZ Berhad, the RI unit maintained a continuous flow of 
general economic, political and regulatory information to the line managers. It was not 
that the line managers did not have information about the broader environment; only, they 
did not have to collect it for the firm had a specialised system that made such information 
available to them internally. They could, therefore, devote their own scanning time to the 
task environment thereby exploiting their relative advantages of access and experience.
Flow of external information into the organisation.
Information specific to business is primarily available from those who are involved in 
that business. General information such as information on regulatory developments or 
on broad social, political or economic issues that are not specific to a particular business, 
on the other hand, is available more easily from general sources such as consultants and 
publications. This becomes clear when one juxtaposes information factors and sources 
(see chapter eight) and the finding is not counter-intuitive. However, it carries interesting 
implications for firm level organisation of the scanning function. In particular it supports 
the argument that the writer made in explaining the absence of a positive association
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between the importance of different kinds of information and the time spent on scanning 
for such information. Staff managers do not have direct access to customers, suppliers 
and other members of the organisation's immediate task environment. Thus, they are 
relatively ineffective in collecting domain-related information, because such information 
is available primarily from these sources. Their role with regard to such task-related 
information lies primarily in collection and internal circulation so as to increase the scope 
of exploitation of information acquired by the line managers. The line managers, in turn, 
usually do not have access to this specialised publications and research like the consulting 
organisations who, as Figure 8:6 shows, are the principal sources for information on the 
firm's area of interest. This is where scanning by staff specialists is most useful. This 
distinction creates the need for a division of labour within the organisation for effective 
scanning of the external environment and this is why, in large and complex 
organisations, scanning has to be organised at the firm level and cannot be left as 
something that individual managers must do by themselves and for themselves.
Surveillance and Search
When managers perceive the external environment to be both unpredictable and 
heterogeneous, they depend relatively more on search for collecting external information. 
When the environment is perceived to be predictable and homogeneous, surveillance 
assumes greater importance for environmental scanning. Again, the finding (see Figure 
8:2 ) is not counter-intuitive. Surveillance is effective when a manger, confronted with a 
particular piece of information by chance, can readily understand the possible 
implications that the information may have on his business. In other words, the manager 
must have prior causal map that allows him to see such implications. If the manager does 
not have such a map, surveillance is ineffective for the manager cannot understand the 
significance of information that may flow by him. When the environment is highly 
complex (unpredictable and discontinuous), a manager does not have such a cognitive 
map and cannot benefit from surveillance. Under such situations, scanning must be
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problem triggered (Collings, 1968) rather than being information triggered. Facing a 
specific situation, the manager must first understand exactly what information he wants 
and must then proceed to acquire it; i.e., use the search mode for scanning. This is why 
search rather than surveillance assumes greater importance when managers perceive the 
environment to be complex.
Usually, over time and in relatively stable environment, managers develop an 
understanding of how different sectors of the task environment affect their objectives. 
For example, a manager often has a fairly clear understanding of how he may be affected 
by a price change announced by a particular competitor or a new capacity created by a 
buyer. In contrast, the effects of a change in the country's budget deficit or external 
relations is more difficult to interpret unless the business is such that the effect of such 
variables are direct and easily understood. Therefore, it can be argued that search is 
relatively more important for scanning the broader environment compared to scanning 
within the task domain since signals from the former are usually more difficult to 
interpret.
Two components of the organisational intelligence system.
These three findings, collectively, suggest a pattern. Scanning the task environment is a 
very different process from scanning the broader environment within which the firm has 
to operate. Information on the task environment is primarily available from customers, 
suppliers and other members of the industry. Line managers, with their connection within 
the industry, are best equipped to both acquire and interpret such information. They do 
so primarily through surveillance, i.e., by remaining sensitive to the continuous flow of 
information around them in the regular process of their work. Information on the broader 
environment, in contrast, is available from public sources and are more conveniently 
acquired through search. Both the acquisition and interpretation of such information are 
facilitated by specialised knowledge about sources and about analytical and conceptual
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expertise in understanding their implications. Expert staffs are, therefore, more suitable 
for this aspect of organisational scanning. This suggests that the organisational task of 
developing external intelligence can be divided into two broad components : one for 
monitoring the task environment and the other for monitoring the general social, 
economic and political developments. The mechanisms and instruments for the two 
components are quite different, suggesting that firms may need to organise them 
separately and differently.
As the writer discussed in chapter nine, this is precisely what firms do. At XYZ Berhad, 
the operational intelligence system and the policy intelligence systems are organised quite 
differently. In the policy intelligence system, a group of "experts” directly and centrally 
acquire relevant economic and political information with little involvement of line 
managers in the acquisition process. Similarly, even the interpretation function is almost 
entirely left to them. Such intelligence becomes a part of the top-down planning process 
and this component of scanning primarily serves as a research arm for the top 
management.
In the operational intelligence system, on the other hand, the role of the scanning staff is 
essentially that of internal PABX that circulates information internally. Both acquisition 
and interpretation is largely left to the line managers.
But even for such circulation, the scanning staff need to have an understanding of the 
business so as to perform effectively as a switching system. So, this part of the scanning 
unit is staffed with experienced line managers and not "experts".
Causal influences on managerial scanning behaviour.
One of the principal objectives of this study was to identify the factors that affect 
managerial attitudes and behaviours with regard to scanning. The writer of this thesis has 
considered various dimensions of individual level scanning including the perceived
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importance of scanning, the time spent on the task, the relative use of surveillance and 
search and, finally, the extent to which scanning is domain-focussed. The writer has also 
investigated the effects of a number of individual, organisational and environmental 
variables on these dimensions of scanning behaviour. The findings, in summary form, 
are presented in Figure 11:1.
Figure 11:1 - Summary of associations
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Recall that all the organisational and environmental variables refer to managerial 
perceptions rather than to any absolute reality. The most interesting of the findings are 
the effects of perceived environmental attributes and of the extent to which the managers 
perceived their jobs to be structured. The writer has discussed the possible explanations
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of these associations in detail in the relevant chapters - particularly in chapter nine - and 
shall not, therefore, repeat them here. From a practical point of view what is important is 
that the influencing variables are managerial perceptions and these perceptions are not 
entirely beyond the organisation's ability to control and to change. Organisational 
structure and processes influence the enactment process through which managers 
perceive the environment and also the nature and complexity of their tasks. The amount 
of integration and differentiation in each organisational sub-unit determine how complex 
managers of the sub-unit perceive the environment to be. This suggests that individual 
level scanning within an organisation can be influenced through appropriate organisation 
design. This argument is developed in greater details in the following section on 
implications of this study.
IMPLICATION
Scanning is an instrument for organisations to cope with external change. Through 
scanning, an organisation is sensitised to the changes in the environment. It is the 
principal input to the learning process that in turn drives the mechanisms of organisational 
adaptation. Ultimately, therefore, the benefits from research on scanning must arise from 
a better understanding of its role in this process of organisational learning and adaptation.
Organisational learning
Cyert and March (1963), Terreberry (1967) and March and Olsen (1976) have argued 
that effective organisations are those in which members have a capacity to learn to predict 
changes in their environment, search for alternative sources of sustenance, and have a 
memory in which is stored information about possible interchangeable input/output 
components. Drawing from this proposition, Duncan and Weiss (1979) have defined 
organisational learning as "that process in the organisation through which members of the 
dominant coalition develop, over time, the ability to discover when organisational
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changes are required and what changes can be undertaken which they believe will 
succeed" (p78).
A prequisite for learning is a sensitivity to external changes that make learning and 
internal changes necessary. A closed system does not learn precisely because this 
sensitivity is lacking in such systems. The first component of organisational learning 
must, therefore, be this process of developing sensitivity to external changes. This is the 
"unfreezing" part in the Lewinian framework of planned change. However, given the 
perspective of learning as a continuous and endogenous process (as opposed to the 
concept of planned change that assumes the intervention of an external change agent), 
"sensitising" rather than "unfreezing" is perhaps a better label for this function.
Scanning is the principal means for sensitising the organisation. But, it is not the only 
means for, as argued by Duncan and Weiss (1979), experimenting (i.e., building up a 
repertoire of action-outcome knowledge through a process of trial-and-error) and 
theorising (i.e., theory or intuition based on deduction or induction) can also contribute 
to the sensitising process. Given the topic of this thesis, the discussion here should only 
be limited to scanning but the arguments are equally applicable to these other means of 
developing organisational sensitivity to change.
Sensitising in this view, is the process of building knowledge through information and 
analysis. However, an "organisation" cannot acquire information or analyse it - only an 
individual within the organisation can carry out such specific activities. Therefore, 
sensitising is essentially an individual level phenomenon. March and Olsen (1976) and 
Argyris and Schon (1976) visualise organisational learning as something that takes place 
at the level of individuals but within an organisational context. But, as suggested by 
Duncan and Weiss (1979), knowledge so accumulated at the individual level is 
fragmented according to the organisation's scheme of division of labour. Thus, the 
process of organisational learning, must include a sub-process that integrates individual
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knowledge or learning to organisational knowledge. This is achieved primarily through 
intra-organisational communication.
Communication converts individual knowledge within an organisation to organisational 
knowledge through the processes of exchange, validation and acceptance (Duncan and 
Weiss). On the one hand these processes require physical facilities and systems for 
transmission of information within the organisation. On the other, they depend on the 
internal context of the organisation - on culture, morale and conflict - for the context 
determines the extent of acceptance that is a prerequisite for the knowledge to be 
organisationally shared.
Finally, organisational learning manifests itself through the organisation’s strategy and 
structure. These are the organisational actions that reflect the ’’theory-in-use" (Argyris 
and Schon, 1976) developed through the learning mechanisms. Such theories pertain to 
action-outcome knowledge with regard to the organisation's interactions with the 
environment (strategy) and also the internal processes required to support such 
interactions (structure). The outcomes, in turn, interact with each other, and this is 
reflected through the two-way arrow between them (Figure 11:2).
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Figure 11:2 -  Organisational adaptation: A first cut 
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Argyris and Schon distinguish between two types of learning. They call them single­
loop and double-loop learning. In single-loop learning, "members of the organisation 
respond to changes in the internal and external environments of the organisation by 
detecting errors which they then correct so as to maintain the central feature of the 
organisational theory in use . . .  (in such learning) there is a single feedback loop which 
connects detected outcomes of action to organisational strategies and assumptions which 
are modified so as to keep organisational performance within the range set by 
organisational norms. The norms themselves - for product quality, sales or task 
performance - remain unchanged" (pi8-19). In double loop learning, on the other hand, 
"there is . . .  a double feedback loop which connects the detection of error not only to 
strategies and assumptions for effective performance but to the very norms which define 
effective performance" (p22).
Single-loop learning, as described by Argyris and Schon, refers to the operational and 
tactical activities of the organisation while double-loop learning is akin to what may be
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called the strategic processes. The distinction is somewhat fuzzy for, as Argyris and 
Schon themselves point out, "the distinction between single and double loop learning is 
less a binary one than might first appear" (p25). The moot point is that in single-loop 
learning (operational activities), the focal question is whether the organisation is 
achieving its objectives. In double-loop learning (strategic activities), the objectives 
themselves are subjected to questioning.
Similarly, for scanning, the writer has shown that there exist two distinct components 
that follow quite different processes and have different organisational implications. 
Strategic learning system is a search based on specialised function involving experts; 
operational scanning is a surveillance dependent function that is carried out by line 
managers in the regular course of their activities and is, therefore, highly dependent on 
what Burgleman (1983) calls the structural context of the organisation. In a way, 
strategic scanning supports the process of double loop learning and enhances the 
organisations' long-term effectiveness. Operational scanning, on the other hand, 
enhances short and medium-term efficiency and relates to what Argyris and Schon call 
single-loop learning.
This analysis leads to the more complex model of the organisational adaptation shown in 
Figure 11:3.
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Figure 11:3 -  Organisational learning : A second cut
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Even this model, however, suffers from a major weaknesses; it does not incorporate the 
feedback loops through which the organisational actions of strategy and structure 
influence the sensitising process thereby leading to "emergent" strategies and structures 
described by Mintzberg (1978), Burgleman (1983) and others.
The writer has argued in this thesis that the individual level scanning behaviour of 
managers and, hence, the operational scanning system of the firm, are highly influenced 
by a number of factors. These include certain personal characteristics of the managers 
concerned and also their perceptions of the firm's strategy and of the environment that it 
faces. In particular, it has been shown that the operational scanning system depends on 
the managers perception of the predictability and heterogeneity of the environment and of 
the extent of structure in their tasks.
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These perceptions of managers, in turn, are influenced by the organisations' strategy and 
structure. As argued by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), how complex the environment 
will appear to be to the managers of a particular organisational sub-unit depends on the 
extent of integration and differentiation that exists within the organisation with regard to 
that sub-unit. The higher the level of differentiation, the less complex is the enacted 
environment; the greater the level of integration, the more complex is the environment as 
perceived by the managers.
Combining these two arguments leads to the feedback loop from structure to operational 
scanning shown in Figure 11:3. Further, even the strategic scanning system, while 
relatively independent of the structural context, is influenced by the strategy of the firm. 
What facts the scanning unit will search for within the broader environment is at least 
partially determined by the goals set up by the firm and the means adopted to achieve 
them. For example, the Research Intelligence (RI) section of XYZ Berhad collects data 
on country A but not on country B; it analyses the market for product X but not for 
product Y and these decisions are determined by the current strategy of the firm. 
However, this is, relatively, a weaker link, because it is possible for the top managers to 
direct this system to go beyond the prevailing strategic context (as done in the case of 
"Vision ’87"), thereby creating the scope for what Burgleman calls "autonomous strategic 
behaviour". The weak link is shown as a bold line in Figure 11:4.
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Figure 11:4 -  Organisational learning : Incorporating 
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The strengths of these feedback loops depend on a number of factors. Two of them 
appear to be most prominent. First is the extent of goal-performance mismatch or more 
simply, the level of performance achieved by the firm. When the performance is deemed 
as unsatisfactory, the links weaken and this enhances the organisation's ability to resort 
to the autonomous strategy mode and permit more pro-active behaviour. In contrast, 
when performance is deemed to be satisfactory, the links strengthen, supporting the 
emergent strategy mode and, therefore, an incremental and reactive adaptive behaviour.
The second factor that influences the strength of the link is the nature of the firm's top 
management or dominant coalition. However, their ability to influence the sensitising 
process and the mechanisms through which such influence can be exercised may be very 
different for the operational ancTstrategic processes. The contribution, if any, of this 
thesis to the practice of management lies in suggesting how such influences may be 
exercised and this is therefore discussed in detail in a later section on the role of the firm's
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top management in enhancing the organisation’s scanning capabilities.
Information value-added
Information differs considerably from conventional inputs to productive processes. The 
economic model of pure information emphasises that (1). it can be inferred and exploited 
by anyone, and (2). the scale of its use does not impair its use value.
In an imperfectly competitive market, competing firms earn different efficiency rents on 
productive factors, including information. They respond differently to available 
information and one of the sources of a firm's competitive advantages lies in the quality 
of its responses to environmental information. In other words, information entering the 
firm's boundaries may possess public goods characteristics but a firm can transform it so 
as to convert it to an appropriable and rent producing resource. This transformation 
process can be viewed as a system of value adding and differences between firms in their 
ability to add value to external information, by this argument, may be one source of the 
differences in their learning and adaptive capabilities.
The concept of "value added" is crucial for both improving and understanding the 
scanning process. Firms operate in a sea of information, only some of which they can 
appropriate and utilise. The first and essential step in the value adding process, therefore, 
is "recognition", i.e., the identification of a particular piece of information as potentially 
relevant. If the information resides only with the original "recogniser", however, the 
value-added may be less than if it is recognised as a resource with wider potential 
applicability and is circulated to others within the organisation who might possibly benefit 
from the use of such information.
Some information may require little more than this : the implications of its action may be 
at the same level as the information itself (for example, competitor X has lowered the 
price of one of its products). Some other pieces of information may not be received at
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such a level (for example, a bishop has been shot in a particular country in Africa where 
the firm has extensive operations) and may require interpretation to have implications for 
use. Such interpretation can take two forms : one is to put several pieces of information 
together to form a larger picture ("synthesis"), another is to fit the piece of information 
into a causal map that derives its implications through a process of implicit or explicit 
hypothesis generation and prediction ("hypothesis"). These four processes - recognition, 
circulation, synthesis, and hypothesis - are the fundamental elements of the mechanism 
through which value is added to information within the firm.
In this thesis, example of each of these value adding processes have been seen. Let us 
for a while recall the construction company case in chapter ten to show how these 
processes work. The recognition phase took place when the salesman identified the 
potential value of a piece of information that he came across quite by chance in a 
stockbroker's office. This piece of information was circulated by the domestic sales 
division, thereby reaching the corporate scanning unit who were in a better position to 
evaluate its potential usefulness. The synthesis phase took place when the finance 
department put this information together with others to arrive at the interpretation that a 
major customer was facing a serious cash flow problem. The hypothesis-forming 
processes that followed led to a prediction and, based on the prediction, to a series of 
actions at different parts of the organisation which resulted in both averting a potential 
problem of bad debts and also the identification of an acquisition opportunity.
This view of information value adding is represented in the model shown in Figure 11:5. 
Scanning, as has been discussed throughout this thesis, takes place in two modes. The 
surveillance mode and recognition driven while the search mode is hypothesis driven. 
Value is added to information through a combination of the four sub-processes and such 
value added information is used as an input to decision making within the organisation. 
The outcomes from such decisions leads to changes in the explicit causal maps that drive
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the information-search process. Further, the knowledge of such outcomes also affect the 
complex gestalt that lies behind the recognition procedure. The process of scanning is 
therefore seen as a complex and dynamic phenomenon that changes continuously as new 
knowledge about action-outcome consequences develop within the firm.
This concept of information value added permits a clearer understanding of the different 
roles of line managers and "expert" scanning staff within the overall scanning system of 
the firm. It also highlights the importance of the interactions that must exist between 
them for the firm to obtain maximum benefits from the information value adding process. 
It is only with regard to the recognition and circulation functions that their roles are 
disltinct and substantially non-overlapping. Line managers are the principal sensors for 
recognition of operational information while expert scanning staff are particularly suitable 
for recognition of relatively weaker and more complex signals from the broader 
environment. The formal circulation function is primarily the responsibility of the staff 
unit even though, in actual practice, considerable amount of internal circulation of 
external information may take place directly among the concerned line managers. But, 
for the synthesis and hypothesis-formation processes, no such division of labour is 
possible. These processes require effective collaboration between the two groups, as 
indeed was noted in each of the cases cited in chapter ten. The extent of such 
collaboration in any firm depends on both formal structural arrangements as well as on 
formal and informal processes and it is through creation and enhancement of these 
mechanisms that the top management of a firm can improve the organisation's scanning 
and value adding capacities.
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Figure 11:5 - The information value-adding process
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DESIGNING THE ORGANISATIONAL SCANNING SYSTEM:
ROLE OF THE TOP MANAGEMENT
In understanding the role of the top management of a firm in designing and 
institutionalising an effective scanning system, a clear distinction must be made between 
the strategic and operational scanning processes. The first can be designed and 
operationalised directly and more or less independently of the rest of the organisational 
processes. Managers can create a special intelligence organisation, staff it with 
appropriate experts, lay down intelligence objectives and exercise suitable control to 
ensure that the system does what it is supposed to do. The operational scanning system, 
in contrast, depends on the general sensitivity of line managers to information that they
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come across in the routine course of their work and on organisational systems that can 
pick up and circulate the fruits of such organisation-wide surveillance. The processes are 
closely interlinked with the overall structure and culture of the organisation and the 
principal mechanisms for influencing these processes are indirect, through suitable 
adjustments in the structure and systems of the organisation so as to create appropriate 
internal conditions in which such information-sensitivity can develop and be nurtured.
In this section, the writer first discusses the role of the top management in creating an 
effective strategic system. He also briefly reviews the problems that may be faced in the 
process and offers some speculative suggestions about how some of them may be 
overcome. Next, he discusses the role the top management can play in making the 
operational scanning system more effective.
The Strategic Scanning System
The starting point for a strategic system is the information needs of the firm which must 
determine the objectives of the system. In fact, one of the reasons that has lead to fairly 
wide-spread disappointment with scanning systems (see discussion in chapter two) is that 
often managers do not pre-specify the objectives that scanning is supposed to serve. The 
result is acquisition of information that may not be relevant or the nature of relevance may 
not be understood.
An organisation faces a number of problems in laying down scanning objectives. 
Scanning is an instrument to avoid surprises. The sources and nature of surprises, by 
definition, cannot be determined on a-priori basis. Yet, to keep scanning within tangible 
and finite limits, a way has to be found to pre-select areas of attention. Herein lies the 
problem in specifying scanning objectives.
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In chapter two, the writer has briefly discussed the different models proposed by 
academics and practitioners for designing a strategic scanning system. In all these 
models, the first step in determining scanning objectives is to define organisational 
objectives (or strategies) and, hence, the relevant performance variables that would affect 
achievement of those objectives. Once the performance variables are defined, scanning 
objectives can be determined by identifying the issues that can affect the performance 
variables and the possible influences of different actors on those issues and, therefore, on 
those performance variables. Scanning can then be focussed on those issues and actors. 
Identifying performance variables, the relevant issues and the influencing actors are often 
highly subjective processes but there is evidence that consensus on these questions can be 
built up through a series of meetings and conferences involving the relevant 
organisational members (see, for example, Kalff, 1980).
In determining the scanning objectives, it is necessary, however, to keep in mind that 
most business systems are highly complex and involve processes that are multivariate, 
heterogeneous, multidimensional and causally confused. For most firms, causes and 
effects are extremely difficult to disentangle, as are facts and values. The methods for 
determining scanning objectives are usually based on the assumption that managers can 
construct meaningful causal models that determine firm performance. There are two 
reasons why this assumption may not be true. First, managers, in certain cases, may 
indeed have such a causal map but it may be implicit and may remain as a part of the 
gestalt that even they cannot vocalise. Second, they may not have such a map and may 
believe, correctly or incorrectly, that it is not possible to construct such a map given the 
intangibles inherent in any large business. These are not grounds for giving up on the 
attempt to define strategic scanning objectives; there are arguments to suggest that the 
methods for determining the objectives may be different under different circumstances. 
Further, in most complex organisations, it may not be useful to try and make the process 
of arriving at the objectives too "scientific" for such methods are often too reductionist, 
given the richness of reality. Softer methods such as the "dialectic confrontation" method
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of Ansoff (1977): MAPS technique and Delphi based scenario planning techniques may 
be more effective in flushing out the scanning objectives than industrial organisation 
theory based approaches suggested by Porter (1980) or cross-impact analysis procedure 
developed by the General Electric Corporation in the United States.
Another important aspect of the strategic scanning system, and one in which the top 
management of the firm is required to play a key role, is the need to adapt the system to 
the strategic position of the firm. All firms are not pro-active prospectors in the 
marketplace. Most are reactors to changes that have already occurred or stodgy 
defenders of their existing positions. And, given the firm's position in the industry, 
such strategies may not often be quite appropriate. Yet, the strategic scanning system is 
often based on the implicit assumption that the firm is a proactive, opportunity-seeking 
entrepreneur. Because of this assumption, such scanning systems attempt to cover a far 
larger opportunity domain than the top management of the firm is actually willing to admit 
to its feasible set. Often this is the principal cause for diverting scanning from strategic 
decision making.
There are a number of dynamic factors that tend to exacerbate the problem. On the one 
hand top mangers are loathe to admit that they are anything other than highly 
entrepreneurial hunters of fortune. This encourages the scanners to spread their net wide 
to begin with. Then the dynamic of the scanning process takes over and the excitement 
of research (biased further by the ease of availability of particular kinds of information) 
widens the gulf between scanning attention and the realities of the firm and its business. 
At the end, line managers are frustrated, for scanning gives them nothing useful, and the 
scanners are bewildered for they cannot understand what went wrong.
Here again, the argument is not that scanning must confirm rigidly to the firm's inertia
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but against the assumption that the inertia can be changed by information alone. Strategic 
scanning can and must be an agent for change, but change that comes gradually, 
"incrementally", and not in quantum leaps.
The Operational Scanning System
o-
In designing the strategic scanning system, the managers of a firm can, generally, follow 
the traditional concept of the information cycle discussed in chapter two. They can first 
determine the information needs of the firm, then set up methods for acquisition, 
interpretation, communication and use of such information. For the operational scanning 
system, however, the entire model break down because it is no longer possible to 
determine information needs a-priori, nor is it possible to get up mechanisms for 
acquisition and interpretation in a formal way. Instead, a firm must depend on the large 
body of its line managers to be sensitive enough to filter the importance from the massive 
flow of information around them. Opportunistic surveillance rather than proactive 
search is key to an effective operational scanning system. Top managers can influence 
this system only through the structural context of the firm that, as the writer has shown in 
this thesis, determine the nature of operational scanning.
By structural context, it means more than the way the boxes are located in the 
organisational chart. It includes both the formal structure and the emergent one. It also 
includes both permanent and temporary structures as well as formal and informal 
processes. It is the overall mechanism in the organisation that determines the flow of 
information, the process of decision making and the allocation of responsibilities.
The top management must involve its own map of how the structure affects the 
organisation’s ability to monitor key environmental attributes. In constructing this map, 
they can obtain relatively little help from theory or generalisations, for the map is highly
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situation-specific. It depends on the nature of the environment that the organisation 
faces, its niche within that environment, its key success factors and, above all, on the 
people who man the boxes in the organogram : the individuals, their strengths and 
weaknesses, their values and beliefs. In constructing this map what is important, 
therefore, is the top management's ability to identify the unique aspects of the firm rather 
than the general.
It is then the task of the top management, with appropriate staff help, to determine the 
extent of integration and differentiation (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) that should exist in 
different organisational sub-units. Such integration and differentiation, as has already 
been argued earlier on in this chapter, significantly affect the nature of operational 
scanning by individual managers in those sub-units. In some functions such as R&D and 
product development, broad base scanning with specific attention to activities and 
developments beyond the task environment may be essential. In certain other functions 
such as component production or assembly, more domain-focussed scanning may be 
more appropriate. Determining the more appropriate focus of operational scanning for 
each sub-unit depend not only on the nature of the external environment but also on the 
firm's strategy for, at a particular point of time, the strategic objectives with regard to 
each of the sub-units may be very different. Sub-units that can benefit from an exposure 
to the wider environment (and hence, from an increased perception of uncertainties), 
must be relatively overintegrated. In plainer language, this means that more lateral 
relations need to be created in those units through task forces and special terms; roles and 
functions of individuals must be left as relatively ambigious and overlapping, and a 
degree of slack must be made available in terms of resources such as management time 
and discretionary funds. On the other hand, sub-units that should be protected from such 
uncertainties should be relatively over-differentiated, with clear allocation of tasks and 
roles and with higher degree of task specification.
The Formal Scanning Unit
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An important aspect of designing the organisational scanning system is the creation of a 
coordinating and integrating mechanism that usually takes the form of a special scanning 
unit. In the introductory chapter, the writer has referred to the evidence that more and 
more firms, in the United States and elsewhere are creating such units. This leads to a 
number of questions that the top management of the firms must confront: what should be 
the role and functions of this unit and how should they be related to the rest of the 
organisation; how should the unit be structured; where in the organisation should it be 
lodged; and how should such a unit be staffed.
The principal suggestion that follows from the arguments developed in this thesis is that 
the role and functions of this department must be very different for the strategic and the 
operational scanning systems. For the strategic scanning system, this unit must have the 
primary responsibility for the entire intelligence function including acquisition of 
necessary information, their interpretation in terms of the strategic implications for the 
firm, and their communication to appropriate managers within the organisation. For the 
operational scanning system, in contrast, the primary role of this unit must be internal 
communication : it must act as an internal PABX for circulating the information inside the 
firm but the responsibility for both acquisition of information and for interpretation must 
lie with the line management. It has already been explained at length why this must be so 
and those argument need not be repeated.
A second suggestion that follows from the writer's observation in the Malaysian 
institutions is that two kinds of staff are required to manage the two components of the 
unit's functions. The strategic scanning task can benefit from the relevant managers 
having requisite analytical and technical backgrounds for knowing where to look for 
needed information and how to analyse and interpret it. Thus, "experts" such as trained 
economists, political scientists and technologists are useful for this task. The unit’s role
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as a communication node for the operational scanning system, on the other hand, can be 
best served by people who have a better understanding of the organisation and of its 
businesses. Experienced line managers rather than "experts" are, therefore, more useful 
for this component of its functions.
Understanding the differences between these two components of the scanning function is 
important for appropriately structuring each activity. An even more critical task, 
however, is the integration of the two components for maximum value adding, 
particularly through the synthesis and hypothesis generation processes. In both XYZ 
Berhad and ION, this was done through the mechanisms of scanning task forces. This 
approach, as argued in chapter ten, offer a number of benefits and organisations not 
having such a mechanism may find it worth emulating. But, clearly, there can be other 
ways to provide such integration and identification and evaluation of these mechanisms 
is an important research question that, along with the many others that the writer had 
raised along the way, must remain as tasks for future researchers.
Suggestion for Future Research
It is customary to conclude a thesis with suggestions about future research that emerge 
from the findings of the one being reported. If past history is any guide, it is perhaps 
also customary for such suggestions to be totally ignored.
Therefore, instead of providing a long list of things about scanning that may be 
interesting to know, the writer mentions here only two issues that he feels excited about 
and on which he hopes to do follow-up research in the near future.
First and foremost is the question of usefulness of scanning. In this study, the writer 
provides anecdotal evidence to show that a firm can benefit from both strategic and 
operational scanning. What, however, is required is a more systematic inquiry into the 
way the output of the scanning function is used (or not used) by the firm. For such an
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inquiry, historical reconstruction would suffice because of the many well known biases 
that such a methodology suffers from. Only a real time monitoring of how the decision 
makers utilise the information can provide reliable insights on this use process. And, 
only a longitudinal research design is appropriate for achieving this objective. Such an 
inquiry may show that different kinds of information are used to different extends under 
different circumstances. Understanding those contingencies can have extremely useful 
theoretical and practical implications.
The second question pertains to the issue of cost-effectiveness of scanning. In the 
scanning literature there seems to be an implicit assumption that more is always better. 
Perhaps, this follows from the role of information as signals and as symbols that has 
been pointed out by Fieldman and March (1981). Organisations are spending increasing 
amount of resources on the scanning function and often, given the nature of the task, the 
actual expenses are hidden and may be much more than imagined. Up to a certain level, 
acquiring environmental information and analysing them may provide positive value for 
the firm; beyond that level, scanning may not be cost-efficient. Certain kinds of scanning 
may be, in terms of the resources invested, be more productive than others. Under 
certain conditions - both of the environment and of the strategic position of the firm - 
more scanning may be required; under others a lot of the scanning efforts may be 
spinning wheel with no tangible benefits for the organisation. This is a question of great 
practical significance but an inquiry on this issue can also provide interesting theoretical 
insights about the organisational learning and adaptive processes.
The concept of information value added may be extremely useful for pursuing both lines 
of inquiry. In the writer's discussions with managers in Malaysia (during the field 
survey) and earlier on in the United States (when doing the MBA programme), it is this 
issue of value adding that has consistently emerged as a major concern both for top 
mangers who must decide on the resources to be invested for scanning, and for the 
special scanning staff who require some norms for evaluating their own work. Research
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on scanning has traditionally focussed on only the recognition process. But, as argued 
earlier, all the value adding processes are closely interlinked. To develop a better 
understanding of the benefits that a firm may derive from environmental scanning and 
also to make any prescriptive suggestions about how the activity should be organised, all 
the components of the value adding process need to be considered jointly and not in 
isolation.
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